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INTRODUCTION
Hugh Everett III is universally known as the father of Many Worlds Interpretation
(hereafter, ‘MWI’) of Quantum Mechanics (hereafter, ‘QM’).
Initially the MWI was considered as science fiction or total absurdity, however
over the last decades, Everett’s work has been strongly re-evaluated, becoming
Oxford’s ‘favorite’ interpretation of QM.
Oxonian supporters try to defend Everett interpretation mostly by demonstrat-
ing how it can give a precise, elegant, structured account of physical reality, no
matter how counterintuitive, because “ultimately, that a theory of the world is
‘unintuitive’ is no argument against it, provided it can be clearly described in
mathematical language. Our intuitions about what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘imaginable’
were designed to aid our ancestors on the savannahs of Africa, and the universe is
not obliged to conform to them” (Wallace 2010a, p. 69).
The majority of Everettian advocates feel comfortable with the proliferation of
worlds, pointing to the advantages of living in a multiverse rather than in a single,
illegible world, in which the radical dualism between classic, macroscopic reality
and quantum strange microscopic entities are never solved.
Today the trend is to read PWM realistically, up to its most incredible conse-
quences.
There are, it seems, good perspectives for future development of Everettian the-
ory, if one accepts the idea of radical, global multiplicity 1. Wallace expresses this
optimistic view in refferring to those “Everettian cautious about the ‘many-worlds’
label” saying: “come on in, the water’s lovely” (Wallace 2010a, p. 71).
But what was Everett’s original task?
And to what extent is it possible to attribute to Everett the idea of multiverse or
multiple worlds?
This is the first motivation of the present study, which is devoted mainly to the
1See the very latest developments in Hall, Deckert and Wiseman (2014).
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reconstruction of Everett’s original ideas and from which a justification of a new
reading is proposed.
Everettian literature divided into supportive and detractive. This division (more
or less) implicitly takes for granted that if one advocates an Everettian version of
QM, then one is opting for a realist, even metaphysical, interpretation of Everett’s
original formulation, that is, his Pure Wave Mechanics (hereafter, ‘PWM’).
On the other hand, if one does not believe in MWI, it is due to a strong commit-
ment of anti-realism. And this is a common view for both factions.
In other terms, even if Everett himself never proposed a metaphysical translation
for his PWM, it is considered to be a matter of fact that believing in this signifies
commitment to some sort of metaphysics of pluralism.
I argue that there is another possibility, and this was precisely Everett’s original
position.
The first chapter is devoted to reconstructing the genesis of Everettian ideas and
their circulation among the most prominent physicists and philosophers.
Everett came face to face with the mathematical contradiction between the linear
evolution of the Schro¨dinger equation and the discontinuous collapse dynamics,
brought about by a measurement, during his years at Princeton. His primary
task became that of formulating a solution for the so-called measurement problem.
Neither the von Neumann-Dirac formulation or Bohr’s solutions were satisfactory,
both assumed a substantial and irreducible dualistic nature of quantum dynamics.
The fundamental idea seemed to be the intrinsic dualistic division (the von Neu-
mann and Heisenberg cut) between a classic and a quantum world, which implied
an unacceptable reduction of quantum entities to the classical level of the ob-
server, because it is the observer who gives, via measurement and collapse, reality
to quantum states.
In 1954 Everett started working on his dissertation, aimed at finding a universal
account for QM, without postulating any sort of discontinuous change. Everett
tried to respond to a simple question: why not use mathematics to reveal the
world, instead of assuming that the world (a well defined portion of world) should
model the theory?
This is an old assumption, of course, and Everett clearly refers to a certain kind
of theory (from Copernican theory to Einsteinian Special Relativity) that takes
the explanation of perceived reality to be ‘revealed’ and ‘decoded’, rather than
offering a mere description of it: on more than one occasion Everett ascribes his
theory to this conceptual framework, stressing how science should always prove
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itself with the discovery of new phenomena.
His theory was simply QM taken with no extra postulates, to its strongest con-
sequences: but if formalism is taken without positing any kind of reduction or
mysterious jumps, this means that only the deterministic and linear evolution of
superposed initial states exists. Superposition is maintained even after measure-
ments, and probabilities are obviously no longer the reflection of some ontological
and objective feature of quantum world. Furthermore, all systems obey the same
quantum mechanical law, because they are constantly correlated (entangled) to
one another, regardless of their size.
For Everett this was the most natural way of solving the measurement problem,
and it was also the most natural way of conceiving the law which governed the
real world, because if QM is valid (and it has been richly demonstrated that it is)
it should be applicable to all systems, with no restrictions.
All restrictions, which in the end were resumed in the ‘principle of complementar-
ity’ seemed to derive from the anthropocentric assumption by which the (macro-
scopic) observer had a special status, whereas for Everett no matter the size of the
system, the status of observer was only a relational, temporary role.
Of course, there were important consequences: if superposition characterizes the
real, global quantum state, then all possible outcomes exist simultaneously, in a
way or another. The strange quantum jump was introduced in order to explain
singularity in observations, an even if contradictory, the multiple existence of dif-
ferent outcomes collides with the strength of evidence, which testifies determinate
outcomes after measurements.
John Wheeler, who was Everett’s supervisor, found his ideas brilliant, and useful
for applications in quantum gravity.
But Wheeler revered Bohr as his mentor, and he wanted positive feedback from
him. It will be shown how the strong rejection from the ‘Copenhagen Monocracy’
contributed to oblivion of Everett’s theory, and its author’s progressive abandon-
ment of work on foundations of QM2.
Princeton awarded Everett his PhD in Physics in April 1957. The presented ver-
sion had been cut and condensed, after Copenhagen disagreement. But by that
time, Everett had been doing top secret operations research for a year at the Pen-
tagon’s WSEG. He needed the doctorate to keep his job, so he had no choice but
to acquiesce to his supervisor’s editorial demands.
2See Byrne (2010b) for a brilliant biographical reconstruction.
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Everett’s ‘amended’ dissertation was published in 1957 as “Relative State formu-
lation of Quantum Theory”; the world of physics remained largely silent.
Everett’s attitude, reflecting his personality, was contradictory: on the one hand,
he was committed to a robust form of conservatism, in which mathematics is the
instrument for interpreting, and explaining, our perceived reality. This being the
reason that standard QM is unacceptable: the ‘exotic’ (von Neumann and Bohr’s)
cut between the reality of classic and macroscopic dimensions, and indeterminacy
of quantum entities was defined a “philosophical monstrosity”.
But, on the other hand, even if the only tenable justification of quantum world
turned out to be a deterministic, linear, explanation of quantum phenomena, the
price to pay was a theory based on superposition principle, and to the extension
of the most genuine quantum feature, i.e., entanglement, to all physical world.
So the resulting picture was a mixture of a deterministic conservative theory and
a globally extended quantum account of reality.
Without further elements for interpreting this dichotomy, critics moved toward
the direction of filling in the apparent gaps: there must be a missing piece, and it
should have the form of a metaphysically featured element; for those who wanted
to get engaged with “many-worlds” labeling, this was a challenge; for the more
standard QM-oriented minds, the idea of multiplicity was science fiction.
It was on this point that interpreters focused on seeking appropriate metaphysics
for PWM. And specifically, it was from the search of a metaphysical completion
that DeWitt’s version of MWI arose, becoming synonymous of Everett’s original
PWM.
This was something that Everett would never had accepted: even if tolerated in
discussion, the metaphysical featuring of PWM was, again, out of the domain of
empirical predictions. Indeed, for Everett what can be said about our physical
world is always bonded to a rigid form of empiricism, from which the extent of
what can be said is established by what can be perceived.
The fact that the evolution of the Everettian critique followed the search for meta-
physical completion derives from the singular primary circulation of Everettian
ideas, which was tied to Wheeler dictates, and from the succeeding re-evaluation
of Everett’s work by DeWitt-Graham3.
This of course does not mean that it is impossible to obtain an appreciable meta-
physics starting from a no-collapse, Everettian-modeled QM; this is the case, for
3See DeWitt and Graham (1973).
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example, of the most recent developments in decoherent versions of MWI (espe-
cially the emergent version proposed by Wallace (2010, 2012)).
But it has been pointed out that this kind of operation does not match Everett’s
original purposes.
This is precisely what the first chapter aims to demonstrate through an historical
analysis of Everett’s published and unpublished works4.
This study seeks to continue the understanding of Everett’s real thoughts regard-
ing physical theories in general, which is in itself a strong commitment to the
empiricist view of science, following which his theory appears to be quite different
to a metaphysics of plurality.
The picture that emerges from Everett’s PWM is surely misleading, at first sight:
if the collapse of the wave function is something mystical, and its unobservability is
simply unacceptable, how can we accept the idea of living in a constantly branch-
ing world, if we do not experience anything like such a prominent plurality?
The second chapter aims to show how Everett did not find any strangeness in
conceiving the global state of the world as a branching tree, because what really
counts is the description of perceived, relative state. If the theory is capable of
explaining the determinateness of our single outcomes without the introduction of
posited elements, then it could be considered empirically adequate.
Everett’s empiricism explains how surplus structure coming from the global model
has to be interpreted: construction of a single, all-embracing theory, applicable
to the entire universe derives from the desire of discover “new phenomena, which
involves the consideration of inductive inference and the factors which influence
our confidence in a given theory (to be applicable outside of the field of its formu-
lation)” (Everett1973a, p. 171).
What the model says about the global state of the world has to be considered un-
der the light of these convictions: all that can be required to a theory is empirical
faithfulness to our perceived reality, the model being a sort of regulative structure,
by which new phenomena could always be revealed.
Everett held a holistic vision of the world: there are continuously interacting sys-
tems, whose role depends on the perspective one decides to assume. That is, our
own state is always a relative state.
It is in this sense that Everett speaks about subjectivity of states: the real state
is the global state, while our relative state is locally, subjectively tied to a specific
4This kind of reconstruction follows suggestions of Barrett (2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012),
Osnaghi and Freitas (2009), Bevers (2011).
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measurement context.
I argue that in PWM there is a pragmatic criterion of selectivity in choosing which
aspect of a theory model has to be isomorphic to our perceived reality, similar to
that proposed by Van Fraassen (2008), in his pragmatic reading of structural em-
piricism, by which the space of a theory is always delimited by their users.
Observers will perceive determinateness and uniqueness of their states, but this is
just a local perspective: it will appear that only one single outcome occurs, be-
cause the state of the observer becomes entangled with the state of the observed
system, and probabilities will follow coefficients of the Born rule.
And that is the second problem with PWM: how is it possible to explain proba-
bilities? It has often said that probabilities lose their meaning, in a situation in
which all outcomes exist. In the third chapter an analysis of the problem is given.
The latest developments of probability in Everettian context aim to highlight the
subjective aspect of statistical assertions: decision-theoretic strategies (Deutsch
1999; Wallace 2003, 2007, 2010) are applied to Everettian agents, whose rational-
ity is defined as the adherence to Born rule in modeling actions.
In other words, an Everettian rational agent (who believes in PWM) will behave
as statistical assertions of standard QM were true, for operationalist purposes: he
will maximize expected utilities following the Born rule.
Even when an account of genuine objective chance is given in PWM (derived
from genuine ignorance of Everettian agents (Vaidman 1998; Saunders 2005, 2008,
2010a)), it is reduced to the subjective level. At the fundamental, global level
there are no stochastic features, because all branches exist.
Even if these approaches are very interesting and coherent with Everett’s under-
standing of probabilities as merely subjective, it seems that a bridging element
between the relative (subjective) and the global state is missing.
In the fourth chapter a solution is given for understanding probabilities in Ev-
erettian theory.
For Everett, the apparent uniqueness of observers and their continuity over time
could be easily explained again with correlation: it is thanks to correlation that
linear trajectory is observed, because systems states are entangled, and a time-
wise ordered sequence of states for a system could be defined by the correlation
model.
Almost all the linear trajectories over the global branching tree will be expression
of typical observers, who will exhibit results coherent with standard QM. ‘Typical’
here is the expression of the overwhelming majority.
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In this sense probability translates into a counting measure, which expresses branch
counting instead of a real stochastic selection of one single state.
Typicality is the recipe for interpreting covariance of statistical assertions with per-
ceived reality, and Everett refers to the analogous classical case: as the Lebesgue
measure is the more natural measure for defining trajectories over the phase space,
without any probabilistic significance, the same happens in PWM with the square
amplitude, which is the only measure which satisfies the additivity requirement (as
Lebesgue measure satisfies the Liouville’s theorem, i.e., conservation of probabili-
ties).
Furthermore, recent developments on the role of typicality in classical statistical
mechanics and in measure-theoretic dynamical systems in general seem to confirm
that a reading of probabilistic aspects as expressions of typical behavior rather
than genuinely stochastic features is possible: the only important characteristic of
probability theory is its mathematical aspect, which in Everett gives the basis for
a measure of branch counting.
Interpreting, as well as merely understanding, PWM is a challenge.
The present work is devoted to reconstructing Everett’s original thoughts and see-
ing to what extent it could be considered a self-compelling interpretation of QM,
without further metaphysical or mathematical insertions.
What emerges is a quantum holistic interpretation of the world, in which the
global state is a profound manifestation of the most important quantum element:
entanglement. The cost is the abandonment of the anthropocentric privileged ab-
solutisation of the relative state, which is taken as a local, relational manifestation.
Chapter 1
Back to ‘original’ Everett
Everett’s Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics is one of the most
famous and debated interpretations of Quantum Theory.
Everett’s genius lays in his recognition of the limits of standard QM that could be
resolved by assuming linear dynamics to be universal, without taking the collapse
postulate as an essential part of the universal description; in this way, determinate
experiences of observers are treated starting from a phenomenological perspective,
as subjective appearances. In other words, Everett PWM is QM taken ‘seriously’,
up to its most extreme consequences, as a good description of the physical world.
Everett’s theory is the first rejection of the collapse postulate, and most no-collapse
interpretations are directly inspired by or devoted to Everett’s original theory, in
one way or another, however it could be considered from new perspectives in its
own right: starting from an integrated historical and philosophical account, the
original theory appears in a new look. Here I would like to emphasize that Everett
never classified or explained how his theory was to be understood concretely, and
this was due in part to the historical contingencies in which the theory developed,
but mostly to his indifference to metaphysical and even philosophical debates: for
this reason a sort of ‘translation’ of his account into an ordinary language is not
given and without guidelines his theory appeared to be at the least arbitrary. I
aim to analyze the historical development of the theory in order to show that Ev-
erett was very aware of the sort of problems his theory could encounter, but the
fact that he was not concerned about speculative questions was simply due to his
strong commitment to a methodological empiricism.
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1.1 The theory grows: a universal explanation
for the universe
Everett’s theory is the first theory to attempt to take QM ‘literally’, as express-
ing the actual state of the physical world, without adding extra postulates, or
requiring ulterior interpretation. For this reason, it could be considered a pure
quantum theory, or better still a solely quantum theory, and not an interpretation
of formalism. As Wallace points out “‘Everett interpretation’ is just QM itself,
read literally, straightforwardly – naively, if you will – as a direct description of
the physical world, just like any other microphysical theory.” (Wallace 2012, p.
2).
Everett’s initial goal was to find a universal quantum mechanical explanation ap-
plicable to all physical systems, and ultimately to the entire universe. To do that,
Everett kept just that part of the standard quantum formalism expressing the lin-
ear dynamic evolution, and considered it to be a complete explanation of physical
reality, because up to then all attempts to formulate an acceptable interpretation
of standard formalism failed to be universal due to the inclusion of the collapse
postulate, which in addition introduced a stochastic element to the explanation1.
Everett’s reasoning seems to start with the main problem of QM, which under
these circumstances was a partial theory, namely the measurement problem. The
difficulties seemed to derive from the observation process, whereby collapse was
introduced. Observation was a metaphor of the irrecoverable cut between the
macroscopic state of observers and measured microscopic objects. For Everett,
instead, it was the collapse postulate which seemed to be a tool posted ad hoc,
introduced to justify the appearance of one singular outcome. For Everett this sit-
uation was untenable, because the theory did not explain in itself what it takes to
be considered a measuring system and even more so because all physical systems,
including measuring devices, are made up of microscopic entities at the end of the
day.
Everett assessed the existing quantum interpretations and, as he emphasized in
his long thesis, in none of them could he find a ‘literal’ version of formalism in
which collapse was excluded.
The main motivation that led Everett to propose his interpretation, as Everett
himself indicates in a letter to Jammer, was “to resolve what appears to me to be
1 See Saunders (2010a, p. 3): “[...] this is the only place where probabilities enter into
quantum mechanics”.
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inherent inconsistencies in the conventional interpretation. I was of course struck,
as many before and also many since, by the apparent paradoxes raised by the
unique role assumed by the measurement process in QM as it was conventionally
espoused. It seemed to me unnatural that there should be a “magic” process in
which something quite drastic occurred (collapse of the wave function), while in
all other times systems were assumed to obey perfectly natural continuous laws”.
(Everett 1973b). It was unacceptable for Everett that something magic, or mys-
tical2 could occur during a measurement, and this strong rejection is repeated in
his works.
There are two important events that probably inspired Everett in his work on QM:
the course in ‘Methods of Mathematical Physics’, taught by Eugene Wigner, and
Bohr’s public lecture, both took place in 1954.
Wigner used to question the standard interpretation in his classes. As Byrne re-
marks “there is little doubt that he had been discussing the problem with his
students for many years”3. As evidence of Wigner’s influence there is a handwrit-
ten draft of his dissertation in which Everett outlines Wigner’s friend’s dilemma;
moreover, a version of Wigner’s friend’s story is the starting case from which Ev-
erett develops his ideas in his long thesis4.
During his lecture Bohr explained his principle of complementarity. Talking with
his young colleague Charles Misner and Aage Petersen, who was Bohr’s assistant,
Everett recalled that his theory had crystallized during a drunken conversation
in his room. Everett himself reported this fact in a conversation with Misner:
“. . . It was because of you and Aage Petersen, one night at the Graduate College
after a slosh or two of sherry, as you might recall. You and Aage were starting
to say ridiculous things about the implications of QM and I was having a little
fun joshing you and telling you some of the outrageous implications of what you
said. . . ” (transcript, Everett and Misner 1977b).
Apart from nice anecdotic issues, the quotation underlines Everett’s feeling of dis-
agreement with standard interpretations of QM. This is also confirmed in a letter
to Jammer, in which Everett reports, in a more formal language, the same ideas
(Everett 1973b).
Starting from the measurement problem, Everett felt the need to find a universal
2 See Everett’s letter to DeWitt (1957d) as another example of emphasis on ‘mystical’ aspect
of observation in standard interpretations.
3 See Barrett and Byrne (2012, p. 12).
4See the draft and the other original manuscripts at UCISPACE archive
(http://ucispace.lib.uci.edu/handle/10575/1060).
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explanation which would embrace even observers treating them as physical sys-
tems.
Everett was inspired by conceptual and theoretical worries: his first aim was to
model observation as a normal, ordinary event, and to treat all physical systems
in the same way and with the same dynamical law: QM, with its predictive power,
has to be considered a universal law, because all physical systems are ultimately
constituted by particles governed by quantum interactions. A good and satisfac-
tory physical theory should be applicable to the entire universe, and QM makes
no exception.
1.1.1 The measurement problem
As mentioned, Everett firstly focused on the measurement problem.
Measurement was explained by the dissipation of superposition, and collapse pos-
tulate made its entrance into the theory in order to explain why we actually see
just one determinate outcome.
Firstly exposed as in its controversial implications by von Neumann (1932, transl.
1955), the measurement problem entailed the irreconcilability of a quantum me-
chanical description of reality with the classic account of our ordinary physical
world. Everett did not accept the limits of quantum mechanical explanations for
the measurement problem: he felt that classical-textbooks versions of QM, which
in the end derived from both Copenhagen interpretation and von Neumann-Dirac
description of the measurement problem, were worrying.
On the one hand Bohr’s explanation gave no reason for this special treatment of
macroscopic objects5.
The principle of complementarity was, using Everett’s words, a “philosophical
monstrosity”. Indeed, for Everett the fact that a physical theory aims to describe
a part of the world which is not actually real was at the very least nonsense. In a
letter to DeWitt he wrote:
The Copenhagen interpretation is hopelessly incomplete because it’s a pri-
ori reliance on classical physics (excluding in principle any deduction of
classical physics from quantum theory, or any adequate investigation of the
measuring process), as well as a philosophical monstrosity with a “reality”
5 See Faye (2014) for a more analytical description of Copenhagen Interpretation.
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concept for the macroscopic world and denial of the same for the microcosm.
(Everett 1957d).
On the other hand von Neumann’s description of the measurement problem firstly
recognized6 the “peculiar dual nature of quantum mechanical procedure which
could not be satisfactorily explained” (von Neumann 1955, p. 417), by which
after a measurement takes place we no longer have a linear superposition of en-
tangled states of measured object-measuring apparatus.
That is, the reduction of the wave packet expressed in a collapse.
Both the standard von Neumann-Dirac and the Copenhagen formulations encoun-
tered different but related difficulties. While with the first account the collapse of
the wave function is simply posed, and we cannot explain how measurement de-
vices are to be treated within quantum explanation, with the latter we are obliged
to stipulate that measurement interactions can be understood by supposing that
a classical measuring device has a special status, our reality being dramatically
divided into two irreconcilable parts. For this reason the standard formalism fails
to provide a quantum mechanical understanding of the measurement process: our
classical world seems to be the ‘true’ reality, and deserves a classical explanation,
while the quantum world simply does not gain existence until a measurement oc-
curs. For Everett, both formulations lead to the same contradictions.
The main problem arises from the understanding of the status of the observer
during the measurement process: if we think of a measurement as a cut between
a classical object and a quantum mechanical element, then we are faced with the
difficulty of understanding what an observer really is, because we cannot use the
same quantum description for both elements of an observation.
Both in his long thesis and the short version Everett uses von Neumann language,
i.e. external observation language7.
6 See Krips (2010): “By embedding the quantum mechanics within the formal theory of
Hilbert spaces, von Neumann provided the first rigorous axiomatic treatment of QM by it within
the formalism of Hilbert spaces. He also allowed a new conceptual architectonic to emerge
from within the theory itself rather than following Heisenberg, Bohr, and Einstein who imposed
a system of concepts a priori. Von Neumann also intervened decisively into the measurement
problem. Summarizing earlier work, he argued that a measurement on a quantum system involves
two distinct processes that may be thought as temporally contiguous stages”.
7 Note that the external observation formulation is also used in a quantum cosmological
context (see for example Smolin 2008), in which a single quantum state (or a single Hilbert
space) for the universe is not a sufficient description for a close system. In this context, complete
information is given by the sum of partial and incomplete, but mutually compatible, information
of quantum state descriptions of all the possible observers (the boundary between the part of
the universe that is considered the observed system and the part that is considered the observer
may be chosen arbitrarily, so the split is relativized). This is a class of interpretations based
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For von Neumann “we therefore have two fundamentally different types of inter-
vention which can occur in a system S” (von Neumann 1955, p. 351); Everett
refers to Process 1 and Process 2, using von Neumann’s words.
Process 1 indicates “the arbitrary changes by measurement” (von Neumann 1955,
p. 351). Everett describes it as “the discontinuous change brought about by the
observation of a quantity with eigenstates ϕ1, ϕ1, in which state ϕ will be changed
to state ϕj with probability |(ϕ, ϕj)|2” (Everett 1973a, p. 3). Process 2 is de-
scribed as “the automatic changes which occur with the passage of time” (von
Neumann 1955, p. 351).
Everett reports: “The continuous, deterministic change of state of the (isolated)
system with time according to a wave equation ∂ϕ
∂t
=
⋃
ϕ, where ∪ is a linear
operator” (Everett 1973a, p. 3).
The first process describes a measurement and implies a random collapse, while
Process 2 describes the deterministic evolution of a system unless a measurement
occurs.
The ‘measurement problem’ arises from the conflict between these two dynamical
laws, and this incompatibility reflects the aforementioned ‘cut’ between the quan-
tum mechanical description of observed systems on one hand, and observers, that
are treated externally, on the other hand8.
Under these respects, a measurement should be considered as a special event, which
represents a final division between our macroscopic classical world and the quan-
tum microstate, and furthermore it introduces a stochastic account in physical
explanation.
As Saunders has well resumed, the collapse cannot be seen as something primitive,
or inevitable, because it is under-specified: the time is undefined, and the criteria
for the kind of collapse are “strange” (Saunders 2010a, p. 3).
For Everett the main problem however is concerned with the connection between
observers and the theory. Observers are treated as external to the measurement
process, and problems related to this kind of arbitrary cut are even more evident
on Everett which give a relational account of quantum mechanics (Rovelli 1996) mostly applied
to quantum cosmology. It must also be noted that Everett himself refers to a real global state,
intending a close state (an isolated state) for the universe, but he never declined this into a
detailed description of how conceiving it in practice (in other words, conceptually speaking, the
only isolated state is thought for the only close system, the universe, for which, conceptually
there cannot be an external observer).
8 See Barrett (2010, p. 226): “if we suppose that measuring devices are physical systems like
any other, then the standard collapse theory is inconsistent because the incompatible laws might
be applied to the same evolution; on the other hand, if measuring devices are somehow special,
the standard theory is incomplete since it does not tell us what interactions should count as
measurements”.
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if the existence of more than one observer is allowed.
But if we want QM to provide a universally valid explanation we should consider
a situation including one or more, rather than one, observers, because that is the
constitution of the universe. Exteriority of observers should be applied to ob-
servers with respect to their role, which is relative, and not with respect to the
theory: while Everett uses external observation formulation, he simply refuses to
treat observers themselves as external to the theory: he allows that a system has
occasionally the role of observer, regardless to his size9.
1.1.2 How to model observations: Everett’s solution
In order to avoid this incompatibility, Everett starts from a new account of mea-
surement that does not postulate any sort of discontinuous change, because every
object is treated as internal to the theory. After a short revision of the alternatives
to the measurement paradox, none of which could be considered tenable, Everett
introduced his own alternative10:
Alternative 5: To assume the universal validity of the quantum descrip-
tion, by the complete abandonment of Process 1. The general validity
of PWM, without any statistical assertions, is assumed for all physical
systems, including observers and measuring apparatus. Observation
processes are to be described completely by the state function of the
composite system which includes the observer and his object system,
and which at all times obeys the wave equation (Process 2). (Everett
1973a, p. 4).
His theory has some important virtues:
9 As Barrett points out: “the problem with the standard collapse theory, according to Everett,
was that it required observers always to be treated as external to the system described by the
theory, one consequence of which was that it could not be used to provide a consistent physical
description of the universe as a whole since the universe contains observers” (Barrett 2012, p.
5).
10 Everett provides an overview of some alternatives to the measurement paradox at the
beginning and comments them in the ‘Discussion’, at the end of the long thesis.
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• Universal validity : the existence of more than one observer is allowed; this
also implies completeness, because Everettian QM is applicable to the entire
universe, since there are no isolated systems (apart from universe itself) 11;
• Psycho-physical parallelism: every object could be considered a good ob-
server depending on its relative position, regardless of whether he is human
or a servomechanism12;
• Deduction of classical phenomena: our world is not to be divided into classic
and quantum, only the first receiving the status of reality13, because reality
itself is composed by microscopic entities;
• Simplicity : no extra postulate or ad hoc assumptions have to be posted14;
• Determinism: Everettian QM ensures a deterministic explanation because
the only stochastic element, that is the collapse postulate, is unnecessary15.
11 At the end of the long thesis Everett refers to the “popular interpretation” as the position
by which the wave function expresses the objective features of the system, but, because its
state discontinuously changes under observation, it could be assumed just starting by a ‘solipsist
position’, since only if there is just one observer the system’s dynamics could be explained
without introducing the collapse postulate. On the other hand Everett’s theory has the great
advantage of explaining the linear dynamics without reducing to a solipsism, because the only
isolated system is taken to be the whole universe (Everett 1973a, p. 110).
12 Everett refers to the psycho-physical parallelism in commenting Bohr’s interpretation: “And
to draw the line at human or animal observers, i.e., to assume that all mechanical apparata obey
the usual laws, but that they are somehow not valid for living observers, does violence to the
so-called principle of psycho-physical parallelism, and constitutes a view to be avoided, if possible
To do justice to this principle we must insist that we be able to conceive of mechanical devices
(such as servomechanisms), obeying natural laws, which we would be willing to call observers”
(Everett 1973a, p. 7).
13 Everett clearly refers to Copenhagen interpretation. See for example the end of the long
thesis, in which Everett criticizes the “strong reliance upon the classical level from the outset,
which precludes any possibility of explaining this level on the basis of an underlying quantum
theory. (The deduction of classical phenomena from quantum theory is impossible simply because
no meaningful statements can be made without pre-existing classical apparatus to serve as a
reference frame.) This interpretation suffers from the dualism of adhering to a “reality” concept
(i.e., the possibility of objective description) on the classical level but renouncing the same in
the quantum domain” (Everett 1973a, p. 111).
14 This is referred to ‘hidden variables’ theories. It could sound strange prima facie that
Everett is adopting something like Occam’s razor, since it is one of the first and more frequent
objections that his theory had received (for example see DeWitt 1957), but in his opinion,
proliferation of non-necessary entities has to be read respect to the theory, and not in what the
theory could ‘create’ in a metaphysical sense. See the next chapter for a clarification of everettian
methodological empiricism.
15 Everett (1973a, p. 114) refers to ‘stochastic interpretations’ (Bopp). He also intends that
determinism is not a necessary requirement, but because his interpretation ensures a determin-
istic account, it is also preferable (a discussion of everettian requirements for physical theories
in general will be addressed in the next chapter).
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Everett was thinking of a unitary explanation, with which one can explain both
macroscopic and microscopic reality, without adding extra-postulates through
which the theory would become partial. Such a description entails that observers
are treated as physical systems, independently of their own nature, and observa-
tion, via measurements, does not represent a special event. Measuring systems
have to be treated quantum mechanically, because if the theory does not provide
a different account for observers while positing it, it will lose its explicative power.
In this sense, there are just interconnected systems, and the state of an isolated
system is simply nonsense. So the entire universe could be explored with the same
wave mechanics. Determinism follows as a consequence of having removed this
special status of observation (namely the stochastic element).
This means that if one wants to formulate a good physical theory, one should be
motivated by the purpose of finding a universal explanation, which is character-
ized by all-encompassing: physics is nothing other than a description of reality,
meaning reality in its totality; so if one wants to formulate a good physical theory,
then all physical systems have to be described by the same theory. QM in this
respect has to be taken as universal, otherwise we would accept a drastic division
between a classic and a quantum world, a division that implies ontological and
epistemic separation.
Classic external observation has to be rejected, because there is no such thing as
an isolated system: the universe is composed of interacting and connected systems.
So, if a system interacts with a quantum object, it has to be treated within the
same framework: this implies that during an interaction an observer system be-
comes entangled with the observed system, and, following linear dynamics, what
one obtains is a superposition of states, each expressing a possible outcome.
Entanglement is one of the basis of Everett’s theory: composite systems are al-
ways entangled, and “by its very nature, entanglement can arise only in composite
systems – those that consist of two or more parts” (Barbour 2000, p. 222).
If one applies entanglement to the entire universe, and if one takes, as Everett
does, both observers and observed elements as described only by the deterministic
linear law, without postulating any sort of cut during the measurement, then one
obtains a universal explanation in which collapse disappears16.
16 See Barbour (2000, p. 222): “an essential element of the many-worlds interpretation as it
is now almost universally understood is that the universe can and must be divided into at least
two parts – an observing part and an observed part. However, Everett himself looked forward to
the application of his ideas in the context of unified field theories, ‘where there is no question of
ever isolating observers and object systems. They are all represented in a single structure, the
field”’.
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So entanglement and universality are the simple ideas at the very basis of ev-
erettian QM.
Everett drops the collapse postulate, Process 1, from the Standard Formulation of
QM, then he deduces the empirical predictions of the standard collapse theory as
the subjective experiences of observers who are themselves treated as physical sys-
tems described by the theory. He calls his theory Pure Wave Mechanics (PWM),
because the dynamic evolution of the involved systems follows the linear evolution
as described in Process 2.
This implies that the superposition principle is maintained even after measure-
ment, because “in general a composite system cannot be represented by a single
pair of subsystem states, but can be represented only by a superposition of such
pairs of subsystem states” (Everett 1973a, p. 9).
We can describe S2 as a measuring device M , while S1 is a measured object. Then
the evolution of a composite system S + M , where system S is measured by a
system M , will be described by:
∑
i
aiφ
S
i ϕ
M
0 →
∑
i
aiφ
S
i ϕ
M
i = Ψ
SM .
We look at two systems, S1 and S2, with associated Hilbert spaces H1 and H2, as a
unique composite system S, whose Hilbert space can be written as a tensor product
of H1 ⊗ H2. So the state of S can be written as a superposition of orthonormal
sets of states
{
ξS1i
}
and
{
ηS2j
}
for S1 and S2, respectively
17:
ΨS =
∑
ij
aijξ
S1
i ⊗ ηS2j
Although S is in a definite state, S1 and S2 do not possess a definite single state
18.
We can describe S2 as a measuring device M , while S1 is a measured object. Then
the evolution of a composite system S + M , where system S is measured by a
system M , will be described by:
∑
i
aiφ
S
i ϕ
M
0 →
∑
i
aiφ
S
i ϕ
M
i = Ψ
SM .
17I am using formalism of the short thesis (Everett 1957b, p. 143).
18 Everett remarks “except in the special case where all but one of the aij are zero” (Everett
1957b, p. 143), maintaining the eigenvalue-eigenstate link.
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which is not a state that describes an observer having one particular result19.
The situation is always the same, for all kinds of interactions, regardless of the
size of the object.
There is nothing special in quantum measurement, because there is nothing special
in the quantum world. Instead of thinking of a measurement as a special event,
Everett takes linear wave mechanics as a complete description of the real state of
a physical system, while collapse serves for phenomenological explanations, with
probabilities expressing subjective appearances. So collapse is confined to a sub-
jective level, in a relational context. This means that it could be considered as
a valid explanation of a contextualized situation, and just for practical and oper-
ationalist purposes, but it does not translate into the only reality, to the extent
that reality is to be taken as completely expressed by universal wave function. So
collapse, which is the source of all evils, is just a mathematical tool, an opera-
tionalist instrument. Our experiences then have to be deduced in some way from
the universal state:
Since the universal validity of the state function description is asserted, one
can regard the state functions themselves as fundamental entities, and one
can even consider the state function of the whole universe. In this sense this
theory can be called the theory of the “universal wave function”, since all
of physics is presumed to follow from this function alone. There remains,
however the question as to whether or not such a theory can be put into
correspondence with our experience. (Everett 1973a, p. 6).
This means that collapse should be interpreted simply as a subjective experience,
and the state of a measured object, together with the state of the observer is a
relative state, while the global state is expressed by the universal wave function.
Everett introduces the ‘Relative State’ formulation to explain how it is possible to
see just one of the superposed outcomes, all possibilities being equally real. The
relative state expressed by the singular outcome is a phenomenological appearance,
or better still, an epiphenomenon. Reality as it is perceived is just the expression
of correlations, and we can look at it from different, interconnected experiences;
but, at a universal level what matters, what counts as fundamental, is the universal
state. So the relative state is only an aspect of the fundamental level, but globally
19 It needs an important remark here: it has been noted that, even if there is no mention of
it, in this form of notation there is an implicit use of Ehrenfest’s theorem (even if Everett made
no mention of it), which is the basis of decoherence (Saunders 2010a, p. 39). Decoherence will
be discussed at the end of the present chapter.
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the symmetry is maintained. In order to give an account of our predictions, the
theory should provide a mechanism through which we can justify our experiencing
determinate records: if we want to accept the theory as a universal account of
the world, starting from where we look at our state as a partial, relative state, we
should ensure that our results are confirmed by the predictions of the theory.
So the theory should also provide an account from which we can construct our
relative states and in which we can find ourselves as experiencing our determinate
outcomes.
Using the above formalism, we can always deduce the relative state of a system
S2 once we choose a state for S1: this means that starting from the state of the
composite system S we simply choose a state for S1, for example ξk, and then we
assign a relative state to S2:
Ψ (S2; rel ξk, S1) = Nk
∑
j
akjn
S2
j ,
where Nk is a normalization constant
20.
It follows that we can always represent the composite system S as a single super-
position derived from the choice of one relative state for the components S1 and
S2:
ψS =
∑
i
1
Ni
ξS
1
i ψ(S2; relξi, S1).
This implies that the state after a measurement is always superposed: using Ev-
erett’s words, the state “splits” in different states, each of which expresses a cor-
related observer-observed object state with an apparently determinate state. But
there is nothing like a determinate state at this level, because the only determinate
state is the final superposition. Rather than a linear trajectory, the final state is
represented by a “branching tree”.
Relative state formulation provides a good explanation for our outcomes, but as
Everett himself noted “this indefinite behavior seems to be quite at variance with
our observations, since physical objects always appear to us to have definite posi-
tions” (Everett 1957b, p. 457).
It is important that the theory could explain why a typical observer, with any
sort of memory configuration, perceives a determinate record, and remembers it,
in situations in which other measurements are performed, or the same measure-
ment is repeated. The superposition principle implies that each element is in an
20 Everett specifies that “this relative state for ξk is independent of the choice of basis (ξk) (ik)
for the orthogonal complement of ξk alone” (Everett 1957b, p. 456).
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eigenstate of the observation, and the observer-system state describes the observer
as having the perception of that particular observed system-state. Furthermore, a
typical element of the final superposition appears to perceive an apparently ran-
dom sequence of definite results for the observations, and also that his memory
states are correlated, i.e. he possesses a memory configuration in which the earlier
memory coincides with the later.
Probabilistic assertions of Process 1 appear to be valid for a typical element of the
final superposition.
To a certain extent it can be said that the principle of complementarity is in-
verted. Human knowledge is surely limited to collapse postulate meaning that
superposition cannot be experienced in its totality, so collapse is a phenomenolog-
ical explanation in this sense. Our knowledge is still classical, simply because all
the objects that we see have classical features; they are, nonetheless, in superposi-
tion, but we cannot see that. In this light, looking at the world through classical
‘glasses’ means just looking from a partial perspective, namely focusing on one
specific outcome, the fundamental level being the final wave function21.
With PWM the measurement problem is resolved, because all the systems involved
in the measurement process follow the same law for the dynamical evolutions. But
in dropping the collapse, the standard explanations for determinate measurement
records and usual quantum statistics are untenable. The determinate-record and
probability problems, respectively, are the problems of providing replacement ex-
planations for determinate measurement records and quantum statistics in PWM
without appealing to Process 1.
1.1.3 Traditional problems with Pure Wave Mechanics
It has often been said that at least prima facie Everett encountered challenging
difficulties, a classic Everettian problem became: the determinate record problem
and the probability problem, which resist up to the last accounts of the Everett
theory, but solutions do not find consensus among physicists or philosophers.
The determinate record problem addresses the difficulty in finding an explanation
for one specific outcome, when the theory entails all outcomes being equally real
21 See ‘’Macroscopic objects and classical mechanics” and “Amplification process” (Everett
1973a, p. 86 and 90) for a more detailed explanation of how our knowledge is to be intended
as ‘classical’; see also Saunders (2010a, p. 8) for a brief introduction to decoherence in PWM,
which is the last trend in interpreting how classic macroscopic world emerges from quantum
microphysics (decoherence will be discussed later in detail).
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(apart from the arbitrary choice of one specific quantity to be measured, and a
relative specific decomposition of the general superposition, i.e. the preferred basis
choice, which has been solved with decoherence22), while the probability problem
addresses the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of probability in a context in
which all possibilities occur23.
Everettians have always moved in the direction of filling in the missing details,
giving rise to a large variety of ‘interpretations of Everett’s interpretation’24: the
‘bare theory’25, ‘splitting worlds’26, ‘decohering histories’27, ‘relative facts’28, ‘sin-
gle minds’ and ‘many minds’29, ‘many threads’30 and the latest developments of
decoherence and emergent worlds31. Such interpretations of PWM are interest-
ing in their own right, but they do not necessarily blend well with Everett’s own
views. These approaches became the history of Everett’s own view, and lately
they appear to be very different from the original recipe.
As Barrett points out32, there are significant reasons to distinguish Everett’s own
interpretation, or theory33, of QM from other interpretations that generate from
it, because Everett’s interpretation is distant from the overwhelming majority of
the theories that inspired to him.
I feel that the main problems derived at the beginning in a certain vagueness that
affects speech in the splitting process. When a measurement occurs, superposition
implies that there will be different entangled states for the observed system and
22 See Barrett (1999) and Butterfield (1996) for a description of the preferred basis problem.
From the 1980s onwards decoherence theory is considered the solution to the problem of defi-
niteness (i.e., the definition of the decomposition of the wavefunction). The basic idea is that
dynamical processes imply emergence, rather than specification a priori, of a particular basis
(interference between processes described by separate terms of the decomposition is negligible).
See Wallace (2003, 2010, 2012), Bacciagaluppi (2012) and Saunders (2010a) for more details on
decoherence.
23 See Barrett (1999), and Bacciagaluppi (2013) for a detailed discussion.
24 It was common idea that Everett interpretation ‘stands for an interpretation’ (see for ex-
ample Barrett, 1999).
25 See Geroch (1984), Albert and Loewer (1988), Albert (1992), Barrett (1999).
26 See DeWitt (1970).
27 See Gell-Man and Hartle (1990).
28 See Saunders (1995, 1996, 1998).
29 See Albert and Loewer (1988), Lockwood (1989).
30 See Barrett (1999).
31 See Zeh (1970), Zureck (1991), the aforementioned Gell-Man and Hartle (1990) and the
Saunders-Wallace approach (Saunders 2010a, Wallace 2010a, 2012).
32 See Barrett (2011a, p. 1).
33 Wallace makes a distinction between the term ‘interpretation’ and ‘theory’, advocating that
the former has had unfortunate consequences in the philosophy of physics, contributing to the
idea that there is one theory and many possible interpretations, limiting the discussion to the
research of the correct one. This is not the case for everettian QM, which is QM “taken literally”
(Wallace 2012, p. 3).
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observer: so the unique initial state splits into different states, following a ramified
(like a ‘branching tree’) trajectory.
Everett did not characterize in a philosophical sense the splitting process: what
is missing I believe is a clear and explicit translation of branching process into a
more detailed and accessible language. Everett says nothing about how to feature
the splitting process: by which I mean that we do not really know what kind of
entities are involved, and what kind of ontological nature we should ascribe to
them; this is the underlying problem from which determinate record and proba-
bility problems arose (and this will be precisely the problem I will analyze in the
next chapters). Of course, the fact that Everett never claimed to have deduced
the existence of splitting worlds from a version of PWM does not mean that it is
impossible to do so. But whether and to what extent such a deduction might be
possible depends on what metaphysical assumptions one takes to be properly in-
cluded in a full statement of PWM. This is how the story went from the beginning
and throughout the following thirty years.
More generally it is not clear how the connection between the theory and what the
theory says about how the world is to be interpreted. Sceptical visions underlined
how the connection of formalism with reality was not at all obvious, because a
mere mathematical tool (i.e., the mere formalism) has nothing to do with reality
itself. In the formalism there is no trace of this connection and this is the reason
why a lot of work has been done in the direction of finding the missing piece of
Everett’s interpretation.
1.2 Historical analysis of the reception of PWM:
from oblivion to rediscovery
In this sense Everett’s interpretation has been misunderstood for years. As Harvey
reported to Everett (Harvey 1977), Jammer called it “one of the best kept secrets
of this century”.
I believe that a new reading of Everett is necessary, and in some respects it is ‘in
the air’: a ‘re-reading’ of the genuine original account, that I will from now on
call the original core, that consists of bare formalism (PWM, with the rules for
relative states construction), the deductions of determinate-records and probabil-
ities, namely our classic perceived reality, and Everett’s own strong convictions
about the requirements and standards that make a physical theory a good theory,
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recently fortified by new documentation, that sheds light on how the scheme is to
be understood.
The fact that this kind of analysis is still in nuce derives from the vicissitudes
related to the historical development and circulation of Everettian ideas, and to
Everett’s apparent indifference to most theoretical (and sometimes metaphysical)
problems.
This kind of approach is in an embryonic stage, and not yet crystallized, but I feel
that it should became a methodological prerequisite. Indeed a deeper reading of
Everettian assumptions explains at least why he considered them self-compelling
and complete.
Reconstruction of Everett’s original thinking is important for two reasons: finding
the original core should be considered an essential starting point. Furthermore,
the original core now reconstructed might appear to be astonishingly interesting
in its own right, as well as self-contained in some important elements.
Everett’s theory has been rejected, disdained and forgotten for thirty years.
The most common opinion was that his theory was just science fiction. It is only
since the late eighties that the debate on Everett’s theory has been reignited receiv-
ing wide consensus. The recent discovery of the “basement treasure”34, consisting
of unpublished notes, correspondence and manuscripts, has allowed a deeper and
more complete reading of Everett’s theory, and a better understanding of the
theoretical framework. Thanks to this recent and illuminating discovery we can
now see Everett’s reaction to the rejection of his theory, but also clarify how even
though Everett abandoned QM, he continued to considered his theory a complete
theory up to the time of his death.
This new perspective, together with Everett’s empiricist account of scientific theo-
ries in general may be useful in understanding why Everett advocated completeness
for his theory. This would be an integrated historic-philosophical approach which
I assume is very important in understanding PWM, because it will be clear that
his empiricism was a very strong assumption.
I will develop the consequences of the new starting point in the next chapters,
while in the present chapter I want to underline how metaphysical speculation,
which was the very first reading and which to some extent influenced later devel-
opments, in trying to fill in the missing splitting process description, even though
it was not Everett’s purpose, attached to PWM.
34 This unpublished works are available online at UCISPACE (University of California Irvine)
under the address http://hdl.handle.net/10575/1060, and in the brilliant volume edited by Bar-
rett and Byrne (2012).
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Once clarified that Everett’s work has suffered from a certain degree of misunder-
standing, it becomes important to understand why, and whence this feeling arises.
As said above, the most robust misunderstanding comes from the lack of a detailed
account of the splitting process, or better splitting in itself35: this is the reason
why interpreters focused on understanding how branching should be intended, as-
suming that it was a structural absence to be filled with some kind of metaphysical
structure.
What is the subject (or the object) of a splitting process? When does a splitting
precisely occur? What happens afterwards and, above all, why don’t we perceive
anything as a splitting?
These questions moved both Everettians and detractors of PWM to formulate the
classic problems discussed above.
There are both practical and theoretical reasons as to why Everett did not speak
about splitting in a more detailed form.
If we take into consideration the historical and biographical reconstruction of
Everett’s work, recently developed (Barrett and Byrne 2012), we can see how
Wheeler, who was Everett’s advisor, pushed his pupil into mitigating his ideas and
his exposition in order not to offend Copenhagen ‘Monocracy’. From a practical
point of view, when giving his explanation and speaking about splitting Everett
mitigated his opinion, even when proposing it in a metaphorical context, to avoid
offending Bohr’s authority.
Wheeler himself wavered all his life regarding Everett’s theory, fluctuating more
towards the opinions of authority than his own convictions. His position oscillated
between a strong acceptance of Everett’s theory on the one hand, and devoted
reverence to Bohr, who was his mentor, on the other36.
Everett decided to work on foundations in his doctoral dissertation. He started
working on it in 1956, and in his correspondence to Wheeler he presented his the-
ory to him.
Wheeler recognized that Everett’s theory was a challenge to authority, but he was
also convinced that the theory could serve to quantum gravity37, on which he was
working. He also knew that paying lip service to Bohr’s authority was a necessary
35 As a matter of fact, it has to be said that Everett described the process, and branching
‘machinery’ very well. What is missing is a more concrete account, an image of what the world(s?)
looks like after the branching process takes place.
36 Misner reported (transcript, Everett and Misner 1977a) that Wheeler ironically said to
believe in Everett’s theory “except on Tuesday, once a month” because “he has to reserve one
day a week to disbelieve in it”.
37 See Wheeler’s assessments to the long thesis and the correspondence with Everett (Wheeler
1956a, 1956b, 1956c).
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requirement for its diffusion and acceptance.
Looking at the theory from an historical perspective, Wheeler’s decisions regarding
Everett’s theory (for example the decision to mitigate metaphorical expressions,
cut the most original parts, and to eliminate the most evident polemic nuances
against Copenhagen interpretation) derived from the necessity to render his the-
ory acceptable, and above all ‘accepted’.
Wheeler’s devotion to Bohr is even clearer if one considers the development of the
thesis: the first version had been cut in its more brilliant parts after Bohr’s ipse
dixit, and the refined and cut version of the long thesis, published as “The Relative
State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics”, is the result of this operation38.
Nonetheless, Everett’s original task was obvious even after being mitigated with
Wheeler’s advice of using it in order to justify quantum gravity, both in the in-
troduction of the short version and in Wheeler’s assessments. And its reception,
however, was a disaster.
So the only circulating version of Everett’s theory was that of the short thesis,
and it was from that version that all his problems arose.
If the publication of the short version did not help Everett with its immediate
reception, Copenhagen’s strong rejection and the theory’s subsequent oblivion for
a long period did not help in the long run.
Copenhagen’s approach to Everett’s theories was both conservative and ‘aggres-
sive’. In 1959 Everett met Bohr in Copenhagen to discuss the thesis; it was “a hell
of a. . . doomed from the beginning”39, and determined Everett’s final abandon-
ment of working on the foundations of QM, as well as Wheeler distancing himself
from PWM.
Moreover, its subsequent recovery with DeWitt did not improve things much, be-
cause the theory was presented as a Many Worlds Interpretation, with a definitive
label that went far beyond the Author’s intents.
Apart from the necessity to formulate the theory in a way that would obtain the
consensus of Copenhagen, Everett did not feel that the use of a more evocative
language was necessary to the theory in itself. The relative state formulation was
38 The long thesis was organized around the measurement problem and its solution, whereas
the short thesis presented a theory suitable for the development of quantum gravity, cosmology
and field theory. The short thesis no longer contains the chapter on information theory and
correlation, Everett’s survey of possible solutions to the measurement problem, and his extended
discussion of the nature of physical theories. What remains is a distilled presentation of Everett
PWM, his principle of the fundamental relativity of states, and his derivation of the standard
quantum statistics.
39 Everett reported his meeting with Bohr in these terms to Misner (transcript, Everett and
Misner 1977a).
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a self compelling explanation of the world, without a metaphysical assumption:
there is evidence that Everett believed that his PWM gave a complete, descriptive
interpretation, for him his theory was logically and ontologically self-contained,
but the singular way in which he addressed problems has led interpreters to think
that his theory is incomplete and requires filling in with some important details.
But, back to the main question, which kind of entities are the subject of splitting
process?
There are substantially two possibilities40, which have been advocated down the
years, and which depend upon the metaphysics one wants to defend:
• Splitting process is referred to observers : that is, this solution is proposed
by those who want to take the boundary between our (classic) knowledge
and microscopic (quantum) world as a matter of consciousness, mind, infor-
mation. Anti-realist welcome this solution. Of course, this approach leaves
the question of psychophysical parallelism open, which was one of Everett’s
first tasks;
• Splitting process is referred to metaphysical entities (more or less, worlds-
like entities): there is a constantly branching universe, composed of (slightly)
different copies of our perceived world at each time. The problem here is
that to justify the passage between our classic world and the (unperceived)
proliferation of quantum copies of it.
As it will be shown, there are significant reasons to refuse that one of these decli-
nations was Everett’s original intention.
1.2.1 Splitting observers
There are few places in which Everett himself speaks about the branching, or
splitting process.
References to splitting observers can be found in his notes and early drafts, and
at least some of the language about splitting observers can be found in even the
final version of his PhD thesis:
40See Saunders (2010a, p. 4).
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Consequently we have a theory which is objectively causal and continuous,
yet at the same time subjectively probabilistic and discontinuous. The the-
ory can lay claim to a certain completeness, since it applies to all systems,
of whatever size, and it can also give an explanation of the appearance
of the macroscopic world. The price, however, is the abandonment of the
concept of the uniqueness of the observer, with its somewhat disconcerting
philosophical implications. (Everett 1957b).
As mentioned above Everett focused on the role of observers from the very be-
ginning of his work on the foundations of QM. As we have seen above, the first
problem was formulating a quantum theory capable of explaining a world that
contained more than one observer. In a handwritten list containing several hy-
potheses for the title of the thesis title, we find for example “QM in a world of
independent observers,” “inclusion of all observers into the machinery of QM,”
and “the multi-observer form of QM,” (1955a).
In a short paper addressed to Wheeler, in which Everett preliminarily faced the
problem of the splitting process we find a very evocative metaphor:
As an analogy one can imagine an intelligent amoeba with a good memory.
As time progresses the amoeba is constantly splitting, each time the result-
ing amoebas having the same memories as the parent. Our amoeba hence
does not have a life line, but a life tree. The question of the identity or non
identity of two amoebas at a later time is somewhat vague. At any time
we can consider two of them, and they will possess common memories up
to a point (common parent) after which they will diverge according to their
separate lives thereafter. We can get a closer analogy if we were to take one
of these intelligent amoebas, erase his past memories, and render him un-
conscious while he underwent fission, placing the two resulting amoebas in
separate tanks, and repeating this process for all succeeding generations, so
that none of them would be aware of their splitting. After a while we would
have a large number of individuals, sharing some memories with one an-
other, differing in others, each of which is completely unaware of his “other
selves” and under the impression that he is a unique individual. It would
be difficult indeed to convince such an amoeba of the true situation short
of actually confronting him with his “other selves”. The same is true if
one accepts the hypothesis of the universal wave function. Each time an
individual splits he is unaware of it, and any single individual is at all times
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unaware of his “other selves” with which he has no interaction from the
time of splitting. (Everett 1955c).
And here Wheeler wrote in marginal notes: “this analogy seems to me quite
capable of misleading readers in what is a very subtle point. Suggest omission”.
The analogy does not occur again. Even if Everett was clearly willing to speak
about splitting observers, it is more probable that here he just wanted to provide
a consistent theory capable of modeling more than one observer.
It is in another early draft document that we find the first explicit talk about
splitting observers. Everett says:
The essence of this theory is the abandonment of the concept of the unique-
ness of observers, i.e. that there are individual entities, machines, people,
etc., which remain single unique individuals throughout periods of time. In
this theory when measurements (or in general any observations) are made
on systems by “observers” (by which we mean merely other systems) the
observer itself splits into a number of observers, each of which sees a definite
result for the state of the system.
Now, all of this, which is seemingly quite farfetched and contrary to our
experience, is actually implied if one takes seriously the formalism of wave
mechanics [without the collapse dynamics] and we shall even see that we
can recover [the collapse dynamics] from this picture as a tool of practical
expediency, not as a basic hypothesis. (Everett 1955c).
And even these two paragraphs are barred to be omitted.
When discussing reversibility and irreversibility in the long thesis Everett says:
. . . in observation processes the state of the observer is transformed into
a superposition of observer states, each element of which describes an ob-
server who is irrevocably cut off from the remaining elements. . . . As
soon as the observation is performed, the composite state is split into a su-
perposition for which each element describes a different object-system state
and an observer with (different) knowledge of it. In a particularly careful
description of how to understand measurement in the long thesis, however,
Everett characterizes the split in terms of states splitting rather than phys-
ical observers splitting. We note that there is no longer any independent
system state or observer state, although the two have become correlated
in a one-one manner. However, in each element of the superposition (2.3),
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ϕiψO i[..., αi], the object system state is a particular eigenstate of the ob-
server, and furthermore the observer-system state describes the observer as
definitely perceiving that particular system state. It is this correlation which
allows one to maintain the interpretation that a measurement has been
performed. (Everett 1973a, p.68).
The most important account of Everett’s role of the observer is in a footnote:
At this point we encounter a language difficulty. Whereas before the ob-
servation we had a single observer state afterwards there were a number
of different states for the observer, all occurring in a superposition. Each
of these separate states is a state for an observer, so that we can speak
of the different observers described by the different states. On the other
hand, the same physical system is involved, and from this viewpoint it is
the same observer, which is in different states for different elements of the
superposition (i.e., has had different experiences in the separate elements of
the superposition). In this situation we shall use the singular when we wish
to emphasize that a single physical system is involved, and the plural when
we wish to emphasize the different experiences for the separate elements
of the superposition. (e.g., “The observer performs an observation of the
quantity A, after which each of the observers of the resulting superposition
has perceived an eigenvalue.”). (Everett 1973a, p. 68).
The most important thing which appears from this note is that for Everett it was
solely a matter of language: it was important to affirm the reality of splitting pro-
cess, even when the observer apparently does not perceive anything like splitting.
But it does not seem that Everett’s goal was that to formulate a many-minds-
like theory, i.e. something like a division between consciousness, mental domain
and physical, ‘real’ world. Plurality is strictly connected to reality, in a physical
sense41.
1.2.2 Splitting worlds
Another step towards understanding Everett’s original idea of splitting is in his
reaction to DeWitt’s proposal, thanks to which the theory was brought to light
again after fifteen years of neglect. Everett in fact never spoke about worlds, even
41 This contradicts many-minds-like interpretations; see also Bevers (2011).
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if his theory is best known as Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI).
Dewitt’s attempt to explain Everettian QM is the first historical attempt to fill it
in with extra structure. He believed that Everett did not characterize the subject
of a relative state properly, and took the theory to extremes: relative states are
to be represented as single states of singles copies of the world, each of which
having a definite outcome. DeWitt called this, now complete, theory as EWG,
because for him it was an Everett-Wheeler-Graham theory. He introduced this
new metaphysical commitment to splitting worlds as its central feature: real and
causally closed worlds are to be thought of as relative states of a cross section of
the universal wave function.
He represented this with a Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment:
The animal [is] trapped in a room together with a Geiger counter and a
hammer, which, upon discharge of the counter, smashes a flask of prussic
acid. The counter contains a trace of radioactive material—just enough that
in 1 h there is a 50% chance one of the nuclei will decay and therefore an
equal chance the cat will be poisoned. At the end of the hour the total wave
function for the system will have a form in which the living cat and the dead
cat are mixed in equal portions. Schro¨dinger felt that the wave mechanics
that led to this paradox presented an unacceptable description of reality.
However, Everett, Wheeler and Graham’s interpretation of QM pictures
the cats as inhabiting two simultaneous, non interacting, but equally real
worlds. (DeWitt 1970, p. 31)
So, without adding extra postulates, PWM for how DeWitt intended it, is a meta-
theory from which the interpretation is logically deduced42:
Nevertheless, this is precisely what EWG would have us believe. According
to them the real universe is faithfully represented by a state vector similar
to that [above] but of vastly greater complexity. This universe is constantly
splitting into a stupendous number of branches, all resulting from the mea-
surement like interactions between its myriads of components. Moreover,
every quantum transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in
every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world on earth into
myriads of copies of itself. (DeWitt 1970, p. 33).
42 See also Bevers (2010).
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DeWitt assumed that with PWM the formalism of QM is capable of yielding its
own interpretation:
Without drawing on any external metaphysics or mathematics other than
the standard rules of logic, EWG are able, from these postulates, to prove
the following meta-theorem: The mathematical formalism of the quantum
theory is capable of yielding its own interpretation. (DeWitt 1970, p. 33).
The long and the short versions of Everett doctoral dissertation were published in
the anthology ‘The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics’ in 1973,
and from that moment the language of worlds stuck to Everett’s interpretation,
even if the world’s speaking is due to DeWitt’s reception. There is good evidence
that DeWitt’s version of Everett’s theory is filtered by Graham’s own view, while
Everett and Wheeler’s versions are different.
Wheeler himself recognized that MWI derived from DeWitt, and not from Everett.
“Bryce DeWitt, my friend at Chapel Hill, chose to call the Everett interpretation
the “Many Worlds” interpretation” says Wheeler, and even if “DeWitt’s termi-
nology is now common among physicists” he added in brackets “(although I don’t
like it)”. Wheeler then said that “The idea has entered into the general public
consciousness through the idea of “parallel universes.” Although I have coined
catchy phrases myself to try to make an idea memorable, in this case, I opted for
a cautious, conservative term. “Many worlds” and “parallel universes” were more
than I could swallow.” (Wheeler and Ford 1998, pp. 269-270).
For Wheeler, many-worlds speaking was an “oversimplified way” of understanding
Everett’s theory, and indeed Everett’s own view is more subtle than suggested by
DeWitt’s presentation.
The point now is that DeWitt implicitly recognized that it was not Everett’s origi-
nal idea to speak about worlds, but in all cases it was a logical consequence already
contained in the theory that the different parts of superposition, deriving from a
cross-section of the universal wave function, have to be intended as “worlds”. In-
deed, he refers to the acronym EWG giving credit to Everett for the meta-theorem,
to Wheeler for supporting him and to Graham for clarifying the meta-theorem.
For DeWitt, PWM alone entailed worlds, and these entities should be regarded as
explaining our experiences.
Even if DeWitt intended that the existence of many splitting worlds was entailed
in PWM alone, this is not exactly a logical consequence. As Barrett points out, “as
a point of logic purely mathematical postulates entail only purely mathematical
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theorems, one cannot deduce any metaphysical commitments whatsoever regard-
ing the physical world from the mathematical formalism of PWM alone” (Barrett
2010, p. 281); a metaphysical commitment can be envisioned as logically entailed
only if it is a proper statement of the theory, which involves interpretational prin-
ciples that go beyond bare mathematical formalism.
1.3 A matter of language?
Both Wheeler and Everett preferred to use “relative state” language, and this
choice is not simply a matter of convention.
Everett was more confident using the language of branches or relative states in his
written works, whereas the language of worlds was employed, or better tolerated,
in conversation.
His preference in using relative state language and referring to relative states,
branches and elements of the superposition is also related to his preference of
describing the correlation structure in terms of splitting observers, as mentioned
before. There is also evidence of Everett’s awareness of the difficulties involved in
using both languages, because both are misleading, although he does not appear
to have been particularly focused on the problem, even if he was fully aware that
these kind of conceptual difficulties were absolutely resulting from his theory; he
assumed that the problems are of a metaphysical or linguistic nature.
The document of the 1962 conference on the foundations of QM at Xavier Uni-
versity is a precious element in understanding Everett’s attitude towards worlds
language. Everett was invited only after a discussion about ‘parallel worlds’, in
order to clarify his position. Podolsky resumed in this way: “Oh yes, I remember
now what it is about—it’s a picture about parallel times, parallel universes, and
each time one gets a given result he chooses which one of the universes he belongs
to, but the other universes continue to exist” (Transcript: Conference at Xavier
University, Werner 1962, Monday AM 13).
Once invited, Everett had the opportunity to explain in person his theory as fol-
lows:
The picture I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making a
sequence of observations on a number of, let’s say, originally identical object
systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of states,
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each element of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular
definite sequence of results of observation. I identify a single element as
what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert
that all of the elements simultaneously coexist. In any single element of
the final superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which
describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently
random sequence of events. Of course, it’s a different sequence of events
in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large
series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost all
of the elements of the final superposition the frequencies of the results of
measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the ordinary
picture of QM. That is very briefly it. (Transcript: Conference at Xavier
University, Werner 1962, Tuesday AM, 18)
Podolsky insisted on a change in using worlds language. “Perhaps it might be a
little clearer to most people if you put it in a different way. Somehow or other
we have here the parallel times or parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk
about so much.”
And Everett replied “yes, it’s a consequence of the superposition principle that
each separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent
of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having a certain
selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the others somehow mys-
teriously vanishing.”
Later in the exchange Podolsky said: “It looks like we would have a non-denumerable
infinity of worlds” and Everett replied “Yes”.
And also, in replying to Shimony, he added: “each individual branch looks like
a perfectly respectable world where definite things have happened” (Transcript:
Conference at Xavier University, Werner 1962, Tuesday AM, 18). It is also impor-
tant to note that Everett, having the opportunity of revising his own comments,
decided to keep the term world.
As further proof, Deutsch43 recalls a private conversation with Everett who was
“very enthusiastic about many universes, and very robust as well as subtle in its
defense, he did not speak in terms of ‘relative states’ or any other euphemism”
43 Deutsch has since become one of the strongest proponents of the multiverse theory, a version
of DeWitt’s splitting worlds interpretation of Everett. Indicating his degree of support for the
theory, Deutsch claims that “[t]he fruitfulness of the multiverse theory in contributing to the
solution of long-standing philosophical problems is so great that it would be worth adopting even
if there were no physical evidence for it at all” (Deutsch 1997, p. 339).
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(quoted in Byrne 2010b, p. 321–2). It seems now that Everett used the worlds
language in conversations, or at least accepted it, and there is also no trace of
Everett’s clear objection to DeWitt speaking of his theory as a Many Worlds
Interpretation, because he recognized that it was this that gave great academic
interest to his theory, after a long period of neglect.
Everett’s opinion of DeWitt was asked on two occasions.
In June 1977 William Harvey, associated with the Science Studies Unit at the Uni-
versity of Edinburgh, wrote to Everett, asking if he approved of the way DeWitt
presented his theory (Harvey to Everett 1977).
Everett replied by describing the process that led to his paper being published in
the DeWitt-Graham anthology; he then concluded “. . . I certainly approve of the
way Bryce DeWitt presented my theory, since without his efforts it would never
have been presented at all” (Everett 1977a).
We can get another important insight into Everett’s own way of thinking from
his correspondence with Le´vy-Leblond. He submitted an enthusiastic paper to
Everett (Le´vy-Leblond to Everett 1976), in which he argued that there had been
a “serious misunderstanding of Everett’s thesis by many of his followers.”
Describing the labours of Everett’s propagandists:
Once more, under a question of terminology lies a deep conceptual prob-
lem. [Everett’s] interpretation in effect has been called by several people,
especially DeWitt, one of his main propagandists, the “many worlds (or
many-universes) interpretation of quantum theory.” The rejection of the
postulate projection [sic] leaves us with the “universal” state vector. Since,
with each successive measurement, this state-vector “splits” into a super-
position of several “branches”, it is said to describe “many universes,” one
for each of the branches. Whereas the Copenhagen interpretation would
arbitrarily choose “one world” by cutting off all “branches” of the state-
vector except one (presumably the one of the “many worlds” corresponding
to all possible outcomes of the measurement. Now, my criticism here is ex-
actly symmetrical of the one I directed again in the orthodox position: the
“many worlds” idea again is a left-over of classical conceptions. The coex-
isting branches here, as the unique surviving one in the Copenhagen point
of view, can only be related to “worlds” described by classical physics. The
difference is that, instead of interpreting the quantum “plus” as a classical
“or”, DeWitt and al. interpret it as a classical “and”. To me, the deep
meaning of Everett’s ideas is not the coexistence of many worlds, but on
the contrary, the existence of a single quantum one. The main drawback
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of the “many-worlds” terminology is that it leads one to ask the question
of “what branch we are on,” since it certainly looks as if our consciousness
definitely belongs to only one world at a time: But this question only makes
sense from a classical point of view, once more. (Le´vy-Leblond to Everett
1976).
Le´vy-Leblond then asked Everett whether he had got it right insomuch as there
are no splitting worlds:
I directly ask your opinion on what I take to be a crucial question concerning
the “Everett and no-longer-Wheeler” (if I understand correctly!) interpre-
tation of [QM]. The question is one of terminology: in my opinion there is
but a single (quantum) world, with its universal wave function. There are
not “many worlds,” no “branching.” etc. except as an artifact of insisting
once more on a classical picture of the world. (Le´vy-Leblond to Everett
1977).
In reply, Everett reported that he very much liked the paper, he agreed with
Le´vy-Leblond’s analysis of the relationship between his work and DeWitt’s, and
he denied that the many worlds terminology was his. Everett wrote: “. . . I have not
done further work in this area since the original paper in 1955 (not published in its
entirety until 1973, as the “Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”).
This, of course, was not my title as I was pleased to have the paper published in
any form anyone chose to do it in! I, in effect, had washed my hands of the whole
affair in 1956” (Everett 1977b).
In a draft of the same letter, Everett said more about how he understood his
relationship with DeWitt. Referring to DeWitt’s energetic promotion of his work,
Everett put it this way: “Far be it for me to look a gift Boswellian writer in
the mouth! But your observations are entirely accurate (as far as I have read)”
(Everett 1977b, draft).
In agreeing with Le´vy-Leblond, Everett is agreeing that the notion of many worlds
relies on a mistaken classical crutch and that his own formulation of QM is best
understood in terms of a single, but quantum, world.
Everett mentions “the world view” one last time in a letter to a physics enthusiast,
L. David Raub, in 1980, two years before Everett’s death. Everett begins his reply
to Raub by stating that he still supports all of the conclusions of his thesis and
believes that his approach remains the only entirely consistent interpretation of
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QM that explains both the content of the theory and appearances. Explaining why
some do not like his theory, Everett says: “It is abhorrent to many individuals that
there should not be a single unique state for them (in the world view), even though
my interpretation explains all subjective feelings quite adequately and is consistent
with all observations” (Everett 1980). Here Everett uses both the relative state
terminology of his thesis and mentions the world view. As usual, Everett suggests
that what should ultimately matter is that his view is logically consistent and
consistent with our observations.
Concluding, from an historical perspective there is evidence that Everett was at
least somewhat uncomfortable with DeWitt’s description of his project and he
specifically points out that many worlds language is not his own proper view,
notwithstanding his gratitude to DeWitt for promoting his work.
1.4 Worlds versus relative states
There are also theoretically significant reasons for distinguishing Everett’s relative
states from worlds.
Everett and DeWitt disagreed in the appropriate measure for branches, which
for Everett was a typicality measure. Both DeWitt and Graham thought of this
measure for branches as a ‘worlds counting’, and this encountered Everett’s frus-
tration.
Moreover, DeWitt’s worlds are metaphysical structures. Everett’s original theory
does not speak about worlds, because even if it could be considered evident and
also necessary to find a characterization for branches, in order to describe what
branches actually are, Everett’s theory does not speak about the characteriza-
tion of branches. Metaphysical claims are central to DeWitt and Graham, while
Everett strongly refused any kind of metaphysical commitment. This leaves the
question of the characterization of branches open, but also underlines Everett’s re-
fusal to accept any metaphysical commitments, which is a very important starting
point in Everett’s discussion, and one that has often been nuanced in the search
of a good interpretation44.
Apart from Everett’s explanation of the nature of physics, which deserves a deeper
exploration as we will see in the next chapter, in general he did not believe in the
need for any special metaphysical support to a physical theory. For the moment it
44 See, as a strengthening, Bevers (2010) and Vaidman (2010).
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is sufficient to note that in his opinion ‘the primary purpose of theoretical physics
is . . . to make useful models which serve for a time and are replaced as they are
outworn” (Everett 1973a, p. 111).
Resuming, it is not evident as DeWitt claims, that Everett’s theory is composed of
a meta-theorem necessarily involving a particular kind of metaphysical account for
branches. So there is nothing that complies with DeWitt’s description in Everett’s
work, and it is significant to note that there is nothing similar even in Everett’s
reply to DeWitt’s letter to Wheeler. Furthermore, Everett’s correspondence with
Le´vy-Leblond shows how the definition of a single quantum world (not our ordi-
nary world, but a world in quantum superposition) is more adherent to Everett’s
own way of thinking than a Many Worlds Interpretation could be.
Two formal elements ordain the final non-overlapping between DeWitt’s worlds
and Everett’s relative states:
• World-like branches versus arbitrary relative states;
• Interference phenomena versus classic behavior.
For DeWitt, a relative state corresponds to a metaphysically real copy of our phys-
ical world, each containing the experience of a definite outcome. Worlds splitting
follows as a consequence of measurements, and ensures the existence of determi-
nate records; worlds are simultaneous, non-interacting entities deriving from the
decomposition of the wave function. So DeWitt individuates each branch as cor-
responding to a world, the totality being the universal state. That is, in order to
characterize them as worlds, DeWitt describes them as parallel, non interacting,
classic worlds.
For Everett, whose metaphysical grounding was very modest, but empirical re-
quirements very high, whatever branches could be identified, for they are elements
of a superposition, it was a matter of fact that they should be considered equally
real: “[f]rom the viewpoint of the theory, all elements of a superposition (all
‘branches’) are ‘actual,’ none any more ‘real’ than another” (Everett 1957d). In
other words, the fundamental relativity of states implies that there is nothing in
the theory by which one of the elements of the superposition is chosen as “special”
or more actual. All elements obey the same dynamical law, independently of one
another. There is no preferred way to decompose the absolute state: this means
that there is no preferred way to individuate branches, so the characterization of
a branch is relative to the choice of a basis, and the correlation model does not
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furnish anything like a possible individuation of a world between its structures.
This also ensures the possibility of interference effects, which are the basis of the
direct empirical consequences of the existence of superposition, at least in princi-
ple. Branches are not so evidently world-like.
As we saw in the above quote from Everett’s letter to DeWitt, Everett’s thinking
was more oriented toward the deduction of classical physics from QM rather than
the contrary: the microcosm is the basis for understanding our classical, macro-
scopic world. It is impossible to think of reality as a property of our classical
world, while a quantum world is not real just because we cannot describe it in
classical terms.
Even if branches are to be interpreted as worlds, they should exhibit typical world-
like properties, and this should be the case for the overwhelming majority of
branches. But Everett’s standard of typicality, as we shall see later, is indepen-
dent of the way decomposition occurs.
Relatively recently, another sort of realism has been suggested in order to deduce
the existence of many splitting worlds as emergent entities, starting from decoher-
ence considerations.
With decoherence, unobservability of interference effects is explained, and clas-
sical, or quasi-classical entities emerge from the quantum state: in other terms,
the dynamical stability of the relative state is explained through entanglement
with environment. Decoherence can be seen as the more natural development of
DeWitt’s interpretation of Everett, and it “furthers Everett’s project insofar as it
remains in the service of his goal of getting as much as possible from PWM while
adding as little interpretational apparatus as possible (italics mine).” (Barrett and
Byrne 2012, p. 45).
However, there are two reasons for not taking decoherence as resolutive.
All diverse decoherence “techniques”45 try to explain under what circumstances
a superposition of states behaves dynamically as an incoherent mixture of those
same states (in order to explain why, at the end, we observe only one single result,
or world).
Zeh (1970) firstly recognized that dynamical stability was the key to solve the
preferred basis problem in the Everettian context. Here the enviroment is a sort
of superselective tool, by which only one of the classically well defined properties
of the initial superposition of a system is chosen for entanglement with a certain
45Saunders (2010a, p. 8) says that decoherence is “more of a heterogeneous collection of
techniques than a systematic theory”.
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environment, and in this way interference phenomena are destroyed, so that each
of the initial components will evolve independently46.
Zeh’s definition was still qualitative, and succeeding developments went more to-
ward localization of consciousness than in physical features.
Further developments lead to “consistent histories” formalism: here, division be-
tween environment and subsystems is inessential, because what brings to observed
quasi-classical states is the coarse-graining of certain dynamical variables, which
evolve in a time-ordered sequence (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1990).
But, and this is the first reason to reject decoherence at least in the present con-
text (that of a faithful reconstruction of Everett’s own thinking), this leads to the
introduction of probabilities, because the global state is a superposition of this kind
of histories (the wavefunction of the universe, in the Heisenberg picture), and the
choice of variables equals the choice of preferred basis.
It will be shown that this kind of scheme is untenable if we want to understand
original Everett, because the probabilistic aspect in PWM is reduced to its math-
ematical usage (see chapter 3 and 4).
Even the more recent developments of decoherence collide with Everett’s own
proposal. In fact, the probabilistic aspect introduces a sort of damaging approxi-
mation, since there is “no algorithm for extracting even approximately decohering
histories for any Hamiltonian and any state” (see Saunders 2010a, p. 11).
Wallace (2010a, 2012) proposes a new structural and pragmatic interpretation:
structures and patterns (such as consistent histories) are always emergent in
physics. This kind of high level ‘emergent’ ontology is routine in science. All
of our observations are structural observations47. Worlds are emerging entities, as
other ordinary physical objects (fluids, crystals, cells, planets, galaxies, etc.), al-
ready instantiated in the wavefunction. Decoherence is then an “emergent process
occurring within an already stated microphysics: unitary quantum mechanics”
(Wallace 2010a, p. 64). Decoherence is a dynamical process whereby certain
components of the fundamental state became autonomous of one another. But
at the fundamental level, all histories exist. In this view, there is nothing prob-
lematic about the approximateness of the decoherence process, because this is an
absolutely standard feature of emergence: there are structural facts about many
microphysical systems which, although perfectly real and objective, simply cannot
46See Zeh (1970, p. 42), who recognized this property in observing chirality of sugar molecules.
47For a reply, see Maudlin (2010).
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be seen in purely microphysical language48.
The point is, however, that in PWM decoherence is used to explain the emergence
of quasi-classical worlds.
The second reason for rejecting decoherence thus understood is the presupposition
of a fundamental ontology, which at the end is DeWitt-style revisited metaphysics
of worlds: Wallace assumes realism to be the theoretical framework for interpret-
ing PWM, and this, again, exceeds Everettian ideas.
Concluding, for Everett both interpretations (many-mind-like or many-worlds-
like interpretations) would have been too strong, because of their commitment to
metaphysics.
I feel that this is a fundamental point to consider because Everett never changed
his position in respect to his theory49.
Everett allowed such kinds of definitions in colloquial contexts, in a descriptive
dimension, just in order to clarify his theory and mostly its reality. But, and this
element will be analysed in the next chapter, his empiricism is the reason for not
giving a metaphysical characterization for branches.
While there is no single interpretation of Everett that fits in well with all of his pub-
lished work, marginal notes, and correspondence, a main feature of his project is
undeniably clear: Everett’s PWM, described using the language of relative states,
is committed to show that one obtains the same empirical predictions as the stan-
dard collapse theory, and this is confirmed in both his published and unpublished
work. As we shall see, Everett’s necessity of a good explication for experience was
always in his mind, even if “in the history of physics, Everett’s theory stands out
as an example of how difficult it can be to translate a logically consistent formal-
ism into a explanatory language”50.
Everett’s main task was that to model observation, in order to explain the mea-
surement process without including anything magical or mystical. For Everett
metaphysics has nothing to do with physics to the extent that a physicist aims
to find a satisfactory explanation for perceived reality: QM makes no exception,
because it is just a model for our experiences, and ordinary physical systems are
48Wallace reports an example: a “tiger hunting pattern” could be studied from many different
perspectives (its atomic or molecular configuration, etc.), but it is “ludicrously hard work to study
tigers in this way. To reach a really practical level of description, we again look for patterns and
regularities. . . ...those entities are structures instantiated within the molecular physics” (Wallace
2010a, p. 58).
49 See Barrett (2010, p. 39).
50 See Byrne (2012, p. 24).
Chapter 1. Back to ‘original’ Everett 41
nothing more than microscopic interacting elements, therefore a quantum expla-
nation must reject all forms of arbitrary division between macroscopic elements
and underlying microphysics.
Taking Everett’s idea seriously implies accepting Everett’s idea on its owns terms
“as an understanding of what QM already claims, not as a proposal for how to
amend it” (Wallace 2010a, p. 55). The axioms of unitary QM say nothing about
‘worlds’ or ‘branches’, because they speak only of a unitarily evolving quantum
state.
A very important job to be done is that of justifying our experience with a rep-
resentation within the theory, showing how one might find our actual experience
represented in the correlation structure described by the theory.
Chapter 2
Undeniable but unobservable:
branches from an empiricist
perspective
So far we see what PWM is not.
While DeWitt had a strong metaphysical commitment to the theory of splitting
worlds being central in understanding Everett’s theory, Everett himself believed
that his theory neither required nor supported any particular metaphysical com-
mitments.
Although metaphysical speech is tolerated in discussion and, as we have previously
seen, Everett himself often used expressions with a metaphysical flavor (“perfectly
respectable worlds”, for example, in replying to Podolsky), he never deemed it
necessary to give an ‘official’ version of a possible metaphysical aspect arising di-
rectly from his theory. Even when he had the opportunity to discuss a possible
completion of PWM, he always assumed that it was absolutely unnecessary, be-
cause the “theory itself was complete”. By complete, he meant that it gave “a
complete account of perceived reality”: determinate outcomes, as well as usual
statistical predictions provided by standard QM, perfectly in accord with PWM,
while the ‘mystical’ cut between classical observers and microscopic quantum re-
ality introduced by the “popular” (Copenhagen) interpretation could be avoided.
So once clarified that the need for metaphysics was not Everett’s original target,
we have to understand how one should consider the Everettian system in its total-
ity, and hence to what extent it might be considered sufficiently self-compelling. If
the global state, which is the fundamental entity, is to be interpreted without any
42
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metaphysical assumptions, how we should look at the ‘Everettian system’ from a
philosophical, interpretive and epistemic point of view needs to be clarified.
There are two main directions that can be taken in interpreting PWM.
These approaches are linked to specific theoretical assumptions: if one decides to
interpret wavefunction as describing our knowledge, or whatever subjective and
local can be thought about it, then an anti-realist position is assumed, because
superposition is confined to a region of non-physical, mathematical space. What
really counts as real is our perceived reality, so collapse is factual.
On the other hand, if one opts for a strong realist (metaphysical) position, then
the quantum state is expression of splitting worlds, but in this way splitting enti-
ties are classic, metaphysical entities1.
I argue that another route can be traversed, even if it seems paradoxical at first
sight: why not assuming the global state as real, without giving any metaphysi-
cal significance or further connotation? This is the particular form of Everettian
original mixture of realism and anti-realism.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Everett’s PWM has to be interpreted start-
ing from what I called the original core, which consists of bare formalism (QM
taken literally, without postulating any sort of collapse), following which uni-
tary quantum state is the fundamental entity, the relative states being a “conse-
quence” of a literal version of linear dynamics taken in themselves; the deduction
of determinate-records and probabilities in the correlation model, or the deduction
of our classic perceived reality (relative state) as a subjective appearance (implying
here even repeated measurements and sequences of different measurements, which
lead to observers’ memory sequences); the interpretation of these rules, which is
related to Everett’s own strong convictions regarding the requirements for a phys-
ical theory to be good, and which reveals a strong empiricism.
Everett indeed proposes an isomorphic identity between some parts of his theory
and our perceived reality: in this sense, it is the theory that provides the bound-
aries between observable and unobservable parts, the latter being not isomorphic
to our perceptions as long as the former are shown to be empirically adequate.
In other words, Everett assumed:
• the global state, described by the unitary evolution of the wave function to
be the real and fundamental entity;
1 See Saunders (2010a, p. 4).
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• the relative state one obtains by isolating a single outcome relative to a
measurement as a relative reality, in the sense that it represents just one
branch. In this sense, a relative state is a subjective appearance, because it
represents an observing device having a particular outcome.
The theory provides also an explanation for observers possessing a certain memory
configuration: it is shown that the theory perfectly predicts an observer having
just one particular memory sequence for observations which is in accord with our
perceptual experience.
Statistical distributions can be seen to be properly represented in the model, and
that is all we require in a theory. The global state, while being unobservable in
its totality, is absolutely real, otherwise we would be obliged to introduce a final
cut again. It is meaningless to ask which relative state counts as the most real,
because all relative states are equally real: we could say that the global state is
more real than (perceived) reality.
This means that the original core of Everett’s idea is minimal regarding its in-
terpretation: a detailed explanation of the remaining relative states is impossible
insofar as it concludes in a metaphysical explanation. In other terms, any con-
struction that one might make in order to characterize the global state beyond
empirical experience is arbitrary.
This is the empiricism that characterizes Everett’s way of thinking, testified to by
his own declarations about the requirements for obtaining a good physical theory,
and also from his deep sympathy respect of Frank. Furthermore, the same un-
easiness in the face of strange, mystical and philosophically monstrous divisions
introduced by popular interpretation testifies to his intention of formulating an
empirically adequate theory. Everett’s strong desire for a theory, and for his own
theory, to be acceptable, is empirical faithfulness : once we grant that the theory
provides an isomorphic (or, better still, homomorphic as will be explained later)
model, we obtain an explanation that is in accordance with our experience, and
we can then accept the theory.
Interpreters focused on the analysis of unobservable entities because it is not clear
how they are to be intended. This has led to a multiplicity of Everettian-like in-
terpretations, each proposing a metaphysical lecture starting from bare formalism.
In the previous chapter we saw that the classic version of relative states as being
worlds is not tenable in DeWitt’s original version if we intend remaining faithful
to a genuine account of Everett’s theory. The same could be verified for other
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many-fashioned interpretations2.
The need for completion derives partly from the particular way in which Ev-
erettian ideas were initially disclosed, this means that it is difficult to understand
how determinate-record experience has to be framed in PWM frame. Starting
from this point, there are other more speculative problems: the existence of par-
allel entities and their characterization, identity over time, and so forth3. But
the need to fill in the (apparent) gaps with metaphysical buildings appears to be
beyond Everett’s original intents.
In fact, Everett was not concerned with speculative problems: even if there is a
sense in which the theory could be considered open to future achievements4, this
does not imply a metaphysically oriented completion. Again, interpretations have
a value, that often go beyond a mere understanding of Everettian theory, but are
distant from the original root.
Moreover, following Everett one discovers that the solution to classic problems
of PWM (determinate-records and probability problems) is obtained within the
theory itself; but by advocating a methodological position which is misleading, at
least at first sight: the theory appears to be too rich in content, by implying a
plethora of unobservable, multiple entities whose nature is not at all clear. How-
ever this does not mean that the remaining states of the cross-section of wave
function have to be discarded as unreal once we have our relative state.
This apparent paradox, in which the global state is undeniable, but still unob-
servable, is resolved by assuming a modest Humean5 approach: in other words,
here I would like to investigate to what extent Everett is really capable of yielding
his own interpretation starting from a new ‘hermeneutic’ analysis. What I am
suggesting is a comparison between Everett’s ideas regarding physical theories in
general and those regarding structural empiricism, as proposed by Van Fraassen
(2008), with its stronger pragmatism, which might prove useful in understanding
extra structure while avoiding metaphysics.
Of course, one could always pose the question as to whether Everett’s original core
is sufficient by itself, but that is a query we have to postpone.
2 For a complete review, see Barrett (1999).
3 See Saunders, S., Barrett, J., Kent, A., & Wallace, D. (Eds) (2010).
4 Actually, Everett himself upholds that a theory should be oriented toward the possibility
of future predictions by means of the discovery of new phenomena (see Everett 1973a, p. 134).
This will be analysed in detail at the end of the chapter.
5 See Bacciagaluppi (2013b).
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2.1 The extra structure
Everettian problems, I feel, have the same unique origin: it is not clear how one
should look at what might be called the “extra structure”, namely the remaining
relative states of the fundamental global state, once we have our own relative state,
describing an observer as having a specific memory configuration in accord with
usual quantum statistics.
After a first reading of Everett’s theory, there is an unavoidable feeling of “strangeness”:
DeWitt himself witnesses this in saying that “It has been a “vivid shock encoun-
tering this multiworld concept. The idea of 100100+ slightly imperfect copies of
oneself all constantly splitting into further copies, which ultimately become unrec-
ognizable, is not easy to reconcile with common sense.” (DeWitt 1970, p. 161).
Once the description of the actual state is acquired, one finds oneself related in
one way or another to a proliferation of branches, in which all outcomes find a
‘reification’ although we cannot find any trace of these states in our ordinary em-
pirical experience.
Extra structure’s counterintuitive nature derives from its unobservability. This is
the main reason that both interpreters and detractors surrendered and qualified
Everett’s theory as, at best, incomplete: from their point of view detractors found
the unobservability of Everettian extra structure to be the final global state’s worst
characteristic, which candidates it to falsifiability6, while his followers thought that
PWM, in order to be complete, should explain the remaining states, the only way
to characterize them being that of finding a new account for the explanation of
reality which in the end is a metaphysical many-fashioned interpretation of states.
So critics found their main reason to reject Everettian theory in the extra structure
because of its strong bond with metaphysical structure; on the other hand, fol-
lowers of PWM thought it was necessary to add metaphysics to Everettian theory
in order to complete it, reading the theory as revealing something new about the
world in a metaphysical sense.
All these contributions have something in common: they approach the Everettian
“system” with a realist length, taking for granted that Everett himself was ad-
vocating such a position (and, as explained above, in the case of the anti-realist
reader, this is unacceptable, whereas dealing with a realist reader, this needs meta-
physics).
6 See for example Tegmark’s review of most common worries about Everett’s theory (Tegmark
2010, p. 553).
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Also to at least understand his original proposal in clarifying and solving apparent
problems, it is necessary to avoid a metaphysical suit for the extra structure. And
this is possible because Everett himself was committed to a strong empiricism,
which is clearly exposed in the second appendix to his long thesis, and which
could be considered a manifesto of Everettian empiricism.
Again, as exposed in the previous chapter, both the initial rejection and the later
acceptance of Everett’s PWM suffered from a vitiated lecture, and that is the rea-
son his empiricism was not emphasized at the time, whereas now it is becoming
quite clear7.
2.1.1 Unobservability
Everett’s position regarding extra structure is that of advocating an anti-metaphysical
methodological position, following which it becomes a false problem. For Everett,
the extra structure is out of our direct experience, which is limited to only one
branch. When a measurement is made, unitary dynamics continues in a super-
position of different branches, each reporting a different outcome. If one of these
branches (even more than one, as we will see) is demonstrated to exhibit a deter-
minate record consistent with observer’s memory configuration, then the model is
coherent to experience. That is what occurs once we confront the determinate out-
come we obtain with the relative state provided by the correlation model (which
is what Everett calls the ‘cross-section’ of the total wave function). The extra
structure, represented by the multiplicity of states which are not observed, derives
from the theory: in other words, it is the theory itself that provides a model for
our experience and a model for the global state (whose totality is, paraphrasing
Everett, never accessible to us).
This position seems to be quite problematic at first sight, to the extent that it
does not explain the real ontological flow of the extra structure.
The problem seems to have different levels: from a very trivial psychological per-
spective, it seems that the branching process has to be rejected simply because it
is not noticeable in a perceptive sense; this in turn introduces a pragmatic level
of critique, that is, unobservability of extra structure which could be a serious
setback for PWM, to the extent that it is not testable. From a deeper conceptual
point of view, unobservability seems to introduce some sort of falsifiable account,
7 See Saunders, S., Barrett, J., Kent, A., & Wallace, D. (2010) and Barrett (2009, 2010,
2011a, 2011b, 2012).
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capable of invalidating the theory.
This triadic lecture of inconsistency has to do with the methodological position
one decides to assume, and of course if one opts for strong realism, then one is
forced to introduce a new metaphysics in order to explain how this extra structure
has to be qualified, or to abandon PWM as untenable.
Everett was aware of this problem, and explained his solution on different occa-
sions, but his methodological assumption, which is fundamental in understanding
his position, was not made clear and public until 1973, the year in which his long
thesis was published in the DeWitt-Graham’s collection of Everett’s works (De-
Witt 1973), and even in this publication, Everett’s own position was obscured by
DeWitt’s proper many-world interpretation, as we saw in the previous chapter.
The short version, which was the only circulating version until 1973, did not ex-
press Everett’s position regarding the status of general physical theories in general.
This is the reason that DeWitt himself, who later became Everett’s strongest sup-
porter, initially rejected the theory. Apart from the great ‘amending’ of 1973, in
which he demonstrated all his enthusiasm for PWM, after having transposed it
into ‘MWI’, in his first lecture on the short thesis, DeWitt was very skeptical.
In a letter to Wheeler, after resuming the potential elegance and beauty of PWM8,
DeWitt firstly recognized that the extra structure and branching process could be
a real problem; he wrote about his concerns to Everett’s advisor clearly pointing
out how extra structure could affect the theory:
What I am not prepared to accept relative to the subject at hand, how-
ever, is that the temporal behavior of the superposition of relative observer
states Ψ0 [α,1i , α
2
i , . . . ] is isomorphic to the “trajectory” of the memory
configuration of a real physical observer, whether human or inanimate. As
Everett quite explicitly says: “with each succeeding observation. . . the ob-
server state branches into a number of different states”. The trajectory of
the memory configuration of a real physical observer, on the other hand,
8 While holding that Everett’s ideas “should have no experimental consequences whatever”
DeWitt also recognized that a parallel can validly be drawn between Everett’s ideas and the
theory of relativity” because the “role of the observer relative to the rest of the universe is
emphasized in both theories” for two reasons: firstly because “Everett’s removal of the external
observer may be viewed as analogous to Einstein’s denial of the existence of any privileged inertial
frame”; also Everett’s “scheme is found to contain its own theory of the measurement process,
by giving back again –but at a new level– the same elements of statistical interpretation which
were put into it at the beginning, just as the combination of the mathematics of a Reimannian
space with Einstein’s equations gives back again (in first approximation) the laws of motion”
(DeWitt 1957). Rovelli (1996) makes the same point.
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does not branch. I can testify to this from personal introspection, as can
you. I simply do not branch. (DeWitt 1957).
In this quotation, it is evident that DeWitt is posing the problem starting from a
simple psychological perspective: how can we speak about a branching process if
we do not notice anything similar? Direct introspection should be considered the
best yardstick to assess the veracity of the branching process.
Everett was aware of this kind of objection. In a letter to Jammer he notes that
“the unwillingness of most physicists to accept this theory, I believe, is due to
the psychological distaste that the theory engenders overwhelming the inherent
simplicity of the theory as a way of resolving the apparent paradoxes of quantum
mechanics as conventionally conceived” (Everett 1973b). His direct reply to De-
Witt is provocative, at any rate: “I can’t resist asking: do you feel the motion of
the earth?”, and he continues:
One of the basic criticism leveled on the Copernican theory was that “the
mobility of the earth as a real physical fact is incompatible with the com-
mon sense interpretation of nature. In other words, as any fool can plainly
see, the earth doesn’t really move because we don’t experience any motion.
However, a theory which involves the motion of the earth is not difficult to
swallow if it is a completely enough theory that one can also deduce that no
motion will be felt by the earth’s inhabitants (as was possible with Newto-
nian physics). Thus, in order to decide whether or not a theory contradicts
our experience, it is necessary to see what the theory itself predicts our
experience will be. (Everett 1957d).
This first response is in order to show how direct introspection could not be as-
sumed as a criterion for rejecting the branching process to the same extent that it
could not be seen as a sufficient reason for rejecting earth movement.
We clearly cannot have direct access to the branching process from a “perceptual”
point of view: firstly, and intuitively, because we are related to one single branch,
we are in a specific portion of reality, and not outside the universe and Everett
simply rejected the “external observation” link to the extent that it was a con-
strual by which the cut between the classic and quantum world was introduced.
In order to have an absolute position, we should conjecture an “absolute” external
observer, namely outside the universe, and we cannot do that (see the previous
chapter, footnote7). Instead we have a correlation model, from which we can find
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our actual position, which is always of a relative kind.
From this it derives directly that a further characterization of branches should be
of a metaphysical type, since we cannot have direct observation of a branching
process.
Secondly and more deeply, awareness of the branching process, intending here
experience of bifurcation, is not predicted by the theory: the relative memory
sequences which express each relative state (branch) do not contain records for
branching events, because a typical relative memory sequence exhibits the stan-
dard quantum statistics. This is a corroborate of the accord between relative state
and our proper perceived reality: once we find a relative state which corresponds
to our actual outcome, we also find that this relative state represents an observer
having a particular memory sequence, which is in accord with usual quantum ex-
pectations, and especially with not having any feeling of the branching processes9.
This is our psychological experience as described by PWM; so the theory, far from
being at variance with perception, is in accord with our perceptual experience.
Actually, Everett says this clearly in reply to DeWitt:
I must confess that I do not see this “branching process” as the vast con-
tradiction” that you do. The theory is in full accord with our experience
(at least insofar as ordinary QM is). It is in full accord just because it is
possible to show that no observer would ever be aware of any “branching”,
which is alien to our experience as you point out”, indeed, he adds, “all
the separate elements of the superposition (“branches”) individually obey
the wave equation with complete indifference to the presence or absence
(“actuality” or not) of any other elements. (Everett 1957d).
The crucial point is that Everett saw how the branching process flowed into a
multiplicity of states, but it was not a concern because this kind of perceptual
objection was not sufficient and above all because perceived reality was totally
explained, without recurring to metaphysical completions.
In this sense it is a false problem: the theory is not incomplete, or contradictory
with the experience, if for experience one refers to immediate, vivid, determinate
actual experience, which is perfectly predicted and explained.
Furthermore, it is the theory itself that justifies and contains its own theory of
measurement.
9 See Everett (1973a, p. 68): “In each element of the superposition, the object-system state
is a particular eigenstate of the observer, and furthermore the observer-system state describes
the observer as definitely perceiving that particular system state”.
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2.1.2 Testability: a real problem?
The psychological level introduces a more pragmatic level of critique.
Indeed the fact that the extra structure has to do with unobservable entities leads
to the problem of non-testability : if in our perceptual experience we have no access
to the other branches, they may appear to be no more postulated than the col-
lapse of the wave function, and even more problematically, since they are totally
foreign to our experience, they could appear dangerously ad hoc; this seems to be
quite at variance with the possibility of future experimental proof, required for the
acceptability of a physical theory.
DeWitt remarked how it is “hard to believe that Everett’s ideas, on the one hand,
will appreciably affect experimental physics (even cosmic level), although this, of
course, remains to be seen” (DeWitt 1957).
Everett clearly did not think that his theory was infected by some form of non-
testability.
Firstly, testability is ensured for the region of observability implied by the theory:
so it could always be demonstrated that our relative state is coherent with stan-
dard predictions of QM, and this not only in the trivial sense that it grants our
actual relative state to be found but also a state in which a typical observer might
find himself appropriately represented (his specific memory configuration)10; more-
over, Everett also refers to a future possibility of developing new ways of testability
(even if in a vague way), by using a distinction between merely descriptive and
explanatory theories, including in the former category his own theory.
Everett’s position is quite clear: the fact that a physical theory does not go be-
yond a specific region of “safety”, in which already known and observable data
are found, is not a virtue. A theory which does not prove itself with unobserv-
able entities (certainly unobservable, but maybe in this specific moment!) is just
surrendering to the temptation of constructing “perfectly safe theories which will
never be open to contradiction. Strict adherence to such a philosophy would prob-
ably seriously stifle the progress of physics”, while the contrary is true: a theory
which is devoted to the main purpose of scientific progress, namely “the discovery
of new phenomena” , will try to go beyond its boundaries, with “considerations
of inductive inference and the factors which influence our confidence in a given
10 Everett shows how usual quantum predictions are found for observers, repeated measure-
ments, and sequences of arbitrary measurements. We will see how a ‘natural’ measure for typical
branches could be found.
Chapter 2. Branches from an empiricist perspective 52
theory” (Everett 1957d) 11, in order to make it applicable outside the fields of its
formulation. In other words, a theory should ‘take the risk’: the fact that physics
sometimes has to do with unobservable entities is not as disruptive as it appears,
it is a peculiarity of the path of scientific theories towards a new possibility of pre-
dictions, always remembering that “the totality of perceived experience is never
accessible to us” (Everett 1973a, p. 134).
Non-testability is not enough to reject the global state as unreal: with non-
testability we define certain regions of the theory model which do not end up
being directly observable. But this is part of a theory’s construction, and it might
always be the case that those regions will give future access to new areas, namely
new phenomena.
2.1.3 The transition from possible to actual: the concep-
tual level
Summarizing, Everett contested the inadmissibility of unobservable entities for
two reasons:
1. what appears fundamental to Everett is to deduce our experience starting
from the model. Awareness is a psychological problem and it is not sufficient
criterion for rejecting the theory, because it is the theory which shows that
an observer would never be aware of branching process. This is the only
requirement one should need for his theory to be a good one;
2. non-testability again is not a limit, because firstly, it could always be possible
for the future to expand our domain of testability, and furthermore, a theory
should always test itself with the discovery of new phenomena.
So for Everett unobservability, with related unawareness and non-testability, does
not imply non existence of branches.
Even at a more profound conceptual level, unobservability is not a sufficient crite-
rion for classifying extra structure as unreal, at least if one assumes a more prudent
(empiricist) position instead of yielding to a strong form of scientific realism, which
implies the unreality of branches or the characterization of them as worlds.
It is starting from this perspective that DeWitt contested the assumption of the
11 See also Everett (1973a, p. 109), in which Everett refers to the Copenhagen interpretation.
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branching process even at this level (and proposed a realist many-worlds interpre-
tation in the end). In the same reply to Wheeler, he said:
I do agree that the scheme which Everett sets up is beautifully consis-
tent; that any single one of the states Ψ0
[
α1i , α
2
i , . . .
]
, when separated from
the superposition which makes up the total or “universal” state vector
ΨS1+S2+···+0, gives an excellent representation of a typical memory con-
figuration, with no causal or logical contradictions, and which “built-in”
statistical features. The whole state vector ΨS1+S2+···+0, however, is simply
too rich in content, by vast orders of magnitude, to serve as a representation
of the physical world. (DeWitt 1957).
DeWitt uses an argument a´ la Occam here, underlining how it is not necessary to
assume a structure which appears to be a richer representation of the real world12.
For DeWitt, even in a deeper sense, the branching process could not be considered
as real: the collapse of the wave function is factual, it implies the reification of
one state or another.
The problem with the extra structure is closely related to another problem, i.e.
the fact that the branching process should imply the so called “transition from
possible to actual”, because we ‘choose’ one branch to represent our relative state
while the other structure is ‘possible’, in the confused sense that its existence is
inaccessible.
After having cited Heisenberg, “the probability concept is closely related to the
concept of possibility, the ‘potentia’ of the natural philosophy of the ancients such
as Aristotle; it is, to a certain extent, a transformation of the old ‘potentia’ concept
from a qualitative to a quantitative idea”, DeWitt manifests his agreement with
the orthodox model: “on the other hand, the single quantum jump is “factual” in
nature; it “happens” in the same manner as an event of everyday life. That is to
say, the real world does not branch. It is constantly in the process from passing
from the possible to the actual – not many actual, but one actual” (DeWitt 1957).
So for DeWitt, at least at that time, the “real” world is just one single world, its
state continuously passing from possible to actual13.
Again Everett denies this as a false problem.
12 In the same letter DeWitt says: “But does Everett’s thesis constitute an entirely valid
application of Occam’s razor? Of this I am not so sure”.
13 Even if limited in some respects, DeWitt indicates how Copenhagen interpretation and
Bohm’s hidden variables theory succeed in giving a better explanation because they both keep
the “transition from possible to actual” in rescue.
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Everett insisted on the existence of the other branches, and their actuality : all
elements of the superposition are “actual”, none any more “real” than another.
The “transition from possible to actual” is not problematic for him, since there
is “no such transition, nor is such a transition necessary for the theory to be in
accord with our experience” (Everett 1957d): this means that unobservability is
not at odds with reality, and then actuality is not at odds with unobservability.
Everett replied by asserting that “it is completely unnecessary to suppose that
after an observation somehow one element of the final superposition is selected to
be awarded with a mysterious quality called “reality”, and the others condemned
to oblivion. We can be more charitable and allow the others to coexist – they won’t
cause any trouble anyway, because all the separate elements of the superposition
(“branches”) individually obey the wave equation with complete indifference to
the presence or absence (“actuality” or not) of any other elements”. (Everett
1957d).
This is the core of Everett’s reasoning, perhaps the more problematic point: the
transition, which implies the passage from a possible existence (the “potentia”
described by Heisenberg) to the “reification” in actual physical states, is denied
by Everett, according to whom such a transition is not necessary for the theory
to be in accord with our experience: all the branches exist simultaneously, but we
just live one of them.
In other words, branches cannot be experienced or perceived, even if they are all
actual and real to the same extent as the one we live in.
When we speak of ‘characterization’ here we clearly intend a kind of metaphysics,
because branches are not directly experienced. It is nonsense to ask what kind of
branches there are outside, since we should speak only about what is in our actual
reality, accessible from an empirical point of view: otherwise we are leaving the
door open to a metaphysical explanation.
Summarizing, the Everettian position appears to be very clear in two indisputable
points: while it is impossible to infer the nature of branching from experience,
because we can only infer the nature of perceived reality, it would be wrong to deny
the existence of a continuous branching process just because we cannot directly
experience it, this kind of overcautious consideration being contradictory to the
main purpose of science, which is that of discovering new phenomena.
Chapter 2. Branches from an empiricist perspective 55
2.2 Everett’s empiricism
Unobservability is a longstanding problem for science: it has to do with the ac-
count of unobservable entities on the one hand, and structures (or models) on the
other14.
Normally it refers to microscopic entities15, such as paramecia and mitochondria
or bigger entities, such as galaxies and black holes.
But the same kind of reasoning can be applied to Everettian ‘strange’ branching
entities, remembering that the author himself suggested how the vexed question of
the acceptance of his theory came about also for other acquired theories (referring
to the Copernican theory and also to Special Relativity); he prefers indeed to insist
on the predictive power of the theory and on its ability to justify our experience
from within itself.
Everett maintains that extra structure, the branching process and different relative
states are unobservable, but this does not imply that they should be considered
as unreal. Simply the equation in which real equals observable is wrong. Funda-
mental to this position is the fact that collapse has no kind of reality, and no way
to invalidate the total wave function, but with good reasons for believing that it
continues to survive, all branches are to be deduced, even if not observed. This is
the reason we cannot find any explanation of extra structure: it is implied in the
theory and our experience, but we cannot investigate it.
That is: collapse is unobserved, while branches are unobservable by definition.
Collapse should be observed in our ordinary lives in order to test its validity,
because it occurs in our perceptual horizon, while branches due to their nature
cannot be observed, because they are out of our perceptual horizon.
So, it appears to be a strong contradiction that we should believe in the reality
(actuality) of other branches, while it is incorrect to describe them, under the
penalty of building a metaphysical structure.
This apparent contradiction, in which unobservable entities cannot be described
but have to be assumed real, is dissipated once we look at Everett’s understanding
of the main features of a good scientific theory.
14 See Chakravartty (2014).
15 See Alspector-Kelley (2004) for a discussion on the role of measurement devices in detection
of unobservable entities, as described by van Fraassen (1980). The Author, in noting that a
satisfactory account for unobservable entities is missing, proposes to classify information gathered
through the ‘unaided eye’ by focusing more on ‘decision’ than on ‘discovery’: “This is not to
say that our decision is arbitrary. On the contrary, we are, I think, guided by fundamentally
epistemic considerations” (p. 343).
Chapter 2. Branches from an empiricist perspective 56
Everett’s discussion of the goals of theoretical physics, towards the end of his
long thesis and in reply to DeWitt suggests a conservative strategy16 for how one
might understand his deduction of determinate measurement records and quan-
tum statistics.
This strategy provides a concrete sense in which PWM can explain both deter-
minate measurement records, quantum statistics and also constitute a theoretical
frame for the extra structure.
As Everett explained in his long thesis, ‘the primary purpose of theoretical physics
is . . . to make useful models which serve for a time and are replaced as they
are outworn”: with the totality of reality completely inaccessible to us, we should
renounce the temptation of finding a direct, complete explanation for all elements
of reality (intending here even unperceived reality), but rather stimulate scientific
progress through the discovery of new phenomena, while being content with a
proper model for our perceived reality.
Indeed, in the second appendix to the long version of his thesis, Everett explains
that taking a theory to be descriptive of the metaphysics of the world is a method-
ological mistake:
[W]hen a theory is highly successful and becomes firmly established, the
model tends to become identified with “reality” itself, and the model na-
ture of the theory becomes obscured. The rise of classical physics offers an
excellent example of this process. The constructs of classical physics are
just as much fictions of our own minds as those of any other theory [. . . ]
we simply have a great deal more confidence in them. It must be deemed
a mistake, therefore, to attribute any more “reality” here than elsewhere.
(Everett 1973a, p. 134).
Everett emphasizes how scientific (realist) reasoning tends to identify the model
provided by the theory with reality itself, once its predictive power is confirmed
in practice. But models are constructions which serve for practice, and there is
no reason to identify a model with that reality. Certainly, the model should be in
accord with our perceived reality, but it is not taken for granted that the model
is identical to reality itself. That is, the theory is not completely identical to
perceived reality, because in general a physical theory, with its models, is not a
universally valid copy of reality, it is just a representation of our reality by means
of description of our empirical data.
16 See Barrett (2011b).
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For Everett, a theory provides models for interpreting perceived reality. But the
model itself is nothing more than a mathematical structure: this means that it is
a mistake to take the model as reality.
Structure is the way science depicts reality, but is not reality itself: with a certain
structure we try to interpret phenomena. Structure is our instrument to embed
phenomena into a theory, but there is not a relation of identity between phenomena
and model:
Once we have granted that any physical theory is essentially only a model
for the world of experience, we must renounce all hope of finding anything
like the correct theory. There is nothing which prevents any number of
quite distinct models from being in correspondence with experience (i.e.
all “correct”), and furthermore no way of ever verifying that any model is
completely correct, simply because the totality of all experience is never
accessible to us. (Everett 1973a, p. 134).
The emphasis goes completely on the correctness of the theory once we grant
that it is able to explain observable reality. The other parts are to be deduced
using “considerations of inductive inference and the factors which influence our
confidence in a given theory” (Everett 1973a, p. 135). For Everett our perceived
reality is totally described by PWM and furthermore the theory tells us that there
is a larger part beyond our horizon of perception (for now) which could be inferred.
PWM provides a correct explanation of our perceived reality, and experience and
theory agree in declaring that apart from our relative state, there is a branching
process, because:
• we do not observe collapse so the wave function still ‘survives’, in one way
or another;
• the total wave function is inaccessible to us: the theory says that we experi-
ence just our actual branch, and nothing like a branching experience is given
for an observer.
So far we have seen that Everett’s aim is to introduce a structure in which the rel-
ative state might be understood. This structure serves as guidance and permits us
to understand the passage from classical to quantum world, with all its paradoxes,
simply as a subjective experience. In this way, it is not necessary to postulate any
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sort of discontinuous and arbitrary change, because our experience is explained
to perfection without resorting to strange, and unobserved phenomena (such as
collapse).
Furthermore, our experience is explained starting from the theory, and this is proof
of the value of the model, because it is the theory itself which grants the delim-
itation of observable and unobservable entities. The definition of those areas of
the model which describe unobservable entities or structure should be defined, but
definition itself has only an operationalist importance, and should not be confused
with a universal criterion17.
That is: the totality of our experience being inaccessible to us, we delimitate our
section of accessible reality, which is the observable part of it. It is this part which
has to be identical to the theory or, in other words, it should be faithfully repro-
duced by the theory.
For Everett the extra structure has to be taken into consideration to the extent
that it is contained and implied in the theory; that is the reason his explanation
could result quite incomplete prima facie, because he assumes a methodological
position from which we can only speak about what the theory says about our
viewable reality, as extra structure is unobservable.
We describe the branching process and branching structure only in the parts im-
plied by direct observation. The result is that all the ‘philosophical’ features
that could emerge from the theory are abandoned, because they are the result of
the temptation to identify the theory itself with reality. The theory is complete,
because it gives a complete explanation of our reality, without resorting to mys-
terious or strange factors, such as a boundary between the classic-reality and the
quantum-unreal.
The fact that Everett did not give further characterization to his branches derives
from a precise methodological assumption: his direct reference to empiricism and
mostly to Frank, to whom Everett writes seeking approval, testifies to his strong
methodological credo18.
Everett took his view of theories to be “very nearly identical” to those held by
17 Everett exemplifies this with special relativity: “the critical examination of what quantities
are observable in a theory does, however, play a useful role, since it gives an insight into ways
of modification of a theory when it becomes necessary. A good example of this process is the
development of Special Relativity”. But he reminds us that “such successes of the positivist
viewpoint, when used merely as a tool for deciding which modifications of a theory are possible,
in no way justify its universal adoption as a general principle which all theories must satisfy”
(Everett 1973a, p. 136).
18 In 1957 Everett corresponded with several supporters of his theory. See Everett’s corre-
spondence with Margenau and with Frank.
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Philipp Frank, one of the founders of the Vienna Circle.
Frank was broadly empiricist, and characterized his philosophical position as a
fusion of positivism, pragmatism and operationalism, holding that ‘the spirit of
all these schools of thought is one and the same’ (Frank 1946, p. 3)19.
Everett may have read at least four of Frank’s works (Frank 1946, 1950, 1954,
1955). His link to Frank is testified to by a letter in which he expressed his full
agreement with his philosophical position.
His devotion to Frank is clearly admitted:
I think that it will be quite interesting to see the various reasons for ac-
cepting or rejecting the theory that will be advanced by various physicist.
[..] because of its particular nature this theory is especially suited to a
number of points which can arise in any discussion of the nature of theories
in general. If you have any interest in the matter [PWM] with respect to
the more general questions of the philosophic, psychological or sociological
reasons which influenced attitudes toward physical theories, I will be happy
to send you copies of the comments and criticism that I receive. (Everett
1957c).
Everett refers to Frank’s idea of validation of scientific theories (Frank 1954).
Frank identifies as good virtues for a physical theory “agreement with observa-
tions” and “mathematical simplicity”; but since they are always unachievable
targets, it is sufficient for our physical theories to be, at best, in agreement with
observable facts and sufficiently simple to be useable: the most we can hope for
obtaining a compromise between both criteria. Frank thus concludes that a the-
ory cannot be ‘the truth”; rather, it is an instrument that serves toward some
definite purpose, a tool that produces other tools according to a practical scheme.
Moreover Frank’s considerations about psychological, sociological and contextual
factors in the acceptance of a theory show how a theory’s acceptance is often
connected more to its compatibility with common sense than to its simplicity or
empirical adequacy. Frank words resound those of Everett:
Looking at the historical record, we notice that the requirement of compat-
ibility with common sense and the rejection of “unnatural theories” have
been advocated with a highly emotional undertone, and it is reasonable to
19 Frank found significant philosophical agreement with Carnap’s recent work and with the
pragmatic tradition represented by C. S. Peirce, William James, and P. W. Bridgman.
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raise the question: What was the source of heat in those fights against new
and absurd theories? Surveying these battles, we easily find one common
feature, the apprehension that a disagreement with common sense may de-
prive scientific theories of their value as incentives for a desirable human
behavior. In other words, by becoming incompatible with common sense,
scientific theories lose their fitness to support desirable attitudes in the do-
main of ethics, politics, and religion. (Frank 1954, p. 9).
Everett probably refers to this when he writes:
I am an example of a certain type of theories – a completely abstract math-
ematical model, which is ultimately put into correspondence with experi-
ence. It has the interesting feature, however, that this correspondence can
be made only by invoking the theory itself to predict our experience – the
world picture presented by the basic mathematical theory being entirely
alien to our usual conception of “reality”. The treatment of observation
itself in the theory is absolutely necessary. If one will only swallow the
world picture implied by the theory one has, I believe, the simplest, more
complete framework for the interpretation of quantum mechanics available
today. (Everett 1957c).
These ideas are quite in accord with Everett’s own way of thinking about phys-
ical theories, and contribute to encompass him into this form of empiricism. As
pointed out in Barrett, “that Everett described his view of the nature of physical
theories as being very nearly identical with Frank’s, situates Everett’s understand-
ing in a relatively clear historical context.” (Barrett 2011a, p. 697).
Indeed, even Frank refused to commit himself with metaphysics since he regarded
“metaphysics as a direct interpretation of scientific principles in terms of the lan-
guage of everyday life experience. ‘Interpretation’ means translation. Metaphysics
attempts a translation of the basic principles of science, but not according to a
strictly fixed dictionary; the univocal relation between a term and its translation
has been replaced by an analogical relation. But we cannot tell by any exact cri-
terion what is a ‘correct’ analogy” (Frank 1955).
Also, Frank divided theories into three essential parts: equations, logical rules for
manipulating them, and semantic rules that tied the language to the formal the-
ory. Semantic rules have operational meaning, since they allow us to check if what
is held in the theory, in a formal theoretic language, can be confirmed experimen-
tally. If there is agreement, then the system as a whole is confirmed. This kind
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of scheme is almost identical to Everett’s own, which will be exposed in the next
paragraph.
2.3 Isomorphism versus homomorphism
When DeWitt qualifies the whole state vector as “simply too rich in content” he is
referring to the lack of isomorphism between the theory and our real world, so that
the ‘excessive’ richness is inexplicable once one looks at the world as it appears.
This is the reason why DeWitt ended with a many-worlds theory, in which each
world is isomorphic to the relative states indicated by the theory.
After his first reading, DeWitt noted how Everett’s system “contains all possible
branches in it at the same time. In the real physical world we must be content with
just one branch. Everett’s world and the real physical world are therefore not iso-
morphic”. He also added that “certain terms, such as “isomorphism”, would seem
to be useful under almost any conceivable circumstances and yet retain meanings
which are held within fairly rigid bounds. I am afraid that it is at precisely the
most crucial point in Everett’s argument where many people, including myself,
will be unable to swallow your implication that the word “isomorphism” applies”
(DeWitt 1957).
The point here is that DeWitt simply misunderstood Everett’s original purpose.
While speaking of an isomorphic model for the world, he ignores the fact that
Everett himself explained this in the appendix of his long thesis, specifying that
he preferred the word homomorphism: as said above, he did not require every ele-
ment of the total superposition to be in perfect correspondence with the perceived
world. It was sufficient for him to find a concrete relative state appropriately
represented in the model provided by the theory. Everett does not identify “corre-
spondence”20 with identity as a mapping between the theory in itself and perceived
reality. Rather, he advocates a one-to-one correspondence, or identity, between
the model, which describes our relative state and perceived reality, which is better
described as an homomorphism:
By isomorphism we mean a mapping of some elements of the model into
elements of the perceived world which has the property that the model
20 DeWitt refers, in using the term identity, to the short thesis (Everett 1957b) which is the
only one he had read. In the long thesis, Everett himself clarifies how the word isomorphism is
to be intended. See Barrett (2011b).
Chapter 2. Branches from an empiricist perspective 62
is faithful, that is, if in the model a symbol A implies a symbol B, and
A corresponds to the happening of an event in the perceived world, then
the event corresponding to B must also obtain. The world homomorphism
would be technically more correct, since there may not be a one to one
correspondence between the model and the external world. (Everett 1973a,
p. 133)21.
Indeed, according to Everett’s approach to physical theories in general, the only
requirement for a scientific theory to be a good theory is empirical faithfulness,
which implies that there must be a sort of ‘isomorphism’ between a mathematical
model and the perceived reality.
Everett then continues describing how a theory should be:
Every theory can be divided into two separate parts, the formal part, and the
interpretive part. The formal part consists of a purely logico-mathematical
structure, i.e., a collection of symbols together with rules for their manipula-
tion, while the interpretive part consists of a set of “associations” which are
rules which put some of the elements of the formal part into correspondence
with the perceived world. The essential point of a theory, then, is that it
is a mathematical model, together with an isomorphism between the model
and the world of experience (i.e., the sense perceptions of the individual,
or the “real world” depending upon one’s choice of epistemology). (Everett
1973a p. 133).
Rather than describing the metaphysical structure of the world, a successful phys-
ical theory for Everett is supposed to be somehow isomorphic to the world of
experience. A theory has:
• A formal part, consisting in purely logico-mathematical structure, and rules
for their manipulation;
• An interpretive part, consisting in a set of associations (in this part corre-
spondence between the formal part and the perceived world is ensured).
This isomorphism (homomorphism, as we saw above) is a mapping between the
model and the world as we see it.
This means that the only requirement of a theory could be its empirical faithfulness
21 See also Barrett and Byrne (2012, footnote on p. 169).
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to perceived reality, and theory acceptance implies the belief in its faithfulness,
and nothing more: we should renounce finding something like the truth, and in
the belief in truth.
Everett underlines that homomorphism is more correct, because there will be ele-
ments of the model which do not find correspondence in the perceived world.
This is the crucial point, because with homomorphism Everett recognized that the
extra structure was not isomorphic to perceived reality. Isomorphism was to be
understood between the relative state and the branch of total superposition.
Everett clarified his position: the theory he advocated provided a model which
perfectly explained our determinate outcome without using the collapse postulate
(in the sense already described: collapse is introduced simply as a tool, for opera-
tionalist purposes, but it has to be understood locally).
The theory then implies a model for other structures of the global state, which
are not isomorphic to our perceived reality. This was the sense in which DeWitt
spoke about the necessity of an isomorphic explanation, which he could not find in
the edited version of the short thesis. DeWitt is misunderstanding Everett when
he says “it concerns the question of what is meant or may be meant by the word
“correspondence” – a better word would be “isomorphism”, but you seem to have
avoided it – particularly when applied to the ensemble of Everett’s relative state
vectors Ψ0[A, B, C . . . ] as compared with the experience of a real physical ob-
server” (DeWitt 1957).
Actually, DeWitt will then opt for a global isomorphism, ultimately ending up with
a many-worlds interpretation. Everett however was searching for a different map-
ping: isomorphism, i.e. the one-to-one mapping was between the perceived state
and the predicted state, as being typical. Homomorphism indicates the correspon-
dence between relative-determinate-record states (all the possible relative-record
states) and the global state.
In replying to DeWitt he writes:
First, I must say a few words to clarify my conception of the nature and pur-
pose of physical theories in general. To me, any physical theory is a logical
construct (model), consisting of symbols and rules for their manipulation,
some of whose elements are associated with elements of the perceived world.
If this association is an isomorphism (or at least a homomorphism) we can
speak of the theory as correct, or as faithful. The fundamental requirements
of any theory are logical consistency and correctness in this sense. (Everett
1957d).
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It is homomorphism which grants that the theory is faithful to our perceived
reality.
Everett’s faithfulness concept, together with his idea of model is in accordance
with the empiricist structuralism description of what is required for a theory to
be empirically adequate.
2.4 Everett meets Van Fraassen
As mentioned above, Everett’s ideas of physical theories in general are also com-
parable to empiricist structuralism. Indeed his description of model and, mostly,
the implicit criterion of pragmatic selectivity makes the theory comparable to
Van Fraassen’s empiricist structuralism, as proposed in Scientific Representation
(2008).
Even in the primitive formulation of The Scientific Image (1980) there are points
in common, but the introduction to a pragmatic criterion of selectivity in Scientific
Representation is the key to understanding Everett’s apparent incomplete position
regarding unobservable entities.
Van Fraassen rejected Everett’s interpretation on various occasions22, but he un-
derstood it a` la Bell23, and not under the light of the latest discoveries (Barrett
and Byrne 2012)24; Everett’s archive provides new important interpretative roots,
which are mostly oriented toward a strong empiricism25.
Even for Van Fraassen “to believe a theory is to believe that one of its models
correctly represents the world. You can think of the models as representing the
possible worlds allowed by the theory; one of these possible worlds is meant to be
the real one. To believe the theory is to believe that exactly one of its models
correctly represents the world (not just to some extent, but in all respects)” (Van
Fraassen 1980, p. 47).
This means that “a model often contains much that does not correspond to any
observable feature in the domain. . . The model’s structure must be taken to reveal
22 See Van Fraassen (1972, 1980, 1991a, 1991b).
23 See Bell (1987) and Van Fraassen (1991a, p. 273), which clearly refers to Bell.
24 See Osnaghi (2008) for a very precise description of analogies between Everett and Van
Fraassen in contrast to Copenhagen interpretation, in which the Author shows “the import of
the early debate on Everett’s thesis for the current discussions of the measurement problem,
and, more specifically, for any account and solution of the problem along van Fraassen lines” (p.
157).
25 See Barrett and Byrne (2012, “Conceptual Introduction”).
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structure in the observable phenomena, while the rest of the model must be serv-
ing that purpose indirectly. It may be practically as well as theoretically useful
to think of the phenomena as embedded in a larger – and largely unobservable –
structure.” (Van Fraassen 2008, p. 87).
Van Fraassen recognizes that the model itself is not an entire copy of perceived
reality, he also sees how unobservable entities could constitute a serious danger for
an empiricist account of science.
Van Fraassen says: “with human participation entirely foreign to the context, what
can constitute adequacy or truth except a direct theory-model to nature relation?
How can we assert that those unknown phenomena fit models of our theories,
except in a sense that implies the metaphysical realist’s postulation of ‘structure
in nature’, consisting of universals or the like? That rhetorical questions present
the first of the main dangers for the empiricist that I want to take up here” (Van
Fraassen 2008, p. 246).
To avoid this danger, the focus should be on empirical adequacy more than the
notion of truth. It is not wrong for a theory to describe unobservable parts of
the world, since “physical theories do indeed describe much more than what is
observable” but what matters is “empirical adequacy, and not the truth or falsity
of how they go beyond the observable phenomena.. . . empirical adequacy: because
it relates the theory to the actual phenomena, it does not collapse into the notion
of truth” (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 64).
The theory is an artifact, constructed to aid us in understanding nature, not to
usurp the function. The target of a theory is the understanding of phenomena,
and the construction of a model is the vehicle. Even “sophistication”26 is positive
if it introduces a future possibility for better practical gain, so Van Fraassen is
in agreement with Everett in asserting that a theory could certainly have parts
which are not yet directly testable, but could constitute a future possibility. For
the moment, the exceeding structure serves to reveal structure in the observable
phenomena even indirectly.
In an empiricist setting of structuralism “scientific theories are viewed precisely as
theories, not as our sole wherewithal for getting around the world” (Van Fraassen
2008, p. 238). Van Fraassen objects to the structuralist view, opposing the slo-
gan “all that science describes is structure” (which implies that structure as we
know it is effectively a natural phenomenon) his own empiricist motto, “all we
know through science is structure”, referring solely to the mathematical aspect of
26 See Van Fraassen (1980, p. 68).
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scientific representation, which is our proper standard for the understanding of
nature, not nature itself. Those words echo Everett: “[W]hen a theory is highly
successful and becomes firmly established, the model tends to become identified
with “reality” itself”, but it has to be remembered that a theory is just a “logical
construct (model), some of whose elements are associated with elements of the
perceived world” (Everett 1973a, p. 136).
Science designates those areas of the theory which are isomorphic to our experi-
ence, and empirically adequate. “What is the proper form of acceptance: belief
that the theory as a whole is true: or something else?....to accept a theory is (for
us) to believe that it is empirically adequate – that what the theory says about
what is observable (by us) is true.” (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 18).
The theory draws a picture of the world. But it is science itself that “designates
certain areas in this picture as observable. The scientist, in accepting the theory,
is asserting the picture to be accurate in those areas. This is, according to the
anti-realist, the only virtue claimed which concerns the relation of theory to world
alone. Any other virtues to be claimed will either concern the internal structure of
the theory (such as logical consistency) or be pragmatic, that is, relate specifically
to human concerns” (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 57). Because, in order to be accepted,
a theory should be correct in what it says about observable phenomena. That is,
the only belief involved is that relative to observable phenomena. But, to delineate
what is observable, however, we must “look at science – and possibly to that same
theory – for that is also an empirical question”27.
This does not obliterate of course the distinction between what is observable and
the unobservable extra structure, but at the same time, it does not invalidate,
nor obliges one to adhere to a specific metaphysical assumption. Van Fraassen’s
position overlaps that of Frank, and mutatis mutandis, Everett’s credo: a theory
could certainly take into consideration unobservable entities, which may become
testable in the future; empirical adequacy should be reserved for phenomena that
are saved even by unobservable parts of a theory, in an indirect form.
Furthermore, the empirical importance of a theory (i.e., its reference to our per-
ceived reality) is defined from within the science, because it is science itself that
delineates the boundary between observable and unobservable entities.
Our conceptual framework changes, even if the real world is always the same.
27 Van Fraassen also says that this “might produce a vicious circle (the hermeneutic circle) if
what is observable were itself not simply a fact disclosed by the theory, but rather theory-relative
or theory-dependent. [..] I regard what is observable as a theory-independent question. It is a
function of facts about us qua organisms in the world”. (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 57).
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2.5 Pragmatic selectivity
So the “model”, in Van Fraassen’s and Everettian language, is a useful representa-
tion, which has to be isomorphic to the ensemble of data we utilize to formulate a
good hypothesis. But this simply implies an isomorphism between the theoretical
model and the data themselves. What has to be specified is isomorphism with
the phenomenon one wants to save and the theoretical construal one intends to
use, because structures can never have a representation in nature, especially when
they relate to phenomena that are never actually represented.
To say that a model has a structure which is isomorphic to that exhibited by phe-
nomena does not mean that phenomena share the same, identical structure, which
equals to say that representation is not mirroring, or copying, reality. In other
words, the abstract structures are the embedding of chaotic, brutish, arbitrary
phenomena. Phenomenon does not have in itself structure: structure pertains to
the selection of a certain class of phenomena.
The development of a theory follows a triadic trend:
1. The first stage is represented by the single, observable phenomenon which is
subject to measurement;
2. The second stage is represented by the appearances they (the phenomena)
present in progressively more abstract outcomes;
3. The theory, in which appearances are embedded, is the last stage.
Only the representation of phenomena by means of appearances should be isomor-
phic to the model, the other parts of a theory serve that purpose indirectly.
This description is diachronic: indeed it has to be remarked that a phenomenon
(or a class of phenomena) is always selected by a certain theory, because our lan-
guage and our attention are theory-laden; even when using theory-laden language,
a scientist always has the possibility of “bracketing” ontological implications of
the theoretical world-picture in which he is immersed (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 81).
The synchronic level introduces the most important aspect: a theory is a user-
dependent tool. In ‘Scientific Representation’ (2008), Van Fraassen revisits his
concept of empirical adequacy, moving towards a stronger pragmatism.
What constitutes a relation between a theory and phenomena is always a 3-place
relation: the object, the subject and its selective depiction. Representation is in
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general three-faceted: reality, appearances (indexical judgments), theory.
We can explain the embedding of phenomena into models just by pointing out
that the relationship between the abstract structure and our perceived reality is
due to our selective attention to certain aspects and to the representation of them
in certain ways.
This is not restrictive: from an empiricist point of view there is no difference be-
tween the phenomenon itself and the phenomenon as represented as thus or so.
And also, it does not imply incompleteness: the essential indexical does not re-
duce the universality (more adequately, “maximal intersubjectivity” (Van Fraassen
2008, p. 182)) of our theory, if it is said to be empirically adequate.
As van Fraassen remarks “science presents a picture of the world which is much
richer in content than what the unaided eye discerns. But science itself teaches
us also that it is richer than the unaided eye can discern. For science itself delin-
eates, at least to some extent, the observable parts of the world it describes” (Van
Fraassen 1980, p. 59).
The term “observable” is putative, and has nothing to do with existence, because it
has no ontological relevance. That is: what counts as an “observable phenomenon
is a function of what the epistemic community is (that observable is observable-
to-us)” (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 19).
Observability is variable. It is functional to what the epistemic community re-
tains to be observable: “the structures definable from measurement data are a
subclass of the physical structures described. It is in this way that science it-
self distinguishes the observable which it postulates from the whole it postulates.
But since science places human observers among the physical systems it means
to describe, it also gives itself the task of describing anthropocentric distinctions”
(Van Fraassen 1980, p. 59). In this sense there is a distinction between the phe-
nomena and the “trans-phenomenal” (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 59) in the scientific
world-picture, which expresses an anthropocentric confine between what is already
knowable (empirically accessible) and what is not yet included in our horizon of
perceptions.
In this sense, realism is much more limiting than an empirical assumption of sci-
ences, because the latter permits us to explore more portions of reality than realism
does. Physics gives us representations of nature for the empiricist, while for the
realist it is a copy of phenomena.
From a purely foundational point of view, theoretical models depict the ‘underly-
ing reality’.
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But from an epistemic point of view, some elements or substructures of those
models are meant to represent the observable phenomena – the empirical sub-
structures. Finally, it is a requirement for the theory to at least predict, and if
possible to “derive” the appearances, that is to say, the contents of measurement
outcomes. This division corresponds to three ostensibly different domains:
• Theoretically postulated reality;
• The observable phenomena;
• Appearances.
In other words, phenomena can be measured and observed in many different ways,
because measurement outcomes provide different perspectival appearances of phe-
nomena. So to say that a theory must ‘save phenomena’ is not the same as saying
that a theory must be in accord with experimental and observational results, since
measurement outcomes do not show what the phenomena are but how they appear:
appearances are always limited, just as the observer cannot see what is behind his
back28.
We cannot transcend observable aspects of reality, which is the act of looking at
(or measuring, creating appearances of) phenomena. We could save phenomena,
and represent reality as it appears in our observation; but reality is made of ob-
servable things, we cannot see reality as it appears from inside. In this sense a
theory is nothing more than a model, with a certain isomorphism to perceived
reality.
If our model is coherent with perceived reality, namely if the model provided by
the theory is empirically adequate, than we have a good theory.
For Van Fraassen a measurement is “an operation that locates an item in a logical
space (provided by the theory to represent a range of possible states or character-
istics of such items)” (Van Fraassen 2008, p. 164)
A theory is a set of theoretical models, which have to fit observed and observable
phenomena. So the elements of a theory are:
28 See Van Fraassen (2008) in explaining how appearance is “compromised” in QM, he says:
“This will still be very puzzling [. . . ] if you identify reality with the theoretically postulated
reality. Think of this, however, as an empiricist must: the theoretical representation, in which
no object state is localized in a finite region of space for more than an instant, is only theory.
As is all of our theoretical science. The reality to which it is accountable is only the observable
part of the world, and for us that implies that what it is in practice directly accountable to are
the appearances-the outcomes of the measurements and observations that are actually made.”
(p. 308).
Chapter 2. Branches from an empiricist perspective 70
• Data model:
starting from the datum (data), which is the row result of a measurement, we
obtain a smoothed-out summary of the information that emerged from all these
data. In data model one summarizes the relative frequencies found;
• Surface model:
mathematically idealized form of data model, in which we replace the relative
frequencies counts by measures with a continuous range of values (probabilities);
• Theoretical model:
1. a family of M observables (physical magnitudes) each with a range of possible
values;
2. a set S of states;
3. a stochastic response function Pms for each m in M and s in S, which is a
probability measure on the range of m.
Since the description of phenomena is already in practice by means of ‘data models’
and ‘surface models’, data and surface models must be isomorphic embeddable in
theoretical models.
The reported relative frequencies, in their own summarized form constitute the
data model, obtained from the repeated applications of a single measurement.
What the theory confronts is abstracted from many data models. The abstracting
“is an idealizing, an extrapolation to a form that could not be reached in actual
practice” (Van Fraassen 2008, p. 172). This idealization, which is not yet a
theoretical structure, is the surface model.
The characterization of this scheme is different to the former form of empiricism,
proposed in ‘The Scientific Image’.
The self-declared “Wittgensteinian move” consists then in the following:
The theory to phenomena relation displayed here is an embedding of one
mathematical structure into another one. For the data model—or, more
accurately, the surface model—which represents appearances, it is itself a
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mathematical structure. . . Construction of a data model is precisely the se-
lective relevant depiction of the phenomena by the user of the theory re-
quired for the possibility of representation of the phenomenon. . . There is
nothing in an abstract structure itself ‘in a context in which a given model
is someone’s representation of a phenomenon, there is for that person no
difference between the question whether the theory fits that representation
and the question whether that theory fits the phenomena. (Van Fraassen
2008, p. ).
The bottom line is that reality consists of smelly, colorful, noisy (observable) phe-
nomena, while appearances are the way phenomena ‘look like’ in a given measure-
ment set-up, and hence from a particular vantage point. We ‘save phenomena’ by
embedding perspectival appearances (as given by a certain instrument, measure-
ment set-up, or frequencies in a data model) into another abstract structure, the
surface model, which ‘smoothes’ and ‘idealizes’ the measurement outcomes, and
eventually embed the surface model into theoretical models (such as for example
Copernicus’s geometric models in astronomy).
By using a pragmatic criterion of selectivity, Van Fraassen proposes a non-pejorative
sense of “subjective”, because the essential indexical has to be labelled as some-
thing subjective. To use a theory or model, to base predictions on it, we have to
locate ourselves with respect to it. We have to locate our situation in the theory’s
logical space, in a way that is similar to our “we are here” with respect to a map.
2.6 Everettian pragmatism
Going back to PWM, with the Everettian theory the relative state is compatible
with the phenomena we observe, then we infer from its relativity that there is a
connection with other structure. We have no reason to postulate the collapse of
the wave function, because we do not have anything that could explain such a
disruptive observation, or better, this privileged and anthropocentric position.
We infer collapse while we should infer that our vision is a partial one, and in
this way we absolutize our position. And moreover, no matter how the rest of the
global state has to be declined, because it is inaccessible (not in the usual sense,
but in a deeper way: branches are genuinely unobservable, while the motion of the
earth is inexperienced); empirically speaking, we should be faithful to our portion
of observed reality. And faithfulness with our portion of accessible, testable reality
Chapter 2. Branches from an empiricist perspective 72
leads to faithfulness to PWM, since we actually perceive one relative state.
Everett himself accepted that we can find our relative state appropriately rep-
resented in the correlation structure, so his understanding of actual experience
can be put into correspondence with this latest form of structural empiricism,
and could be considered in the frame of Van Fraassen’s empirical adequacy : the
problem in figuring out ‘extra structures’ coming from the model, which is the
reason for metaphysical interpretations, can be solved by using pragmatic criteria
to choose in which way the theory should correspond to empirical evidence.
In this way, Everett’s interpretation can also be considered an example of van
Fraassen’s theory.
Indeed there is in Everett’s theory an implicit criterion of pragmatic selectivity.
That PWM is faithful to our determinate measurement records and to statisti-
cal distribution of these records simply amounts to the fact that one can find an
isomorphic substructure to our statistical experience with determinate records in
the model of PWM. The point is that determinate record and probability prob-
lems are solved here in the sense that one can find our actual empirical records
and our empirically supported quantum expectations in the correlation model of
PWM. And furthermore, the fact that there is much more than just our actual
determinate records in the correlation model is something that Everett can, and
does, embrace when he speaks about homomorphism; but he prefers to focus on
our actual experience and in doing this he simply chooses a pragmatic criterion of
selectivity : empirical faithfulness as Everett understood it “did not require every
element in the theory’s representation of an observer’s experience to correspond to
the observer’s experience; rather, it was enough that there was an element of the
empirical substructure associated with the observer that represented the observer’s
experience [..] The surplus empirical structure was not necessary to explain our
particular experience, but he also insisted that its presence did not undermine the
theory’s explanation since one can find our particular experience appropriately
represented in the correlation structure” (Barrett 2011b, p. 704).
In PWM, the data model could be represented by the relative frequencies one ob-
tains from elaborating raw data, coming from repeated measurements.
More specifically, one can think of relative states as what one gets when one chooses
a physical system S and a state of that system φS then ignores all components of
the entangled global state of the world that characterize S as being in any state
other than φS. If the single remaining component also characterizes the system R
as being in state χR, then we say that the state of R is χR relative to the state
Chapter 2. Branches from an empiricist perspective 73
of S being φS. Given this picture of such relative states in the correlation model,
“addressing the probability problem requires only slightly more subtlety” (Barrett
2010, p. 233).
In other words, the relative state is the phenomenon, which comes out of a mea-
suring process.
The surface model, which is an idealization of what we observe with relative fre-
quencies, permits us to find in the correlation model our standard expectations.
Indeed, there is a parameter determined by the correlation model that covaries
with our standard quantum statistical expectations. It is not the norm-squared of
the coefficients of the global state, but it is closely related29.
In other words, the parameter |ak|2 can be taken as representing the degree to
which the result k is expected given the usual quantum statistics. The faithfulness
of PWM with respect to the usual quantum statistics simply consists in finding
such a parameter in the correlation model. And, taken together, that PWM is
faithful to our determinate measurement records and the statistical distribution of
these records simply amounts to the fact that one can find an isomorphic substruc-
ture to our statistical experience with determinate records in the model of PWM.
With the surface model we can give a meaning to data models: in other words,
phenomena are recognized as appearances, and in this way they are collocated in
a precise region of our perceptual horizon.
The theoretical model provided by Everett is then an explanation of how our
expectations co-vary with usual quantum statistics; using Everett’s words, the
theoretical model provides a correlation model with which we can find ourselves
as located in the global state, as typical elements of it.
We found a frame in which our appearances are explained.
What mattered to Everett was the empirical faithfulness of PWM, which for him
involved showing how one might find our actual experience represented in the cor-
relation structure described by the theory. He did not pretend that PWM was
the only theory capable of explaining QM, because, as we saw above, he did not
believe in anything like ‘the correct theory’.
The only requirement for a theory to be a good theory is logical consistence and
29 See Barrett (2010, p. 233): “Consider the state of the observer and her object system
relative to the observer having a record that the measurement was performed but not relative to
any particular record of the result. One might renormalize this relative state, then think of it as
a state describing the superposition of possible measurement records that would result from a
simple measurement interaction on the linear dynamics. Suppose the coefficient associated with
the term characterizing the notebook as recording the result k is ak. Our quantum expectations
for result k covary with the parameter |ak|2 ”.
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isomorphic adherence with the perceived world. Everett took PWM to be em-
pirically faithful because the values of our measurement records are represented
as relative records in the correlation structure characterized by the theory and
there is a measure of typicality over relative measurement records that can be
determined from the correlation structure alone and that co-varies with standard
quantum expectations.
Everett recognized that there was also excess structure represented by PWM in-
sofar as it provided representations of both our actual measurement records and
measurement records that do not appear to us therefore unobtainable, this did
not bother him since he simply required that one was able to discover our actual
experience in the model and be able to understand the experience as being appro-
priately typical.
Typicality is the justification for inferring the relativity of the single state and its
coherence with standard quantum expectations.
In this sense, then, Everett explained both determinate measurement records and
standard quantum statistics while avoiding the embarrassment of having to insist
on a particular metaphysical interpretation of branches. Moreover it is the same
theory which affirms unawareness of any sort of branching event.
The pragmatic criterion for acceptability is also confirmed by what Everett in-
dicated as virtues for a theory to be good, in agreement with Frank and Van
Fraassen. While he held that one can only require that a physical theory has to
be logically consistent and empirically faithful, he also believed that there were
various optional, but desirable, pragmatic virtues.
These other virtues make a theory “more” acceptable than others: in a cost-benefit
analysis, Everett indicates consistency, simplicity, comprehensiveness and pictora-
bility (a particularly detailed intuitive understanding of the theory’s model).
Everett took his relative-state formulation of PWM to be acceptable because it
was consistent and empirically faithful, also it was superior to other consistent
interpretations of quantum mechanics because it was simpler, pictorable and more
comprehensive. PWM as he presented it is indeed consistent, it is arguably simple,
intending here conceptual simplicity rather than ease in use, and it is comprehen-
sive in the sense that all physical systems are precisely treated in the same linear
way. Comprehensiveness increases our confidence in a theory, because its predic-
tive power is more ostensive than the previous ones.
Predictive power is in fact connected to the ability to create new predictions, “un-
suspected before the formulation of the theory” (Everett 1973a, p. 134), which
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is preferable to the mere description of already known phenomena, described as
“the role of compactly summarizing known results” (Everett 1973a, p. 134). This
“inertia of theories” is the stimulating part of scientific research and “supplies a
greater motive to theory construction than that of aiding the engineer” (Everett
1973a, p. 134).
Everett in this way justifies the usage of unobservable entities, which are intro-
duced to expand our possibility of prediction:
It is necessary to say a few words about a view which is sometimes expressed,
the idea that a physical theory should contain no elements which do not
correspond directly to observables. This position seems to be founded on the
notion that the only purpose of a theory is to serve as a summary of known
data, and overlooks the [..] discovery of totally new phenomena. The major
motivation of this viewpoint appears to be the desire to construct perfectly
‘safe’ theories which will never be opened to contradiction. (Everett 1934,
p. 136).
Explanatory power is not “pure science”, but an application of a scientific theory:
“it is a use of science to satisfy certain of our desires, and these desires are quite
specific in a specific context. The exact content of the desire varies from context
to context.” (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 156).
The pragmatic dimension of such virtues is implied by “use and usefulness of a
theory. In other words, once a theory is evaluated as empirically adequate, more
than belief is involved: to accept a theory signifies to make a commitment, a com-
mitment to the further confrontation of new phenomena” (Van Fraassen 1980, p.
88), and these virtues permit us to compare the theory following its usage.
Summarizing, for Everett the branching process is unobservable for direct, imme-
diate reasons: the theory does not provide anything like a branching experience for
the memory configuration of observers systems, and this means that it is perfectly
coherent with our “factual” experience. It is the theory in itself which indicates
the parts of it which designate observable areas: the only thing we can claim is
that branches exist, but since the same theory claims that “external” branches are
unobservable, it is meaningless to ask what kind of nature corresponds to branches,
unless we wish to become involved in metaphysical assumptions, which is exactly
what Everett did not intend doing.
With PWM we allow a comprehension of phenomena which is opened to future
possibilities, starting from the assumption that the observable is a perspectival,
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contextual appearance, and allowing for a more general and less anthropological
vision of reality, provided that a certain portion of the global state is empirically
inaccessible.
Empirical ‘minimalism’ is what is needed together with theoretical ‘inertia’. The
fact that a theory has some degree of “sophistication” (intending with this term
“introduction of detours via theoretical variables to arrive at useful, adequate,
manageable descriptions of the phenomena”) does not automatically mean that
such a theory is not valid or should be seen as metaphysically filled: “the ‘meta-
physical baggage’ will of course not be used when the detour pays off; it is reserved
for those detours that yield no practical gain. Even useless metaphysical baggage
may be intriguing, however, due to its potentialities for the future30”. This kind
of sophistication is functional to the usage of the theory, and metaphysics appears
here in case the detour is not capable of producing a ‘pragmatic’ pay off, via a
better predictive power.
For Everett the other interpretations of QM were even more metaphysically com-
mitted and limited to the explanation of already established phenomena.
Concluding, there is textual evidence that something like Van Fraassen’s empirical
adequacy is what Everett had in mind as the proper standard for the empirical
acceptability of physical theories more generally, it is closely related to the type
of explanation that has a long history of being taken seriously by both physi-
cists and philosophers of science. This notion of faithfulness might be considered
weak because it allows for surplus empirical structure that does not correspond
to experience (the notion of Everett’s homomorphism), but after all, in judging
the “empirical adequacy of a physical theory one always has some degree of free-
dom in choosing what aspect of the theory’s model should correspond to empirical
evidence, how it should correspond, and how empirical evidence should itself be
represented” (Barrett 2011b, p. 707). These degrees of freedom are justified by
a pragmatic criterion of selectivity, which is essential in van Fraassen’s and Ev-
erett’s, account of empirical adequacy.
As Van Fraassen remarks “Advocates of the Appearance from Reality Criterion
will not be satisfied with QM. Some of the resistance may be explained in this
way. Even more so the attempts to provide the theory with an interpretation
30 See Van Fraassen (1980, p. 68) in which the author indicates as a good example the “hidden
variable theories in QM: “Such hidden variable models have much extra structure, now looked
upon as ‘metaphysical baggage’, but capable of being mobilized should radically new phenomena
come to light”.
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that restores obedience to the Criterion at some ‘deeper’ level. Conversely, irenic
acceptance of the theory would seem to signal an attitude that is content with-
out any sustained attempt to satisfy that Criterion. This, it seems to me, should
allow us to draw the right moral about what are and what are not norms that
govern scientific practice”. (Van Fraassen 2008, p. 308). Everett shares the same
attitude.
If one is tempted to say that Everettian QM is a weak and ad hoc explanation,
it has to be remarked that it depends on the theoretical approach one decides
to adopt: a “broadly Humean view” is satisfied in PWM and in its empiricist
understanding. Furthermore, standard quantum mechanics is more ad hoc than
PWM in Everett’s opinion, since it limits its epistemological valence to the classical
world, which is absolutized starting from the perspective of the observer, whereas
Everettian quantum mechanics constructs a ‘democratic’ view of measurement,
insisting on interaction as correlation between systems; it is untenable to think
about a measurement as a final cut in the sense that it is of course, but only from
a phenomenological perspective.
Starting from a ‘modest’ approach of probabilities in the Everettian case, an “alter-
native strategy” for navigating branching universe will be proposed in the following
chapters.
Chapter 3
Everettian pseudo-probability
Everett speaks about a qualitative and a quantitative dimension of explanation,
once empirical adequacy is ensured.
How can be possible to explain the everettian relative state, without assuming a
metaphysical commitment a` la DeWitt, quantitatively?
So far we saw how by looking at Everett’s own convictions about physical theories
in general it is clear why his own theory could be understood without recurring to
a special sort of metaphysics; however, once granted that it is perfectly possible
to understand the global state and the derivation of relative states as cross sec-
tions, choosing only one among the many possible expansions of the global state,
it remains to be understood how this assumptions are declined in practice.
In the previous chapter we see how the relative state formulation is capable to
explain our determinate experience, which consists of apparently single outcomes
when a measurement is made, but we took for granted that, in practice, it could
be done: in other words, once clarified that phenomenological and subjective ex-
perience is just a relative reality, and once explained that it is so because of
unawareness of branching process and the dialectics between unobservability and
reality of branches (at a deeper level, if we look at the system from an empirical
point of view this perspective is possible and also productive in the sense of future
achievements), PWM is then perfectly coherent with perceptions.
If we assume that our state is a relative state, in which determinate records are
only appearances, it has to be clarified not only why experience is quite at variance
with PWM (in a philosophical way, it has been explained in the previous chapter),
but also why experience seems to be perfectly compatible with statistical asser-
tions of Process 2.
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Furthermore, in admitting that it is quite possible to have a state which is not
straightforwardly coherent with the statistical assertions of standard QM (because
all possible states are real, even those in which atypical statistics are observed)
then an explanation of how it is possible that this could happen is required.
Now it remains to be seen if PWM could bear the burden of more ‘technical’
implications without assuming further metaphysical assumptions, focusing on the
model, rather than on experience: once found that experience could be appropri-
ately represented in the correlation model, and once clarified that extra structure
does not prevent PWM from being empirically adequate, because there is an iso-
morphic part in it which is perfectly compatible with our experience, now it is
necessary to see whether the model can also “explain itself”.
Our experience is in fact coherent with statistical assertions of standard QM, and
the deduction of the standard model, that at this stage appears to be a “special
case” of the more global PWM (as the theory capable of explaining the global
state of the universe), should give the reasons behind these statistical predictions,
in one way or another, to be complete.
3.1 Old-new problems
There are two practical, concrete and interconnected problems related to the de-
duction of assertions of standard QM from PWM. As Everettian literature under-
lines1, determinate records and the probability problems are the two main hitches
in acceptance of PWM, the first concerning the difficulty of justifying one single
outcome once established that the superposition principle is the global law, while
the second problem deals with the framing of probabilities in a deterministic and
causal context, not only in its epistemic weight, but also in its practical meaning
(in the end, we use probabilistic assertions of the standard formalism when we
make a measurement even in an everettian context).
Of course, these are classical problems, as mentioned earlier; but once Everett’s
original thoughts regarding physical theories in general are taken for granted, and
once clarified what could be understood to be his understanding of PWM from an
epistemic point of view (and this implies acceptance of relative state formulation
as expressing the irreducible subjectivity of observers, without further metaphys-
ical characterizations), the problems came back in a new guise.
1 See Barrett (1999), and see also chapter 1.
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The first problem arises once one tries to deduce the determinate records from
the global superposition, and it is strictly connected with the problem of finding a
single trajectory capable of explaining a single memory configuration (a branching
observer with his own identity) pertaining to one single observer, who will even-
tually inhabit a branch.
The second problem is that these single records seem to mirror the statistical as-
sertions of Process 1, which is precisely the probability problem in Everettian QM.
In this chapter I will try to deal with Everettian problems in the new context of
Everettian empirical faithfulness, and show how it is possible to find subjective
appearances even in a mathematical, pragmatic way within the theory itself, with-
out recurring to additive factors.
It will be shown how Everett himself proposes a natural measure for branches,
covariant with the square amplitude, which grants the recovery of statistical as-
sertions and memory configurations without recurring to “strange’ factors even in
a quantitative way.
The quantitative aspect is particularly important with regard to the probability
problem, because if it is true that only Process 2 counts as real, while Process 1 is
just a manifestation of subjective appearance, it has to be noted that if the proba-
bilistic aspect is illusory, then we require an explanation as to why we still observe
it, as observers with specific, time-wise ordered and apparently serial memory
configurations (capable of restoring sequences of serial events, while constantly
branching from one state into a multiplicity of different but equivalent states).
More profoundly, the kind of measure that might substitute probabilities will be
explained, and what is its meaning.
3.2 Continuity: identity, memory configurations
and uniqueness over branches
The determinate-records problem refers to the experience of the singularity of one
specific outcome after a measurement is made. Typically, a good observer (which
could be a human being, or any kind of servomechanism able to register the out-
come with some specific devices) will exhibit one single outcome after a measuring
process.
This means that if we start with a superposition of different states for a specific
operator (the measured system not being in an eigenstate of the specific measured
Chapter 3. Everettian pseudo-probability 81
quantity) we expect the system, once the interaction has occurred, to exhibit just
one of the possible final states of the initial superposition.
Standard formalism assigns the responsibility of actualizing just one of the possi-
ble eigenstates of the original superposition to the collapse of the wave function,
which obeys the Born rule for ascribing probabilities to different coefficients. The
irreducible experience of the singularity of just one outcome is the more striking
evidence for believing that something like Process 1 has occurred, meanwhile non-
awareness of branching collides with our evidence in this case.
The strength of this experience irreducibly seems to witness the correctness of
standard QM, while the superposition principle appears to be at least at variance
with our experience.
But not only in this sense does superposition seem to be counterintuitive: at the
level of the measuring process uniqueness of observers is implied without discus-
sion, and obviously related coherence with different memory states is implied and
implicitly ensured in standard QM.
In other words, any observer will be seen as a single physical system with single
time-ordered records, which are furthermore compatible with the statistical asser-
tions of Process 12. PWM gives a completely different account of reality, in which
observers are constantly branching, and nothing like identity, or singularity, could
be univocally assumed.
At this point, it seems that isomorphic identity between relative states and our
subjective experience is not sufficient for rejecting Process 1, at least if we do not
find some kind of measure with which we can legitimately “cut” a cross section
from the total wave function in a non arbitrary way, and then reconstruct a single
trajectory over the total branching structure with which we could explain conti-
nuity for observers and between observations.
In other words, what it needs is a quantitative, in addition to qualitative, descrip-
tion of relative states and related statistical assertions.
So, firstly it is necessary to understand how it is possible for observers and their
memories to find a sort of ‘continuity’ in the branching structure.
Single-multiple states which emerge from the branching structure have particular
2 At this stage, it seems that the discussion of the previous chapter is repeated, and also the
‘old’ question of the branching process related to an observer rather than to a ‘world’. Actually
Everettian problems seem to be recurring: once clarified in which sense one problem could be
resolved, it comes back while trying to solve another one. I feel that it depends on the difficulty
of finding an appropriate explanation which could ‘restore’ the common sense, and also by the
fact that the same problem could be faced starting from different levels. But if one is able to
find a measure (which is exactly what is going to be done) the problem could be solved.
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features: from an external point of view, they are no more than relative states
resulting from the cross section of the global state; at the same time, each of these
relative states describes systems with a certain memory configuration and certain
determinate experiences, which seem perfectly continuous and linear (in a ‘geo-
metric’ sense) while we are told that each trajectory follows a “life tree”. In fact,
from a global-state point of view, nothing prevents any possible relative state from
existing, and nothing like a linear trajectory is depicted.
Furthermore, against this proliferation of similar states, common predictions of
the standard probabilistic interpretation of QM appear to be perfectly in line with
experience.
Continuity, in this specific sense, implies that any observer system is supposed to
possess memories, i.e. “parts of a relatively permanent nature whose states are
in correspondence with the past experience of the observer” (Everett 1973a, p.
64), because it is by examining the content of a memory that we can infer that
something like ‘subjective appearance’ has taken place.
Memory also implies that the observer’s specific present actions are determined
not only by its present sensory data, but by the contents of its past memory as
well. This appears more evident for sequences of measurements, in which the past
results will condition future experiments: the action of an observer at a given in-
stant can be regarded as a “function of the memory contents only, and all relevant
experience of the machine is contained in the memory” (Everett 1973a, p. 64).
Everett resumes his idea in a strong metaphor (which, as mentioned in the first
chapter, was avoided in the final version of his thesis on Wheeler’s advice):
As an analogy one can imagine an intelligent amoeba with a good memory.
As time progresses the amoeba is constantly splitting, each time the result-
ing amoebas having the same memories as the parent. Our amoeba hence
does not have a life line, but a life tree. The question of the identity or non
identity of two amoebas at a later time is somewhat vague. At any time
we can consider two of them, and they will possess common memories up
to a point (common parent) after which they will diverge according to their
separate lives thereafter. We can get a closer analogy if we were to take one
of these intelligent amoebas, erase his past memories, and render him un-
conscious while he underwent fission, placing the two resulting amoebas in
separate tanks, and repeating this process for all succeeding generations, so
that none of them would be aware of their splitting. After a while we would
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have a large number of individuals, sharing some memories with one an-
other, differing in others, each of which is completely unaware of his “other
selves” and under the impression that he is a unique individual. It would
be difficult indeed to convince such an amoeba of the true situation short
of actually confronting him with his “other selves”. The same is true if
one accepts the hypothesis of the universal wave function. Each time an
individual splits he is unaware of it, and any single individual is at all times
unaware of his “other selves” with which he has no interaction from the
time of splitting. (Everett 1955c)
The splitting amoeba well represents the branching of the observer, while retaining
awareness of a time-ordered, serial memory.
However, continuity is also related to the object system state: without postulating
that a previous measurement affected in practice the system, no other predictions
about future arrangements could be made (for example without preparing the sys-
tem we cannot make predictions about measurements of quantities that are not in
eigenstates, etc.).
Something like memory configurations (description of events time-wise ordered for
the observers even if we are considering servomechanisms) must be found in PWM,
it is also necessary to justify in some way the legitimacy of the linear trajectory
expressed in the global state (remembering that the global state, expressing a per-
fectly real superposition, in no way gives a criterion for judging as more real than
others some of the singular decompositions); paraphrasing Orwell, it seems that
“all branches are real, but some branches are more real than others”.
Everett recognizes that some ‘special’ property of observers’ systems should be
recognized in order to make the correct deductions about the appearance of phe-
nomena as subjective experiences.
These properties should be found within PWM itself:
In order to accomplish this [i.e. to make deductions about the appearance of
phenomena to observers] it is necessary to identify some objective properties
of such an observer (states) with the subjective knowledge (i.e., perceptions).
Thus in order to say that the state O has observed the event α, it is necessary
that the state of O has become changed from its former state to a new state
which is dependent upon α. (Everett 1973a, p. 63-64)
This special property is identified with correlation, by which the state of a system
will be changed by interaction with another system, and vice versa.
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Correlation is an extensive concept: not only is the correlation between systems
indicated as the most important feature, but also, and mostly, the correlation
between different states, at different times, is fundamental in understanding con-
tinuity. In this way continuity and singularity over time are justified within the
relative state formulation. This is the profound reason as to why Everett affirms
a strong relativity of states: systems are always interconnected by continuous in-
teractions, and the only isolated system could be understood to be the universe
as a whole3. This sort of relative correlation4 is also referable to the role of the
observer, played occasionally by systems, which derives uniquely from the per-
spective one decides to observe from: if correlation is implied by interaction, then
all ‘contacts’ between systems produce some correlation (in no other way can we
describe an object except through correlation; this is indisputable for quantum
objects, but Everett applies the same principle, and the same PWM, to all physi-
cal objects); and such a correlation could occasionally be a measurement process,
in the Everettian sense of a “natural” process:
We now consider the question of measurement in QM, which we desire to
treat as a natural process within the theory of PWM. From our point of
view there is no fundamental distinction between “measuring apparata”
and other physical systems. For us, therefore, a measurement is simply a
special case of interaction between physical systems – an interaction which
has the property of correlating a quantity in one subsystem with a quantity
in another. (Everett 1973a, p. 53)
This produces the effect that “interacting systems are continually “measuring”
one another” (Everett 1973a, p. 53).
Correlation is then primitive in respect to other apparently more cogent properties;
for this reason the role of the ‘external’ (preeminent and macroscopic) observer,
which was the ultimate reason for believing in a drastic change of the observed
system, is relativized only if all assertions of the standard model, even in those
cases in which a system with a memory configuration was implicitly considered as
the observer (noting that in standard QM interactions between classical objects
and microscopic system are always of this nature), are deduced with PWM using
some sort of quantitative measure.
3 This is the reason for the primary reception of PWM as a good quantum cosmology theory
(DeWitt 1973), but also for more recent relational versions (Rovelli 1996).
4 See Rovelli (1996).
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In other words, if Everett succeeds in explaining why, quantitatively, the observer
system perceives a determinate record coherent with his serial memory, even if
what counts as genuinely real is a life tree, then the theory is quantitatively self-
contained (which is equal to explaining analytically and mathematically the un-
awareness of the branching process described in chapter 2). In technical terms
it is equal to finding, within the theory, a correlation model by which memory
sequences are perfectly explainable.
The problem is that of treating interactions between systems within the scheme of
PWM, so that memory configurations are deduced and interpreted as subjective
experiences.
Let us look at Everett’s own proposal in detail.
In order to give back the idea of a memory sequence, the state function of an
observer has to be described as a sequence of events A, B, . . . , C, of the form
ψO[A, B, ..., C] which represents an observer with a certain sequence of memories (or-
dered time-wise). A “good” measurement will be one in which the observation of
a quantity A with eigenvalues {φi} over a system S, and the state of an observer
ψO[... ], which has the initial form:
ψS+O = φiψ
O
[... ]
will be changed into a new state:
ψS+O
′
= φiψ
O
i[...,αi]
,
where αi characterizes the state φi. If the system state is an eigenstate, it will be
unchanged, whereas the observer will register the value; if the system state is not
an eigenstate of that quantity A, but a general state
∑
i aiφi, the final total state
will be:
ψ′S+O =
∑
i
aiφiψ
O
i[, ai]
which expresses a superposition in which each element represents a correlation be-
tween a particular observed system state and the object system state as definitely
perceiving that specific eigenstate.
With PWM a strong correlation between the object-system state and the observer
state is ensured: there is no longer any independent state for the observer or for
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the object5.
This is also the case for more than two interacting systems and for repeated mea-
surements6: it follows directly from the superposition principle that each element
of the above equation describes the object-system state in a particular eigenstate
for the observer, and the observer-system state as definitely perceiving that par-
ticular system-state.
Repeatability is the consequence of the relativity of states, which expresses a cor-
relation between a certain eigenvalue and an observer whose memory registers the
single outcome.
The final superposition of a composite system S+O, after a sequence of measure-
ments in which the quantity A is measured over S1, S2, Sn will be:
ψr =
∑
i, j,k
aiajakφ
S1
i φ
S2
i φ
Sr
i ψ
Sr+1ψSnψOijk[α1i ,α2j ,,αrk]
,
which describes each element of the global state as having a definite memory
sequence [. . . .α1i , α
2
j , , α
r
k]and the relative states of each object system as corre-
sponding eigenfunctions φS1i , φ
S2
j , . . . φ
S3
k .
Every element of the resulting final superposition will describe an observer with
a memory configuration, in which the earlier memory will coincide with the later,
because memory states are correlated.
This is the point in which epistemic contents of PWM find a mathematical and
formal answer: because of the superposition principle, an element of the total
superposition is appropriately represented with a relative state, and as a relative
state, by which it is correlated to the state of the object system, while the global
reality (the final global wave function) describes a multiplicity of states.
Relativity of states ensures the continuity between present, past and future states,
perfectly representing the subjective experience, which is a serial connection of
events ordered time-wise. Metaphorically speaking, correlation is the ‘scissors’
which ‘cuts’ an apparently linear trajectory from the branching global reality.
That is the reason each initial observation appears to be the consequence of a
‘jump’ into an eigenstate (when the object system state is not in an eigenstate
of the quantity being measured, so the initial state had to be a superposition of
eigenstates of the observed property).
5 This is, in brief, the relative state formulation: from the Superposition Principle Rule 1 and
Rule 2 are derived (Everett 1973a, p. 67).
6 That is Rule 2 in Everett’s language: any number of observation processes in any combi-
nation could be explained, by applying Rule 1 (by which an observation, in brief, will lead to a
superposition) to any kind of measurements (Everett 1973a, p. 67).
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Correlation arises from interaction between systems, and preserves “consistency
when several observers are present and allowed to interact with one another (to
“consult” one another) as well as with other object-systems” (Everett 1973a, p.
13).
Everett devotes large parts of his work to developing a correlation model, which
turns out to be the heart of his relative state formulation, using probability the-
ory’s concepts “without, however, making any reference to probability models”
(Everett, 1973a p. 13). The mathematical definitions are then used in terms of
information and correlation, without giving them the same probabilistic signifi-
cance.
Correlation and related probability distributions are then “phrased into infor-
mation language” (Everett 1973a, p. 34): Everett always distinguishes his own
interpretation of quantum formalism from the standard probabilistic interpreta-
tion, specifying that the measure used to define correlation, mathematically, equals
probability theory, without in any way assuming the same connotation. This al-
lows us to treat interactions simply as relative states, and measurement processes
as a particular case of interaction.
Everett then dedicates the third chapter of his doctoral thesis to elaborating a
quantitative definition of correlation. He thought that this part of his work was
the central core of his ideas, even if in his short thesis it was cut out.
In order to “develop a language for interpreting our PWM for composite systems
we will find it useful to develop quantitative definitions for such notions as the
“sharpness” or “definiteness” of an operator A for a state ψ, and the “degree of
correlation” between the subsystems of a composite system or between a pair of
operators in the subsystems, so that we can use these concepts in an unambiguous
manner” (Everett 1973a, p. 16).
Everett refers to Shannon’s Information Theory (Shannon and Weaver 1949) for
developing his correlation model.
The information is essentially a measure of the “sharpness of a probability dis-
tribution, that is, an inverse measure of its spread” (Everett 1973a, p. 16). For
example, if we have a single random variable X, with distribution P(xi) the infor-
mation of X, Ix, will be:
Ix =
∑
i
P (xi) lnP (xi) = Exp [lnP (xi) ] .
This means that information is a function of the probabilities alone, and not of
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any possible numerical values of a random variable.
Once affirmed that after an interaction isolated systems are no longer depicted
and describable, because in general anything like an isolated system is no longer
found, the state function of a composite system leads to joint distributions over
subsystem quantities, rather than independent subsystem distributions.
Two variables are correlated if one learns something about one variable when one
is told the value of the other variable.
If we have a joint distribution P (x, y) over two random variables X and Y, then
the information relative to one of the two variables also changes the information
regarding the other. Indeed if we do not know the value of Y, then the probability
distribution of X will be (marginal or a priori distribution): P (x) =
∫
(x, y) dy
(the same could be done for Y symmetrically) and our information about X is
IX =
∫
P (x)logP (x) dx .
But if we are told that Y has value y, the probability distribution for X changes
to the conditional distribution Py (x) = P (x, y)/P (y), with information I
y
X =∫
Py(x)logPy (x) dx .
The expected change in information about X, given the value of Y, will be:
C (X, Y ) =
∫
P (y) [IyX − IX ] dy.
This quantity is zero if and only if the two variables are independent, and is oth-
erwise strictly positive, ranging to +∞ in the case of a functional dependence of
x on y (perfect correlation).
Correlation is “absolute rather than relative quantity, in the sense that the corre-
lation between (numerical valued) random variables are completely independent
of the scale of measurement chosen for the variables” (independence of the coor-
dinate system, or of space-time coordinate transformations) (Everett 1973a, 25).
The relative state function gives the correct measure of conditional distribution
for all operators, while marginal distributions cannot generally be represented by
state functions, but only by density matrices.
A state of a composite system leads to joint distributions over subsystem quantities
which are generally not independent. Conditional distributions and expectations
for subsystems are obtained from relative states, and subsystem marginal distri-
butions and expectations are given by density matrices.
There does not, in general, exist anything like a single state for one subsystem of
a composite system. That is, subsystems do not posses states independent of the
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state of the remainder of the system, so that the subsystem states are generally
correlated (Everett 1973a, p. 43).
Conditional distributions and expectations for subsystems are obtained by relative
states, which are coherent superpositions, and subsystems marginal expectations
are given by density matrices, which are statistical mixtures. Once we know the
result of a measurement performed upon a system S1, then we know the condi-
tional distributions and expectations.
Therefore there exists in general no state for S1 alone, which correctly gives the
marginal expectations for all operators in S1; even though there is no single state,
there is always a mixture of states7.
Due to the fact that nothing like a single and independent state for a subsystem
exists after an interaction, one can arbitrarily choose a state for one subsystem
and be led to the relative state for the other subsystem. The correlated state of
two subsystems is represented by a pure state (and this follows directly from the
superposition principle).
3.3 Everettian ‘pseudo-probability’
Continuity is then associated with correlated states, and is explained without re-
curring to the collapse of the wave function, identifying single states with branches
of a global life tree whose singularity could be associated to a measure for condi-
tional distributions, which grants for their coherence. Once granted that correla-
tion implies the relativity of states, one single state is “chosen” in direct experience.
We find ourselves in this singular situation: even if one accepts all possible branches
as real, only one at the end is experimented by direct observation; one feels com-
fortably nestled on one’s own branch, so one’s state could be pompously taken
as the “best of all possible states” (in the sense of “more probable”), and this is
not yet a quantitative criterion by which we might ensure neither the existence of
other more or less different relative states and different branches, nor the ‘primate’
to our own branch.
What is missing at this level is a more precise definition, in numerical terms, of
the global state (in terms of branching structure).
7This is called the “canonical representation”: a pair of operators for two subsystems are
perfectly correlated, i.e. there is a one-one correspondence between their eigenvalues. This
depends on representing a composite state as a superposition, while the marginal expectations
of single subsystems states are given as a mixture. (Everett 1973a, p. 45-52).
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Strictly speaking, there is no fundamental reason why, at this point, we are al-
lowed to think of relative states, intending here all of them, as the real entity:
in a universe which is constantly branching, in the end, there is no real reason,
it seems, to push towards the construction of relative states which are moreover
coherent with our perceived reality, or, better, in doing this it seems that an ad
hoc criterion has been adopted. To do so with a justification we should be able to
quantify the global state too.
Once we take our state to be just one of the possible decompositions of the ini-
tial superposition, we do not say anything about the way in which the global
wave function relates to singular states: there needs to be a sort of measure over
branches in order to ensure an internal coherence to the theory; furthermore, this
kind of measure should justify the usage of probabilities, once affirmed their mere
operationalist role.
The initial, classical Everettian probability problem returns in a new, more subtle
form, once continuity and identity over branches is explained.
A sort of justification in using probabilities is needed in order to understand why
our actual relative states are chosen as the “more probable”. The problem is to
clarify the role of related probabilistic assertions, which always appear coherent
with standard QM, and are always coherent with our observations.
In standard QM, our statistical predictions are perfectly compatible with mea-
surement outcomes, and this is the major evidence of the intrinsically stochastic
nature of quantum world.
With this consideration probability problem makes its entrance in Everettian QM:
putting the issue in other terms, it equals saying that in a world with no proba-
bility at all, it is difficult to understand which is the weight of our relative state,
once affirmed that all states are equally real, and also why we should promote our
world to the status of ‘more probable’ than others, while reality is given to all
possible worlds. In the end it seems at best tautology asking what the possibility
of something which is actual is, and at best it seems nonsense to ask to quantify
probabilities in this contest. Wallace calls this the Incoherence problem: “What is
in dispute is why, and how, this physical magnitude can be probability. One might
ask: how can it make sense for anything to ‘be probability’ in a theory where all
possible outcomes occur” (Wallace 2010b, p. 227).
The probability issue in Everettian contest is subtle: it is not just a matter of co-
herence with our experience, because in this case Everettians would have no need
for probabilities (since for every outcome regarded as possible, the theory entailed
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that that outcome would occur); the problem is that “to provide an interpretation
in which the statistical analysis of the outcomes of repeated experiments provides
empirical support for the theory” (Greaves and Myrvold 2010, p. 266).
Conceptually speaking, in PWM the role of probability is completely changed: in
standard QM probability expresses the very real essence of the world, while in
PWM it is a mathematical tool, used only “for operationalist purposes”:
Furthermore, for almost all of the “branches” of his “life tree” that we might
consider, the frequencies with which the observer sees the various results of
his measurements will follow the probabilistic law of [Process] (1). There-
fore, for practical considerations, an observer is justified in using [Process]
(1) for calculations; not because the system undergoes any such probabilistic
jumps, but simply because he himself will split into a number of observers,
to each of which it appears that the system underwent a probabilistic jump.
(Everett 1955c).
In its standard formulation, quantum theory seems to imply a strong probabilistic
aspect of reality. Probability in that contest is an objective feature of reality, and
reality appears to be stochastic.
Looking at the philosophical conception of probability, Everett refers to “two types
of probability, which may be called subjective or objective probabilities respec-
tively. A subjective probability refers to an estimate by a particular observer
which is based upon incomplete information, and as such is not a property of the
system being observed, but only of the state of the information of the observer.
An objective probability on the other hand is regarded as an intrinsic property of
a system, i.e., to what may be called “really” random processes” (Everett 1955b).
Objective probabilities are invariant, since they have to be conceived as ‘proper-
ties’, so that they do not depend upon observers’ information. But if two observers
ascribe different probabilities to some aspect of the same system, then “at least
one of these probabilities is subjective!” (Everett 1955b).
For Everett, in standard QM probabilities are imposed as objective “by criterion”,
even if they have some limitations.
In fact, taking the state function as the expression of objective probabilities of the
results of any measurement makes standard QM inconsistent: we can exemplify
this by imaging a situation in which a measured system S1 possesses the state
function ψ1 which gives the objective probabilities (neither 0 or 1, since the state
is not an eigenstate of the observed quantity) of the results of the measurement;
Chapter 3. Everettian pseudo-probability 92
but if we now consider the system before the measurement as a total system S2,
it also possesses a state function ψ2, which is “strictly determined by our initial
ψ2 so long as there are no outside interactions, so that in particular ψ2 for some
time after the measurement has taken place is strictly determined by its value
before the measurement. We now consider what this later ψ2 may say about the
configuration of the recording device” and, Everett notes, “if it gives a probability
mixture over the configurations, then clearly these probabilities are of the sub-
jective type, since they refer to something which actually exists in a pure state,
because in reality the configuration of the recording device has already been de-
termined. On the other hand if this later ψ2 gives the exact configuration of the
recording device, then clearly the outcome of the measurement was determined
before it took place, since the later ψ2 was strictly determined by the earlier, in
which case the probability given by ψ1 was not objective” (Everett 1955b)
8.
For the two systems probability has a different meaning in this context: while for
S1 expresses objective probabilities, ψ2 expressing a probability mixture gives a
subjective meaning to its probabilities. Objective probability does not invariantly
depend upon the object, but rather depends upon the observer’s choice, and so it
is an epistemic feature deriving from subjective ignorance. Objective probability
relates to the intimate constitution of the object, it has ontological relevance.
For Everett, in PWM the usage of probabilities is limited to their subjective mean-
ing (what is called ‘epistemic probability’) expressing subjective ignorance (in the
specific sense of momentary relative-state ignorance) and referring more to their
functional valence from a mathematical point of view.
Everett states his purpose by saying that PWM is a “causal theory which pos-
tulates the existence of some sort of wave function for the entire universe, and
for which [Process] (2) alone holds” (Everett 1955b). This means that “by as-
suming the general validity of PWM, without any initial statistical interpretation,
we obtain a theory which is in principle applicable to all natural processes, and
furthermore one which even leads to probabilistic aspects on a subjective level in
a rather novel way (i.e., that we are able to deduce that [Process] (1) will appear
to hold to observers” (Everett 1955b).
Everett argues that PWM reduces QM to Process 2, which is a perfectly deter-
ministic and straightforward explanation of the global state, while probability is
just another appearance once we found the cross section of the total wave function
8Everett explains this with an example: if we try to guess which card will be chosen between
a shuﬄed deck of cards, from a subjective point of view, an observer will have 1/52 of possibility
of finding ace of spades; objectively, the possibility amounts to Ω (see Everett 1955b).
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as representing one single state: it is a sort of ‘pseudo-probability’.
Now what is missing is a formal account of this appearance.
The fact is that for Everett subjective reality could appear stochastic and perfectly
explainable with Process 1, but the global state which is the reality in a stronger
sense is deterministic and linear, and explicable with Process 2 alone (the linear
evolution of the wave equation), seems to require a more technical explanation: an
instrument more general than probabilities is needed, which serves as a counting
measure, which will be a more general rule, applicable to all processes.
What Everett wishes to obtain is a configuration for trajectories of (all possible)
observers through the life tree with specific numerical values. It is now important
to deduce the same statistical predictions of standard QM, without giving them a
probabilistic significance: what Everett does is to justify its operationalist usage,
for predictive purposes, while taking them not as probabilities, but as a counting
measure. In order to give a quantitative account of PWM, Everett searches for
a general scheme for assigning a measure to the elements of a superposition of
orthogonal states.
Technically, PWM affirms that the measure over branches covaries with the square
amplitude. The parameter determined by the correlation model alone covaries
with our standard quantum statistical expectations, and it is closely related to the
norm-squared of the coefficients of the global state.
So the correlation model provides a parameter following which we can build on
our standard expectations, which are in harmony with usual quantum statistics,
even if they have no probabilistic significance. As said at the end of the previous
chapter, faithfulness accorded to PWM simply consists in finding such a parameter
in the correlation model. And once granted that this is all we can expect, we can
also ask more of PWM in quantitative terms, by trying to frame this parameter
and specifying in what sense it covaries and mostly what kind of meaning has to
be ascribed, once we renounce anything like probabilities.
In other words, branch amplitude translates into branch weight, and no more in
branch (outcome) probability.
With the association of the measure over branches with the square amplitude we
have not succeeded yet in explaining what kind of measure we are dealing with: in
other terms, once affirmed that the square amplitude is the more natural measure
for the elements of the superposition, we gave them a number, without clarifying
what this number stands for.
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3.4 The evidential problem
The association between probability and branches measure is still not clear: “how
does probability fit into the story? It is not disputed what physical magnitude is
supposed to be (or to stand for), probability: the probability of a branch is sup-
posed to be its weight (i.e., its mod-squared amplitude) [. . . ] one might ask what
kind of argument can be given to justify the claim that mod-squared amplitude is
probability”. Wallace calls this the quantitative problem (Wallace 2010b, p. 227).
This kind of argument directly introduces us to what has been called the Eviden-
tial problem, which is the most dangerous threat to Everett’s interpretation: the
problem is not just to derive the correct probabilities within the theory, but either
making sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes in a situation in which all
outcomes exist, and then to consider them as evidence for confirming the theory
(remembering that “this sort of empirical testing of probabilistic claims forms a
substantial part of the evidence we have for accepting quantum mechanics as a
theory that is empirically superior to classical mechanics” (Greaves and Myrvold
2010, p. 265)).
There are two different but strictly correlated points:
1. First, the legitimacy in using the Born rule should be proved, and also it is
necessary to see what kind of measure it equals to (probabilities, or a good
substitute of them). The same problem could be posed in different terms:
how are we to act rationally, if we interpret QM along Everettian lines? Sup-
pose we are faced with a choice between, say, disaster on the spin-up branch
and disaster on the spin-down branch. Given only that, whichever choice we
make, there will be a disaster branch and a non-disaster branch, how could
we ever have grounds for choosing? (call it the Quantitative problem, Fol-
lowing Wallace (2010), or the Practical problem, following Greaves (2007);
both relate the Equivalence claim: once established that all outcomes exist,
there is no reason for preferring one result to another. Whatever plays the
role of probabilities depends only on the quantum mechanical amplitudes:
these sort of ‘functional probabilities’ depend solely on the absolute squares
of the amplitudes);
2. Second, this proof must also apply as confirmation for Everett’s theory, via
empirical testing, as in standard QM, in which usually the statistical analysis
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of the outcomes of repeated experiments provides empirical support for the
theory: this has been dubbed the Evidential problem9.
The evidential problem refers to the possibility of testing Everettian assumptions,
and harks back to the problem of empirical adequacy.
Detractors find in probability, using its reliance on empirical evidence, another
way out to disconfirm PWM, given that “empirical texting of probabilistic claims
forms a substantial part of the evidence we have for accepting QM as a theory
that is empirically superior to classical mechanics” (Greaves and Myrvold 2010,
p. 265).
Imagine an exemplified situation, in which an Everettian observer (who takes
PWM as the true theory) is going to perform a spin-up/spin-down measurement.
How should the observer, prior to the splitting, describe the future of her branch?
He can think in terms of subjective uncertainty : both spin-up and spin-down might
happen, but not both.
Or, he can think in terms of objective determinism: spin-up will happen and so
will spin-down, but not both.
While the last option is universally seen as viable, the first one received disagree-
ment. Both ‘Everettians’ and ‘anti-Everettians’ affirm that the Everett interpreta-
tion is defensible if and only if subjective uncertainty is viable. Thus, Everettians
tend to defend an account of subjective uncertainty to show how Everett inter-
pretation is prosecutable. Anti-Everettians tend not to dispute the claim that if
an account of subjective uncertainty were available, then the Everett interpreta-
tion could be defended; they argue that it is anyhow incoherent and that, in its
absence, one cannot defend the Everett interpretation.
Several attempts have been made to solve the evidential problem.
In the context of what has been dubbed the “fission programme”10, it has been
argued that probability problems (and the evidential problem) could be solved via
considerations of rationality and behavior (which refer to Lewis’ Principal Princi-
ple): in other words, whatever probability is, it is assumed as rational to use it as
a guide to action.
Some of the participants on the fission programme tried to solve the evidential
9 Greaves (2007) correctly called it “the epistemic problem: how can we justify believing
the theory on the basis of our empirical evidence, if we interpret quantum mechanics along
Everettian lines? Given only that the theory predicted that the evidence that we have in fact
observed would occur on some branch (and that the same is true of every ‘other’ possible string
of evidence) how can we reasonably take our evidence to confirm the theory?” (p. 3).
10See Greaves (2004).
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problem by using a decision-theoretic strategy without giving a specific account
for probabilities (Deutsch 1999, Wallace 2003, 2007, 2010); others assume that
in Everettian QM there is room for genuine uncertainty (Wallace 2006, Saunders
2005, Saunders and Wallace 2008)11. These solutions will be examined in the fol-
lowing sections.
A different approach treats the problem from a more general perspective, aiming
to demonstrate that a confirmation theory for both Everettian and non-Everettian
QM is possible (Greaves 2007, Myrvold and Greaves 2010). Here the confirmation-
theoretic role of chances (CC), which states that if S observes something to which
a theory T assigns a higher chance than that assigned by other rival theories,
then T is confirmed and is applied also to branching theories. Instead of CC,
there will be a principle of confirmation-theoretic role of branch weights (CW):
if S observes something to which theory T assigns a branch weight higher than
the average-chance-or-branch-weight assigned to the same event by rival theories,
then theory T is confirmed for S, relative to those theories.
Objective chances have a role in our updating, but they are eliminable: agents with
suitable preferences will act as if they believe that there are objective chances
associated with outcomes, following what a theory T says about these chances
(Greaves and Myrvold 2010). Rational agents follow branch weights as if they
were chances, and “the occurrence of events to which the theory ascribed a weight
higher than the average chance-or-weight ascribed by rival theories increases ra-
tional degree of belief in Everettian theory” (Greaves and Myrvold 2010, p. 301).
In detail, a rational agent will take relative frequencies data from repeated mea-
surements as informative about values of branch weights, in the same way that
they are informative about chances of outcomes. Then the framework recalls Sav-
age’s axioms for preferences between wagers: first, it is argued that the rational
constraints on the agent’s preferences can also apply to experiments thought of as
branching events, for maximizing expected utilities; second, in learning the results
of experiments, the agent updates his quasi-credences, to distinguish them from
ordinary credences, and quantify one’s concerns, and this is a “caring measure”,
rather than a measure of uncertainties, with Bayesian conditionalization, in the
same way as in non-Everettian theories; third, with de Finetti’s representation
theorem is shown that for an exchangeable sequence of experiments, the agent’s
credences (quasi-credences) function is a weighted average of certain extremal func-
tions that can be thought of as “objective-chances-or-branch-weights” associated
11Note that Greaves (2007) schematizes the problem in semantic terms.
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with the outcomes of experiments12. Once established that all outcomes exist,
there is no reason for preferring one result to another. Whatever plays the role
of probabilities depends only on quantum mechanical amplitudes: these kinds of
‘functional probabilities’ depend solely on the absolute squares of the amplitudes.
A rational agent should adopt a caring measure, contra the equivalence claim: a
choice should be made between, for example, two alternative outcomes.
Decision-theoretic axioms and representation theorems applied to PWM are struc-
turally identical to those applied to non-branching theories, and this solves prima
facie the evidential problem. There is a pervasive structural analogy between
chance theories and branching theories, which reflects the analogy between chances
themselves and branch weights.
Everett’s interpretation is no worse off than any other theory in respect to the
philosophy of probability: an Everettian agent would behave just as any other
agent would do in the context of rival theories.
Nevertheless, Greaves and Myrvold’s proposal encounters objections.
Part of the critics relates to the caring measure: in a certain sense it seems that the
problem has just been postponed. One can always ask: of what kind of credences
are caring measures functions, if probabilities are no longer in the field?
It has been objected that branch weights are not probabilities, and it seems un-
convincing to claim that the agent acts as if he believes that branch weights are
analogous to physical chances13.
In addition to this objection, even if now the only rational constraint is based
upon the use of the Born rule in guiding agent’s actions, and one can feel free
to establish one’s own preferences according to them14. The functional role of
probability now depends upon what is reasonable for me to care about. And it is
not evident what is reasonable for me to care about.
Moreover, the information one obtains is self-locating, and cannot possibly be rel-
evant to theory confirmation. There is nothing that is evidentially relevant to the
truth of PWM. As shown in the previous chapter, such a principle, as Myrvold
and Greaves remark, “cannot be sacrosanct”; true, but the claim that “there are
in any case many known counterexamples” (Myrvold and Greaves 2010) does not
12 The demonstration of the confirmation theory is in Greaves and Myrvold (2010), and a
slightly different version could be found in Greaves (2007).
13 See Myrvold and Greaves (2010) for a more detailed description of this objection.
14 Albert vividly explains how an alternative ‘caring measure’ could be perfectly based upon
‘fatness’: “I decide that the degree to which it is reasonable for me to care about what transpires
on some particular one of my future branches ought to be proportional to how fat I am on that
branch” (Albert 2010, p. 361).
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seem very convincing on this question. Rather, as said before, a new perspective
of empirical adequacy would be preferable.
Another important and related objection applies to all possible approaches to
Everettian QM, that is, the indisputable fact that there are branches in which
non-quantum statistics are observed:
There are future copies of us who are bound to observe frequencies that do
not match the quantum probabilities. (Hemmo and Pitowsky 2007, p. 348)
This amounts to claiming that even for a rational agent which observes typical
frequencies of results (i.e. whose statistics conform to the Born Rule) the adoption
of quantum probability as subjective probability for modeling future actions is
completely arbitrary, since there should be atypical observers (future copies of
us).
Myrvold and Greaves reply that an agent always learns from his experience, and
in so doing he is updating his beliefs by conditionalizing on observed data, which
is preferable to any other strategy. I think that the reply missed the point: it
perfectly explains our branch, but one can still ask what happens in a non-typical
branch. The discussion about Everettian typicality needs further explanation, and
will be addressed in the next chapter.
3.5 Decision-theoretic approach
Greaves and Myrvold try to demonstrate the validity of Everett’s theory defining a
theory-general confirmation theory in which the principal principle governs quasi-
credences instead of credences. The advantage is its universality, it could solve (or
better, it is structurally adequate to solve) the evidential problem, because it is
applicable to all physical theories.
The ultimate trend is to encompass probability without giving it an objective
meaning.
A brilliant solution consists in considering Everettian ‘pseudo-probability’ in the
light of a decision-theoretic strategy. This proposal was advanced firstly by Deutsch
(1999) and today the strongest proponents are Wallace (2003, 2006, 2010b, 2012),
and in part Saunders (2005), even though the latter proposes a different reading,
as we will see on the following section.
Chapter 3. Everettian pseudo-probability 99
All accounts of decision-theoretic strategy accord in considering a particular ver-
sion of the axioms of probability: rather than focusing on probabilities themselves,
which are obviously bracketed in a PWM contest, this approach stresses the impor-
tance of the rationality of agents, which is considered the adherence to probabil-
ity measure without assigning probabilistic significance (the revisited Born rule).
These are in part pragmatic constraints, focused on the kind of actions that a
rational agent should choose if PWM is the correct physical theory.
In fact, all these contributors agree in assuming the truth of PWM without addi-
tional demonstrations, and take for granted the validity of Everett’s interpretation
in a strong realist version.
Following the decision-theoretic approach, probability in PWM gets its meaning
from the rational preferences of agents: a rational agent who knows that the Born
rule’s weight of an outcome is p is rationally compelled to act as if that outcome
had probability p. Even more specifically an agent that does not assume Process
1 to be valid, “or any other probabilistic postulate, but does believe the rest of
quantum theory, necessarily makes decisions as if (1) were true” (Deutsch 1999,
p. 2). In other words, a rational agent would act as probabilistic assertions of
Process 1 were true, but without giving them a probabilistic significance.
In classical physics, in situations of perfect knowledge (where one knows all the
variables that can produce one outcome, and can calculate how they affect it), a
rational agent will choose one outcome among the available possibilities, calculat-
ing the highest value.
In QM the situation is quite different: an association between the highest value
and one specific outcome could be missing, firstly because a given option might
generate a ‘range’ of possible outcomes, and also knowledge of all the variables is
not sufficient to predict which outcome will be effectively observed. These are the
reasons why probability is introduced in standard QM, with Process 1.
Decision-theoretic strategy used in this sense, in general, affirms that PWM does
not need probabilistic axioms. An Everettian agent could be defined as an agent
who genuinely believes only in Process 2 (a supporter of PWM, in more general
terms), and whose rationality refers to “a strictly non-probabilistic restriction of
classical decision theory”15 (Deutsch 1999, p. 13); he then will decide upon the
15 Deutsch (1999, p. 2) writes: “The decision maker is rational in the standard decision-
theoretic sense, except that, to avoid circularity, we must omit from the definition of ‘rationality’
anything that refers directly or indirectly to probabilities. In particular we must not make the
standard assumption that a rational decision maker maximizes the expectation value of his utility.
In this approach, such propositions are to be proved rather than postulated. ‘Rationality’ in this
restricted sense means conformity to a set of constraints on a decision maker’s preferences. For
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prediction of outcomes following Process 1 (“as if those outcomes were determined
by stochastic processes, with probabilities given by axiom (1)” (Deutsch 1999, p.
13)), maximizing the expected value of his utility in a Savage-style Representation
Theorem: the measure over branches plays the role of credence measure.
If the decision-theoretic strategy succeeds in demonstrating the validity of the Born
rule deprived of probabilistic assertions, then “quantum theory permits what phi-
losophy would hitherto have regarded as a formal impossibility, akin to deriving
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, namely deriving a probability statement from a factual
statement. This could be called deriving a ‘tends to’ from a ‘does”’ (Deutsch
1999, p. 9).
To depict it more clearly with an example, imagine a classical bet context of coin
tossing: suppose a coin is to be tossed in five minutes time, and suppose that an
agent bets five dollars (at even odds) that it will be heads. Looking solely at the
pragmatic interests of the agent, imagine taking into consideration the only two
possible sets of results:
1. The agent wins: the coin lands heads, in this case obviously the agent will
be pleased;
2. The agent loses: the coin lands tails, in this case the agent will be less
delighted, but, as Wallace remarks: “he may well still regard the bet as
having been the right choice given his information before the coin toss”
(Wallace 2010b p. 229, italics is mine).
The agent, in other words, weights the cost-benefits of his betting with the in-
formation about the possibility of ending with heads or tails. Decision theory
formalizes the weighting in assigning some utility to payoffs, in the form of a real
number: V (+5) stands for receiving five dollars, while V (−5) stands for losing
five dollars, also V (0) stands for neither gaining nor losing it.
Now, if Pr(H) is assigned to heads, the risk should be taken only if:
Pr (H) × V (+5) + (1− Pr(H))× V (−5) > V (0).
In other words, once a probability is assigned to each outcome, the agent assigns
example, his preferences must be transitive: if he prefers A to B, and B to C, then he must also
prefer A to C. Transitive preferences can be summarized by assigning a real number – a utility
value – to each possible outcome, in such a way that the decision maker prefers higher-valued
outcomes to lower-valued ones”.
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a utility to each bet, and chooses the “option that maximizes expected utility
with respect to those assignments” (Wallace 2010b, p. 230)16. For any preference
there is a unique probability function so for one bet there is only one expected
utility (the higher, the better), and this directly connects to the rationality of an
agent (if the agent’s preferences cannot be so represented, then the action is to be
considered irrational)17.
In the Everettian version of the coin toss, instead of two different possibilities,
there are two interestingly different sets of branches: the head-landed branches,
whose denizens are winners, and the tail-headed branches, where inhabitants are
losers. In this picture the rational action of the agent changes: now he has to
consider a different cost-benefit analysis, based upon the weight of the branches
on which the head is up18.
An Everettian agent (again, an agent who assumes that PWM is correct) knows
that a measurement will produce a splitting, after which there will be multiple
outcomes, and different versions of the agent19. The relative weights of branches
16 It has to be remarked that “Prima facie, it isn’t at all obvious that he should try to
maximize expected utility rather than, for example, maximize utility with respect to the square
of the probability function; or maximize the logarithm of utility; or just maximize the utility of
the least desirable possible outcome” (Wallace 2010b, p. 230).
17 There is an important remark to make here: “There is an important weakness in the
decision-theoretic argument which needs to be stressed. It is proof that rational agents must bet
according to some probability function, but it is silent on the connection between that function
and the ‘real’ probabilities. No decision-theoretic principle is contradicted by an agent who
assigns probability 99/100 to an apparently fair coin landing ‘heads’, for instance. A minority
of advocates of the decision-theoretic approach simply deny that there is any such thing as
‘objective’ or real probability; the majority just take it as a bare postulate that an agent should
conform his subjective probabilities to the objective probabilities when he knows the latter.
This weakness actually rather undermines the use of probabilities as a criticism of the Everett
interpretation, even without the arguments in this paper: if classical probability can give no
justification of its probability rule, why ask the Everettian for such a justification?”. Wallace
soon adds that “we can prove and not merely postulate the link between those probabilities and
the quantum mechanical weights” (Wallace 2010b, p. 231), intending a merely operationalist
usage of probabilities.
18 A sceptic may argue that the status of the agent, in the Everettian context, is completely
changed, and it enters the decision, because there are several copies of observers now. This
does not change things however, because what really counts is the future gain, no matter how
many copies of the rational agent could be produced: “an Everettian agent can be in a decision
problem just as can a non-Everettian” (Wallace 2010b, p. 232).
19 It is extremely important to remark here that the ontological frame in which Wallace (and
also Deutsch) fits the decision-theoretic strategy is the decoherence-version of PWM, which
imposes the acknowledgement of a certain structure on the Hilbert space. The resolution of
the identity on the Hilbert space implies “a decomoposition of the space into subspaces, with
each subspace pi corresponding to a possible macrostate. The choice of macrostates is largely
fixed by decoherence, although the precise fineness of the grain of the decomposition is under-
specified. . . we call a macrostate available to an agent if there is an available act which, when
performed, leaves some of his future selves in that macrostate” (Wallace 2010b, p. 233). The
model is artificially precise then, because the decomposition will appear precisely specified.
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are given by the Born rule, applied to the post measurement state of the system
and of the measuring device (considering here the ‘factual’ importance of the Born
rule: after a measurement has taken place, by considering the result on my own
branch I can account for weights, and rationally update my credences). Two
different categories of axioms will explain the agent’s acts: “richness” axioms,
concerning which acts are available to the agent (how rich the structure of the set
of acts is), and axioms of “rationality”, connected to the agent’s preference order.
The richness axioms are:
• Reward availability, in which all rewards are available to the agent at any
macrostate, including the set in which all the agent’s future selves are re-
warded;
• Branching availability : an agent can always choose an act with different
macrostates as possible outcomes, and give to each a specific weight p;
• Erasure: given a pair of states ψ ∈ E and φ ∈ F in the same reward, “there
is an act Uˆ available at E and an act Vˆ available at F such that Uˆ ψ = Vˆ φ”
(Wallace 2010b, p. 235). Erasure implies that an agent can forget any facts
about his situation that don’t concern things he cares about;
• Problem continuity: For each event the set of available acts is an open subset
of the set of unitary transformations from E to H20.
The axioms of rationality are ‘dictates’ which dominate an agent’s rational actions:
the first is that an agent’s preferences must follow a total ordering of his actions
(it is not possible to violate an ordering); the other implies diachronic consistency,
in which an agent will prefer the succession U-V 21 to U-V’ if he knows that his
successors will prefer V to V’ (even if I could locally violate this constraint, for
example in telling my friend not to let me order another drink after my second,
but those are to be considered irrational, conflictual, and localized situations)22.
Now, the decision-theoretic strategy applied to PWM implies that a rational con-
sideration is that of assigning to a set of branches of relative weight w a probability
w : the rational agent acts as if the Born rule were true. And this is enough to
20For a more accurate description of axioms of richness, see Wallace (2010b).
21 U here stands for unitary transformation: since in PWM preparations, measurements, and
payments made to agents are all physical processes, for simplicity any sequence preparation-
measurement-payments can be represented by a single unitary transformation.
22 See Wallace (2010b, p. 236) for a more accurate description of the dictates of rationality.
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justify the general role of probability in PWM.
Certainly an agent can refer to the Born rule for maximizing expected utility,
and that would be a possible strategy, which equals Everettian agents to non-
Everettians: in other words credence tracks the Born rule in the same way as in
classical decision-theoretic contest credence tracks chance, so the squared modulus
of the amplitudes plays the same role of chances in a one world picture. That is
equal to saying that the Lewis’ Principal Principle (which in this non-Everettian
scenario is the quantitative link between chances and subjective degrees of belief)
is derived in Everettian QM via the Born rule.
But, adds Wallace, this is also the only possible strategy: any other strategy rather
than the Born rule violates some rational constraint on action. Wallace then gives
an axiomatised version of Deutsch-Wallace Quantum Representation Theorem23,
which formally demonstrates the unique validity of the Born rule as a rational
constraint.
Summarizing, this genre of approach tries to justify the usage of probability by
using constraints of rationality, without giving classical decision-theoretic-like ar-
guments for doing it (i.e., arguments directly referable to probability).
In this sense probabilities are functions of branch amplitudes, and are no longer
seen as fundamental; rather this sort of “reduced” to “emergent features” (Saun-
ders 2010b, p. 182).
The rational agent is then no longer compelled to refer to probability in a profound
sense, mostly because probabilities in the Everettian contest are no longer asym-
metric. The older idea of symmetric probability (related to the idealized throw
of dice of the 17th century) made every possibility equiprobable. Real physical
facts (or real dices!) are then shown to be dependent upon initial conditions, and
symmetry is broken: we have to impose a certain probability distribution on the
initial conditions, and “any prospect of a reductive analysis of probability is lost”
(Wallace 2010b, p. 262). In Everettian QM the symmetry is still maintained:
all outcomes are actual, and there is no requirement for the perceived outcome
to break the symmetry (the program of deriving probabilities from a symmetric
reality is then viable).
In general, these efforts to explain the use of the Born Rule in Everett encounter
severe critics (Kent 2010, Albert 2010, Price 2010).
Criticism refers to the inability to prove the correctness of Born rule in PWM
using an account of rationality instead of a chance notion.
23 See Sections 7-8 (Wallace 2010b, pp. 240-254) for the formal proof.
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Even if the effort is commendable, and is a “sensible project” with “sensible mo-
tivations” (Kent 2010, p. 308), they result unconvincing: there is still no evidence
for believing that a decision theoretic approach could give the same sense to the
Born rule as in the standard one-world QM; at the end of the day the Born rule
still refers to probabilities, and furthermore, it is in standard QM that probabilities
are expressed in their strongest form. As mentioned in Myrvold and Greaves con-
firmation theory, it seems that, despite efforts to yield probability into a branching
context, they are in the end still limiting.
Besides, decision-theoretic supporters all start from a very inflexible requirement:
they all require us to imagine an Everettian observer, who already believes in
PWM.
PWM is in this way presupposed. This is something quite different to Everett’s
own deduction of the Born rule in the statement of PWM itself, which is fully in
line with his search for a self-compelling theory.
As Albert remarks “the questions to which this program is addressed are questions
of what we would do if we believed that fission hypothesis were correct. But the
question at issue here is precisely whether to believe that the fission hypothesis is
correct!” (Albert 2010, p. 359). In order to establish if PWM can be tenable, one
just has to look at its empirical adequacy24 (see chapter 2), while decision-theoretic
programme takes betting-style decisions in the first instance. And that is “crazy”,
using Albert’s words, because even if it could be demonstrated that rationality of
Everettian agents amounts to bet as any other (one-world) agent would do (fol-
lowing the Born rule, as if Process 1 were true), “that would merely show that
circumstances can be imagined, circumstances which are altogether different from
those of our actual experience, circumstances in which the business of betting X
has nothing whatsoever to do with the business of guessing whether or not X is
going to occur, in which, as it happens, we would bet just as we do” (Albert 2010,
p. 359).
Apart from a different criterion for establishing appearances and attributing empir-
ical adequacy to them (which obviously denies the existence of any sort of branch-
ing process), the argument is correct, I think: decision-theoretic strategy, and also
24 Albert does not know, however, that PWM is capable of empirical adequacy: “And that
experience is of certain particular sorts of experiments having certain particular sorts of outcomes
with certain particular sorts of frequencies – and not with others. And the fission hypothesis
(since it is committed to the claim that all such experiments have all possible outcomes with all
possible frequencies) is structurally incapable of explaining anything like that.” (Albert 2010, p.
359).
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Greaves-Myrvold confirmation theory, merely use the same non-Everettian ratio-
nal constraints for actions applied in an Everettian context, claiming a universal
application of it, and taking this rationality as a prior criterion for judging the
validity of the Born rule.
In doing this, PWM is no longer self-compelling, and needs an extra postulate
which might appear to be something like:
When deciding to bet between two possible outcomes, the rationality of
agents (who believe in PWM) will impose acting maximizing expected
utilities following the coefficients indicated by the Born rule
which is equal to saying that the preferences (even rational, but always preferences)
of agents are in line with the Born rule. This is a partial explanation of the
Born rule in PWM, because it is equal to saying that it is correct because it has
normative valence for rational agents. The contrary should be done: because of
the correctness of the Born rule, an agent should certainly make his decisions
following it. Rationality of agents could certainly be based upon the discovery of
the correctness of PWM, but an element of explanation of the Born rule in PWM
is missing.
Furthermore, rationality in a branching context might appear to imply “something
new for agents to have preferences about” (Price 2010, p. 378).
Again, something quite new seems to be required, to justify an operationalist use
of probabilities.
3.6 Ignorance and chance
In Deutsch-Wallace’s account of Everettian probability something in the real, phys-
ical world provides a guide for rational decision regarding maximizing expected
utilities.
There still remains a problem, however: fission programme contributors focus on
the translation of classical rational constraints in an Everettian picture, without
worrying about the kind of underlying probabilities (that they take, it is not so
important: they are replaced by the Born rule, so their normative power is ensured
while avoiding the embarrassment of explaining their meaning).
This means that PWM refers solely to the link with statistics and rationality alone
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(“if it is to mean anything” as Saunders remarks (Saunders 2010b, p. 183)).
But, even if the Deutsch-Wallace approach solves the practical problem, i.e., the
“normative problem of how agents who believe they live in a branching universe
ought to achieve their ends (without any prior assumption about probability)”
(Saunders 2010b, p. 184), the solution remains limited to agents who assume
PWM to be a true universal theory; but it has “no direct role in confirming or
disconfirming EQM as one of a number of rival physical theories by agents un-
committed to this truth” (Saunders 2010b, p. 184), and this leaves the evidential
problem unsolved.
With their more general Bayesian confirmation theory, Greaves and Myrvold give
a more general account of representation theory, applicable both to Everettian
and non-Everettian (or better still, to quantum and non quantum) contexts; but
again they do make reference to a notion of probability which requires further
explanation.
The route for chance and ignorance in Everett has been traced mostly by Vaidman
(1998) and Saunders (2005, 2008, 2010b), among all.
One can think of the possibility of uncertainty in an Everettian universe: if chance
has to be thought of as a physical magnitude, it should, at least indirectly, be
measurable, like anything else.
What Vaidman and Saunders try to do is add a definition of what chances really
are or are meant to be in an Everettian picture: in a one-world theory it is easy
to demonstrate that they link to uncertainty. In an Everettian, deterministic QM
in which all outcomes exist and, once accepted, are known to exist, the link is not
clear.
At this point it seems that these authors are denying what Deutsch-Wallace and
also the more general Myrvold-Greaves Representation Theorems aim to do: the
reduction of probability to a mere quantitative measure, deprived of any stochastic
significance. In the end, isn’t it a privilege to abandon an indeterministic account
of QM to demonstrate how a deterministic, straightforward causal theory, such as
PWM might succeed in explaining all physical facts without the embarrassment
of having to do with uncertainty?
But the reasons for deriving a notion of uncertainty from chance in Everett are
subtle.
Saunders’ “cautious functionalism” aims to demonstrate that with a reduction of
probabilities as emergent from the branching structure, the evidential problem is
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solved, and the derivation of the Born rule via Wallace’s Representation Theo-
rem succeeds in giving to PWM the same quantitative results that probabilities
do in classical contexts. Furthermore, the task of identifying objective chances
in Everett is solved at least as in the classical case with Myrvold and Greaves’
analysis:
As an objection to the Everett interpretation, the problem only arises if it
is granted that branches and branch amplitudes cannot be identified with
chance and probabilities (which we take to mean are not in fact quantities
that satisfy (i), (ii), (iii))25, precisely the point here in contention. Show
that they can, and the evidential problem simply dissolves. Or rather, since
it can be read as a problem for every chance theory, it will have the same
status in the Everett interpretation as it has in any other physical theory
of chance, to all of which Greaves and Myrvold analysis applies. (Saunders
2010b, p. 185).
The link to uncertainty relates to ignorance of rational agents even in Everettian
QM: Saunders argues that an Everettian agent has the same ignorance about
the future as a non Everettian, if we think of it as an “in-branch” problem. The
presupposition in which only one outcome happens (of two mutually incompatible,
observable outcomes) is applicable also to Everettian in-branched events, since
an Everettian observer can never witness two outcomes simultaneously. So, if
chances are identified with the functions of branch amplitudes, the former will
always be associated with incompatible observable outcomes. Ignorance is used
here in Vaidman’s sense (Vaidman 1998): an agent is ignorant one moment after
the measurement has taken place (before looking at measuring apparatus).
It in this sense that Saunders’ ‘relativity’ of ignorance should be read. Once
identified chances with functions of branch amplitudes it is shown that:
1. Chances will be associated with incompatible observable outcomes, only one
of which can happen at one time;
25 With (i), (ii) and (iii) Saunders refers to three known statements about probabilities in
general: (i) the link between chance and statistics (“chance is measured by statistics, and per-
haps, among observable quantities, only statistics, but with high chance”); (ii) the link between
chance and subjective degrees of belief, or credences (the Principal principle); (iii) the link
between chance and uncertainty (see Saunders 2010b, p. 181).
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2. They may not be measured in a way that is not itself chancey, and single
cases cannot be measured at all, they can only be measured by running a
chance (branching) process repeatedly26;
3. None of these facts can be explained by any conventional physical theory of
probability (rather, they are presupposed).
Alice is an Everettian observer who is going to perform a measurement, she is
convinced that PWM is true. She will know that after measurement, each of her
‘copies’ will have a single, different result in each branch, but she does not know
which particular result she will obtain until she looks at the measuring device
(Vaidman closes Alice’s eyes, in order to make the example more vivid). This
state of ignorance refers to in-branch information, while looking at the global
state, she is able to say quantitatively what results she is likely to obtain.
In other words, ignorance refers to the actual post-measurement situation of the
actual branch in which a measurement has just been performed: the indexical,
self-locating knowledge in this specific sense is missing, and relates to the impos-
sibility of saying who and where Alice is to be collocated between the possibilities
of the global wave function. In this sense, branching events are “algorithmically
uncertain too – they are indeterministic” (Saunders 2010b, p. 193)
This kind of momentary ignorance translates into uncertainty depending on the
reading one decides to give to PWM: using consistent histories formalism, as Saun-
ders does, this momentary lack of certainty becomes the classical uncertainty re-
lated to probability.
If a ‘person’ (or ‘thing’) is taken to be a branch-part or ordered pair (〈β, |α〉) where
α ∈ β, then she/it is a sequence of configurations α obtained by fine-graining of
β27.
In this respect Alice is genuinely uncertain before the branching process, and gains
knowledge, specifically self-locating knowledge, but in this case it is knowledge
about her consistent history. Vaidman’s ignorance is then applied to the whole
branching process, whose dynamics are defined over time and not instantaneously
(as Saunders remarks, “the idea of a decoherence basis, defined at an instant of
26 It refers to the no-go fact by which “there is a no probability meter that can measure chance
on repeated trials with chance equal to one” (Saunders 2010b, p. 185).
27Consistent histories formalism gives a different representation for subjects, and objects:
following the Heisenberg-picture vector signifies treating Alice “strictly as a momentary thing”
(|βj〉 = Pβj (tj) |Ω〉, where Ω is the universal state); in the consistent histories formalism Alice is
represented by an ordered triple (βj , β, |α〉)which means treating Alice as a fine-grained sequence
of configurations over trajectories of β.
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time independent of what comes before and what comes after, is a fiction” (Saun-
ders 2010b, p. 192)).
In this sense, Vaidman’s ignorance concept is extended over time, not limited to
a specific instant: ignorance a´ la Vaidman is ignorance that each Alice was not
already limited to an extraordinary and momentary blindness.
Even if Everett advocated a sort of subjective ignorance in preferring a subjective
(epistemic) definition of probability as we saw previously, this account of ignorance
surely depends on the metaphysics of personal identity one decides to adopt, and
of course this was not an Everettian concern, to the extent that continuity was
easily explained with correlation and relativity of states (in an ‘Everettian-style
way’, avoiding unnecessary speculative problems, in line with his strong empiri-
cism).
But it has the virtue of stressing the uncertainty concept in a context in which
it apparently seems that no space for ignorance, apart from post-measurement
occasions, is left. So the measure of branch amplitudes arising in the representa-
tion theorems express genuine credences, deriving from genuine ignorance about
histories
Is the probability problem solved? Something puzzling and unconvincing seems
to emerge from this approach.
Papineau (2010) argues that orthodox ignorance-based thinking about probability
is incoherent in an Everettian context and it is a “disservice”: it could be the
case, if it takes a strong metaphysical installation, and it is the case, if we consider
that ignorance a´ la Saunders pays lip service to a strong metaphysics of identity.
And furthermore, it opens the road to a very difficult issue, that of overlapping
versus divergent worlds28. Underlying these approaches lies the biggest danger of
becoming related to the many minds theory. In fact, they appear to be irreducibly
subjectivist approaches: if “one fleshes their ideas out into a fully coherent and
complete interpretation, one would necessarily arrive either at the many-minds
interpretation or something even worse”29.
These new indexical uncertainties are strongly related to an undisputed priority
attributed to the subject: “completely new centers of subjectivity, from the stand-
points of which completely new and previously unformulable indexical questions
can come up” (Albert 2010, p. 368).This kind of ignorance is not ‘genuine’ uncer-
tainty. As Albert notes, it refers to the measurement setting, and “has nothing
28 See Saunders (2010b) for more details.
29 See Kent (2010, p. 311).
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whatever to do with objective metaphysical features of the world, and they are
not the sorts of uncertainties that can only arise by means of forgetting” (Albert
2010, p. 368).
The other problem relates to statistics: it is not obvious why we observe only the
more probable outcomes. What about the less recurrent (atypical), again?
It seems that subjectivity, or rationality, deserves a more general explanation.
I feel that the point is that all these approaches reduce decisions of rational,
in-world agents (regardless of the branch they inhabit) to a context in which what
should count as real is the global state.
In one way or another, the problem with Everett’s original proposal is not centered.
Even regarding the probability problem Everett in fact gave a more pragmatist ac-
count focused on the utility of squared amplitude once affirmed that what counts
as real is the global state. It is the global state which gives reason to the correla-
tion between states, and it is also the Born rule which gives the counting measure.
There is no need to find anything like a privileged observer, and even if those
approaches aim to explain the Born rule globally, they all take for granted an as-
sumption which is at the very basis of Everett’s own thinking, and that, if stressed,
could also give the reason for believing in the Born rule as the correct counting
measure replacing probabilities: the Born rule expresses degrees of typicality, sim-
ilar to classical statistical mechanics.
Once this assumption is established, then decision theoretic strategies could be
seen as a normative strategy, in a subjective way. What has to be said firstly
is that prior to decision theoretic accounts there is the more general concept of
typicality: following the coefficients of the square amplitude, the overwhelming
majority of branches are typical.
Chapter 4
Typicality: all branches are equal,
but some branches are more
typical than others
We can see how the most recent developments of Everett’s notion of probability
try to justify the usage of Born rule giving a pragmatist explanation, but turning
it into a subjective approach.
Even if they all have the merit of explaining why, from a subjective point of view,
it is acceptable to use the statistical assertions of Process 1 for “operationalist pur-
poses”, they do not succeed in explaining why the world is rather understandable
as a deterministic, linear, isolated system following the superposition principle
(Process 2) globally, because they all start from the assumption that the world is
definitely explainable with a superposition of all possible states (they take it for
granted, assuming that an Everettian agent already believes PWM is true).
A bridging element between the pragmatic, subjectivist dimension of decision-
theoretic approach and the global state is missing, I argue: in fact, decision-
theoretic links to probabilities should be followed ‘later’, intending that they
should arrive at a later time, only when explanation of what the Born rule es-
sentially stands for, if not probabilities, has become clear.
This bridging element, following Everett’s original purpose, is typicality.
Typicality turns out to have the same mathematical advantages of probability
measure, without the same epistemic valence. Of course justification is required
in order to use it. If typicality is not a measure of probability, the kind of measure
we have must be explained (or, what typical is).
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4.1 Measure versus probability: the missing piece
In the previous chapter we saw Everett’s purpose in using probability theory as
a mathematical tool. Mathematically, the square amplitude covaries with our
expectations.
It is now necessary to understand whether the mathematical equivalence translates
into something different, before using the Born rule pragmatically, for subjectively
orienteering our predictions.
With the search for a measure which mathematically equals probability, without
in any case implying it in an epistemic sense, Everett introduces the notion of
typicality. The measure equals the probabilistic assertions of Process 1 without
giving it the same valence of objective probability:
In order to establish quantitative results, we must put some sort of measure
(weighting) on the elements of a final superposition. This is necessary to
be able to make assertions which will hold for almost all of the observers
described by elements of a superposition. In order to make quantitative
statements about the relative frequencies of the different possible results of
observation which are recorded in the memory of a typical observer we must
have a method of selecting a typical observer. (Everett 1973a, p. 123).
This is precisely the sense in which Everett distinguishes between measure and
probability : with the first term he refers to branches counting, while with the
second term he refers to objective probabilities. The concept of measure itself
excludes a probabilistic usage of the squared amplitude, in objective terms.
It will be shown that the parameter which covaries with the square amplitude is
the expression of typicality : the coefficient simply expresses a counting measure
related to the degree of typicality of each state (or branch). In other words, what
Everett introduces is a method of selecting a typical observer.
A typical element of the final superposition will perceive an apparently random
sequence of definite results after an observation: for a typical element of the final
superposition, it will appear that assertions of Process 1 are perfectly compatible
with experience, and this derives directly from the relative state formulation, i.e.
from the superposition principle.
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4.2 Typicality in PWM
Why is it the case that for each state we can associate a value?
Furthermore, the second problem related to probability is more subtle: where this
measure for branches came from - why do certain branches have a certain coeffi-
cient while others have a different number?
Everett takes the square-amplitude distribution to be used in his PWM, with no
reference to probabilistic assertions. What does this measure mean in Everettian
context?
If the total wave function is perfectly deterministic and stochastic elements are
avoided, because all states exist simultaneously in the sense described in the pre-
vious chapter, and relative states are just a derivation of the cross section of the
global state, which appropriately represents the appearance of determinate phe-
nomena to observers, it remains to be understood why it seems perfectly evident
that ‘reality’ (meaning global reality) follows the coefficients of the Born Rule.
In a very subtle form, “in order to make quantitative statements about the relative
frequencies of the different possible results of observation which are recorded in
the memory of a typical observer we must have a method of selecting a typical
observer” (Everett 1973a, p. 124).
Typicality in Everettian contest is the bridging element between perceived reality
and what the theory says about the entire universe. But it relates to the global
state rather than being a subjective feature: in other words, the difference be-
tween decision-theoretic-like links and Everettian typicality is that it expresses a
real characteristic of the world, from the global perspective, rather than from the
subject’s point of view.
Almost all branches exhibit the same statistical predictions of standard QM, and
they are typical branches, but some branches will have different predictions, and
they will be atypical branches.
Through the counting measure, or better the weight, of branches, which mathe-
matically equals the square amplitude we can quantify typical elements of the final
superposition exhibiting standard statistical distributions.
So the square amplitude expresses the degree of typicality, following which the
agent will model his degree of belief.
The problem of identity over branches, which has been deduced as a consequence
of correlation between states, is explained using a measure of typicality, which also
grants the possibility of finding one’s memory configuration in the life tree, in the
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same way as in classical statistical mechanics a trajectory over the phase space is
considered typical.
Typicality allows the deduction of statistical assertions from within the theory
itself: the theory should be capable of explaining why statistical assertions appear
to be valid to almost all of the observers described by elements of a superposition.
Furthermore, “maverick” elements, or trajectories, are described as being simply
atypical, and this is a good explanation for unusual statistics (which have always
worried non-Everettians).
Our deductions must hold for almost all observers described by elements of the
superposition; this means that the memory sequence of a typical observer should
be coherently represented by a quantitative measure:
In the language of subjective experience, the observer which is described by
a typical element, ψij...k, of the superposition has perceived an apparently
random sequence of definite results for the observation. It is furthermore
true, since in each element the system has been left in an eigenstate of the
measurement, that if at this stage a redetermination of an earlier system
observation (Sl) takes place, every element of the resulting final superpo-
sition will describe the observer with a memory configuration of the form
[. . . ,α1i , . . . α
l
j ,. . . α
r
k, α
l
j ] in which the earlier memory coincides with the
later-i.e., the memory states are correlated. (Everett 1973a, p. 70)
Everett says that, speaking in terms of subjective experience, the observer that
is described by a typical element of the superposition has perceived a supposedly
random sequence of definite results for the observation (while they are all actually
real in the global state).
Such a typical element will perceive that something like a collapse has occurred
after measurement:
It will thus appear to the observer which is described by a typical element of
the superposition that each initial observation on a system caused the sys-
tem to “jump” into an eigenstate in a random fashion and thereafter remain
there for least, the probabilistic assertions of Process 1 appear to be valid
to the observer described by a typical element of the final superposition.
(Everett 1973a, p. 123)
This amounts to saying that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the relative
frequencies one obtains will be, on average, coherent with statistical mechanics.
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Everett was very focused on this concept: in the long thesis, in the short version
and during the Xavier conference1 he tried to defend his solution regarding the
probability problem by assuming that typical states are simply more “frequent”
than atypical ones.
But in order to explain why ‘typical observers are typical (in a mathematical
sense)’ it is again necessary to have a general scheme for assigning a measure of
typicality to relative states, without using ad hoc explanations. Everett demon-
strates that the norm squared measure is the more natural measure for giving
typicality a quantitative meaning.
In fact, in order to give strength to typicality measure, it is necessary that a cri-
terion of consistency be satisfied: after having affirmed that not only “a typical
branch of results will be precisely what is predicted by ordinary QM” but further-
more that “as the number of observations goes to infinity, almost all branches will
contain frequencies of results in accord with ordinary QM”, Everett explains that
“to be able to make a statement like this requires that there be some sort of a
measure on the superposition of states. What I need, therefore, is a measure that
I can put on a sum of orthogonal states” (Everett 1962, p. 275).
The criteria of consistency of such a sum is sufficient to justify the usage of the
square amplitude:
There is one consistency criteria which would be required for such a thing.
Since my states are constantly branching, I must insist that the measure
on a state originally is equal to the sum of the measures on the separate
branches after a branching process. Now this consistency criterion can be
shown to lead directly to the squared amplitude of the coefficient, as the
unique measure which satisfies this. (Everett 1962, p. 275).
The only measure turns out to be the square amplitude, since the measure as-
signed to a trajectory at one time shall equal the sum of measures of its separate
branches at a later time: in order to be consistent, typicality should satisfy ad-
ditivity requirement. Analogously to the classical case, in which conservation of
probability has to be held, in PWM it is necessary to grant that the sum of measure
is coherent. The unique measure which guarantees the additivity requirement is
the square amplitude, as in classical statistical mechanics the only measure which
guarantees conservation of probability is the Lebesgue measure.
The deduction of a measure assigned to the superposition of orthogonal states
1 See Everett (1962).
Chapter 4. Typicality 116
requires that a positive function M of the complex coefficients of the elements
should be declined in M (ai) for the element φi. From a superposition
∑n
i=1 aiφi
of orthogonal states, we take a subset αφ′ =
∑n
i=1 aiφi and we regard it as a single
element αφ
′
; the additivity requirement imposes that the measure assigned to φ
′
shall be the sum of the measures assigned to the φi (from 1 to n), so that:
M (α) =
∑
i
M(ai).
This is precisely the additivity requirement which we imposed and which leads
uniquely to a choice of square measure amplitude.
This measure then assigns to the i, j, . . . , kth elements of the superposition:
φS1i , φ
S2
j . . . φ
Sr
k , ψ
Sr+1 . . . ψSnψ0
i,j,...,k[...,α1i ,α2j ...αrk]
the measure
Mi, j, ...,k = (aiaj . . . ak)
∗ (aiaj . . . ak) .
This is a product measure (Ml = a
∗
l al), so that the measure of a particular memory
sequence is the product of the measures for individual components of the memory
sequences.
The analogy between this measure and the probability theory of random sequence
is now evident.
This means that probability theory is equivalent to Everett’s measure theory math-
ematically (is has to be translated into measure-theoretic language). The measure
over the branching trajectory should equal the sum of measures of the single
branches at different times. This is precisely what is obtained by using the squared
amplitude measure:
If we were to regard theMi, j, ...,k as probability for the sequence [. . . , α
1
i , α
2
j , . . . , α
r
k
]
then the sequences are equivalent to the random sequences which are gen-
erated by ascribing to each term the independent probabilities Ml = a
∗
l al.
Now the probability theory is equivalent to measure theory mathematically,
so that we can make use of it, while keeping in mind that all results should
be translated back to measure theoretic language. (Everett 1973a, p. 126).
For longer and longer sequences of observations each memory sequence will produce
the appearance of a randomly generated sequence, except for a set of a total
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measures which tends to zero as the number of observations becomes unlimited:
Hence all averages of functions over any memory sequence, including the
special case of frequencies, can be computed from probabilities a∗i ai, except
for a set of memory sequences of measure zero.
We have therefore shown that the statistical assertions of Process 1 will
appear to be valid to almost all observers described by separate elements of
the superposition, in the limit as the number of observations goes to infinity.
(Everett 1973a, p. 127).2
The same measure is applied to arbitrary sequences of observations and to situa-
tions in which different observations are performed upon the same system.
Independent probabilities of Process 1 for each initial observation, and transition
probabilities for succeeding observations upon the same system are then used for
calculating the averages of any function over a memory sequence3.
The scheme is the same in situations in which more than one observers are per-
forming a measurement4.
In order to respect the consistency criteria, typicality is then deduced from the
theory as a simple measure for branch weighting.
Typicality is then prior to the square-amplitude, which is used to establish a cri-
terion of consistency to branch weight measure.
With this natural and unique measure the value assigned to a particular memory
sequence is simply the product of the measures for individual components of that
memory sequence.
In this sense probability theory is equivalent to this measure theory from a math-
ematical point of view, and it is for this reason that we can make use of it for
operationalist purposes (also for updating our expectations).
Summarizing, for almost all the elements of the superposition, it will appear that
statistical assertions of Process 1 are correct, except for a set of elements with
memory sequence zero; the frequency of results will be exactly the same of QM:
almost all the branches will contain frequencies of results in accord with ordinary
2 See Barrett (1999, “Limiting properties of the bare theory”) for more details.
3 Everett specifies how “the result is equally true for arbitrary sequences of observations”,
that is, observations of different quantities upon the same system will lead to the same measure
because of application of Rule 1 and Rule 2 above mentioned (see Everett 1955d for further
details).
4 See Everett1973a, Section 3, p. 78 for the description of observations with several observers,
when communication between them is allowed (with communication, i.e. transfer of impulses
from the magnetic tape memory of one mechanical observer to that of another, observers become
correlated).
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quantum predictions.
Typicality is the recipe to assume that probability is not an objective feature of
QM, but rather a subjective characteristic (in terms of decision-theoretic axioms, if
you will) which depends only upon a relative state; it is also a natural justification
for the quantitative valence of PWM.
4.3 The analogy with the classical case
The main argument for taking typicality as a justification of the Born rule is that
it reflects classical statistical mechanics.
Everett indicates typicality as an analogous to the classical statistical mechanics,
where the trajectory of systems in the phase space is measured on the phase space
itself.
As in thermodynamics, even in PWM typicality is a measure of trajectories (in the
classical case, over the phase space, in the quantum case as described by Everett,
over the “life tree”) which refers to the overwhelming majority of the system taken
into consideration.
Typicality in classical statistical dynamics refers to Lebesgue measure for phase
space, which is the natural measure of probabilities (which are to be intended as
epistemic probabilities):
The situation here is fully analogous to that of the classical statistical me-
chanics, where one puts a measure on trajectories on systems in the phase
space by placing a measure on the phase space itself, and then making as-
sertions which hold for “almost all” trajectories (such as ergodicity, quasi-
ergodicity, etc.). This notion of “almost all” depends here also upon the
choice of measure, which is in this case taken to be the Lebesgue measure
on the phase space. (Everett 1973a, p. 72).
That is, the choice of measure is free, but the reason one chooses the one for which
the overwhelming majority has nonzero amplitude in classical statistical mechan-
ics, rather than assigning nonzero measure to “maverick” (atypical) trajectories is
a strong one:
One could, of course, contradict the statements of classical statistical me-
chanics by choosing a measure for which only the exceptional trajectories
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had nonzero measure. Nevertheless, only the Lebesgue measure on the
phase space can be justified by the fact that it is the only choice for which
the conservation of probability holds (“Liouville’s theorem”), and hence the
only choice which makes possible any reasonable statistical deductions at
all. (Everett 1973a, p. 72-73).
“Conservation of probability”, is ensured in the classical case; analogously, in
PWM the additivity requirement quoted above is satisfied: the measure of one
trajectory at one time will equal the sum of separate branches at a later time; in
the same sense in classical phase space the density distribution over phase space
is ensured and also Lebesgue measure is the only measure that satisfies Liouville’s
theorem. So, even if the choice for one measure is not a constraint, it is the
only reasonable choice, because it is only with this measure that the additivity
requirement is satisfied.
The analogy with the classical case justifies usage of typicality in PWM. But where
does typicality in both contexts came from?
4.4 Typicality in classical statistical mechanics
Everett clearly refers to classical statistical mechanics to construct his analogy.
In this ambit, the concept of typicality derives from Boltzmannian statistical me-
chanics.
Statistical mechanics represents a bridge between macroscopic and microscopic
levels of the description of a system, and the measure in statistical mechanics is a
“crucial level-bridging ingredient” (Werndl 2013, p. 3).
Over the years it has been proposed to interpret this measure as a typicality
measure: typical states show a certain property if the measure of the set that
corresponds to this property is one or closer to one.
Here, a measure is defined over possible states of an isolated (bounded in a con-
tainer) system, consisting of n particles, by which an approach to equilibrium
is explained5. Obviously, the system can be regarded as an ensemble of micro-
elements, as well as a unique macroscopic system.
Microscopically, the system is represented by a point x = (p1, . . . pn, q1 . . . qn) where
qi stands for the position of the i -th particle and pi stands for the momentum.
5 See Werndl (2013, p. 4) for a description of a Boltzmannian system.
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The microstates x are elements of the 6-n dimensional state space Γ (which rep-
resents all possible position and momentum coordinates for all the particles). The
system starts in a certain condition (microstate x ) and its evolution is governed
by Hamilton’s equations; the solutions of these equations are the phase flow on
the energy hypersurface φt (because the energy is conserved, the motion of the
system is confined to a hypersurface ΓE).
So, φt(x) gives the microstate of the system.
The macroscopic stateMi (1 < i < n ) expresses parameters such as local pressure
and local temperature. For each macrostate there corresponds a macroregion ΓM
which consists of all x∈ ΓE for which the macrostate takes those parameters.
Two macrostates are important: the “equilibrium state Meq and the macrostate
at the beginning of the process Mp. The macroscopic evolution of the system with
initial microstate x is given by Mx (t) = M(φ(x))” (Werndl 2013, p. 5).
To characterize thermodynamic-like behavior6, entropy should be introduced.
The Boltzmann entropy of a macrostate Mi at time t is definable as SBt :=
SB
(
Mx(t)
)
, where x(t) is the system’s microstate at t and Mx(t) is the macrostate
corresponding to x(t) (see Frigg 2009, p. 998).
The initial state Mp (also called the past state) is, by assumption, a low-entropy
state; we expect Boltzmannian entropy of a system initially prepared in such a
state to increase, reach its maximum quickly, and then remain more or less in this
state for a long time (the dynamics will carry the system’s initial state into ΓMeq
and keep it there for a long time).
The ‘problem’ emerges when one asks why the system behaves in a thermodynamic-
like way.
The crucial point in statistical mechanics is the difficulty in examining the same
systems at two very different levels. Macroscopic irreversibility derives from mi-
croscopic reversible dynamics: there is something like a “dramatic decimation”
(Volchan 2007, p. 808) of degrees of freedom in passing from 6-N degrees of free-
dom to a macrostate involving few variables.
The reduction from a microscopic to a macroscopic level suggests that some kind
of averaging should be involved which points to the role of statistics: “ as there is
no intrinsic randomness in the system at hand the use of statistics and probability
might be better understood through typicality” (Volchan 2007, p. 808).
6 A specification is needed: “because the same measures are employed in Boltzmannian
statistical mechanics for questions regarding equilibrium and non equilibrium, the interpretation
as typicality measure is relevant in both contexts. In general, much more is known about
equilibrium SM than non-equilibrium SM. In particular, it is a central aim of non-equilibrium
SM to explain thermodynamic-like behavior, but this is extremely difficult” (Werndl 2013, p. 6).
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Standard Boltzmannian response is to introduce probabilities, arguing that a sys-
tem of this kind is overwhelmingly likely to evolve in a thermodynamic-like way:
the difficulties in analyzing initial conditions lead to the introduction of statistical
assertions.
Typicality is then introduced to eschew probabilities: the system’s behavior is
typical, and that is the only reason why thermodynamic-like behavior is over-
whelmingly observed.
As Volchan (2007, p. 803) observes “instead of indicating the presence of a ran-
dom ingredient in the system, it [typicality] is taken as a yardstick in probing the
relative size of some sets of microstates of interest (in particular, initial conditions)
in the geometrical arena of phase-space”.
The underlying concept is that probability, after Kolmogorov’s axiomatization,
has become a branch of pure mathematics: the old jargon of pre-axiomatized era
(such as “sample”, “occurrence”, “trials”, etc.) is not, strictly speaking, part of
probability theory. In particular, “there is nothing intrinsically random “about
random variables”: they are just real valued measurable functions, those one ex-
pects to find in real analysis” (Volchan 2007, p. 804)7.
Now, in statistical mechanics typicality makes its entrance to justify the usage of
“pure” mathematics, i.e. the mathematical part of probability theory, without ap-
plying to it a stochastic significance (exactly what Everett wanted for his PWM).
Formally, typicality has been defined as a relational property P of e, which e
possesses with respect to a set Σ to which it belongs (Frigg 2009, p. 1000): e is
typical if most members of Σ have P and e is one of them. Derivatively, the set
Π is typical if the overwhelming majority of its components have P.
Now, a measure of typicality could also be introduced to explain this sort of aver-
aging, that is, to indicate the relative size of sets of states.
It is important to remember that “regarding the measures of interest in Boltz-
mannian SM, note that for Hamiltonian systems the uniform measure µ defined
on Γ (the Lebesgue measure) is invariant under the dynamics; this result is known
as Liouville’s theorem (Petersen 1983, 5). µ can be restricted to a normalized
measure µE on ΓE, which is also invariant under the dynamics. ΓE is called the
microcanonical measure and is the standard measure used in Boltzmannian SM.
Hence the question is how to justify ΓE as typicality measure” (Werndl 2013, p.
7 Volchan also adds: “coin-tossing is usually taken as the epitome of a random phenomenon.
However, real coin-tossing is purely mechanical process that should in principle be modelled
using rigid-body Newtonian dynamics plus the initial conditions; and its relation to randomness
and unpredictability is a non-trivial matter”.
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5).
This means that typicality measure of an initial set of states should equal the
typicality measure of the evolved set.
4.5 A general typicality measure: PWM explained
But typicality itself stands for a good justification. As Volchan says, “many tough
questions are still to be addressed. For example, as typicality is relative to the
measure used, how does one justify a particular choice? Under what criteria?”
(Volchan 2007, p. 13).
A lot of work has been done recently on justifying application of the concept in
classical statistical mechanics. Some of these accounts are unconvincing.
Zangh`ı (2005) for example explains that reaching the equilibrium distribution is
inevitable since the overwhelming majority of microstates have this distribution.
But, as Frigg (2009) notes, “typical states do not automatically attract trajecto-
ries”.
Several attempts to justify it as a good measure for thermodynamic systems have
been made; these examples, and its usage in other versions of QM (in pilot-wave
theory) gave a new insight into using it as a counting measure also in Everettian
QM.
The search for a more general criterion for evaluating typicality measure suggests
that the same description of typicality in classical statistical mechanics could be
applied more generally to measure-theoretic dynamical systems: measure-theoretic
dynamical systems theory is indeed a mathematical tool by which the dynamic
evolution of systems could be analysed starting from their initial conditions. In
this case, typicality is “less problematic here than in statistical mechanics, in which
a stronger conceptual justification is required. Now proponents of the typicality
approach argue that typical initial states show thermodynamic-like behavior, and
hence that an explanation of thermodynamic-like behavior can be given in terms
of typicality” (Werndl 2013, p. 3).
Recently, Werndl proposed a justification of the usage of typicality as a good mea-
sure for both statistical mechanics and measure-theoretic dynamical systems, be-
cause once a justification is granted for the first set, then this is self-compelling for
dynamical systems too: statistical mechanics is a special case of measure-theoretic
dynamical systems, even if the former could not be conceptually assimilated by
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the latter.
Werndl says:
Statistical mechanical systems (ΓE; ΣΓE ; µE; φt) are (continuous-time)
measure-theoretic dynamical systems (where ΣΓE is the Lebesgue σ-
algebra of ΓE). This just means that the (ΓE; ΣΓE ; µE; φt) satisfy
the formal definition of a measure-theoretic dynamical system. It does
not imply that statistical mechanics is reducible to dynamical systems
theory in any sense (the physical postulates of SM are not part of the
mathematical framework of dynamical systems theory). (Werndl 2013,
p. 7)
I feel that Werndl’s proposal could well support Everettian systems too.
The kind of justification for typicality should satisfy requirements, i.e. uniqueness
and plausibility :
• the premises imply that there is a unique typicality measure or a set of
typicality measures which agree on which sets are typical/atypical (here any
measure of this set can be used as typicality measure);
• the premises are at least potentially more plausible than just postulating
that certain measures are a good choice of typicality measures.
What Werndl proposes is to look at the measure of measure-theoretic dynamical
systems as a typicality measure.
Her argument goes as follows. The initial probability distributions of interest
are translation-continuous (Typicality I, or “atypical means measure zero”), or
translation-close (Typicality II, or “atypical means very small measure). A typical
measure should be connected to these initial probability distributions in two ways:
1. if the set is of probability zero (typicality I) or very small probability (typi-
cality II), for all probability distributions, then the set is atypical;
2. if, on the contrary, for all probability distributions, the set is typical if it is
of probability one (typicality I), or very high probability (typicality II).
Furthermore, typicality measures should be invariant. All the typicality measures
“agree on which sets are typical” (Werndl 2013, p. 28).
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Now, my point is that in PWM this kind of justification is correct, that is, once
its validity is demonstrated, its validity in PWM is also ensured.
I argue that in the contest of PWM, typicality has the same valence: it also could
be seen as a “level-bridging” element but here between our experience and the
branching process, because even PWM is concerned with two different levels of
description.
Initially we focus on the explanation of our subjective experience, which is a fine-
graining of the global wave function, and which is the equivalent of the microscopic
description in classical statistical mechanics.
But once we examine the branching process, we can interpret it using a mathe-
matical tool, which appears to be the “unique measure”.
As in statistical mechanics, even in Everettian QM, what makes typicality a unique
measure is its invariance and its reliance on initial probability distribution.
Everett’s PWM, in the end, concerns deterministically evolving dynamical systems,
made up of branches whose evolution has to be clarified.
Understanding the ‘behavior’ of “most” initial conditions, and knowing their ini-
tial probability distributions (by preparing the system), could give us the sense in
which Werndl speaks about typicality measure: the coefficients express only the
measure of typicality of subsets (rather than the single outcomes).
The last point of contact is invariance. The additivity requirement could be seen
under the same light.
Typicality is an epistemic ‘trope’: it is an assemblage of concepts, methods and
argumentative patterns that organize well-established mathematical practices into
a specific epistemic story of equilibrium.
One final remark: “one could argue that it would be irrational to adopt a prob-
abilistic model if one were not to assume also that the actual world is typical,
but that also seems to be a (merely) pragmatic consideration. If all typicality
means is the assumption that the initial conditions are such that they lead to the
desired behavior, then it is hardly explanatory of that behavior [. . . ] It seems to
me that this line of thought, de-emphasising as it does the explanatory role of
probabilities, on the whole favors a pragmatist reading of probabilities in Everett”
(Bacciagaluppi 2013).
CONCLUSION
The aim of the present work was that of finding the original core of Everett’s
PWM.
Once established that the construction of a metaphysics of ‘Many Worlds’ was not
in Everett’s desires, the reconstruction of his own interpretation has been settled.
What emerges is an empirically featured PWM, that is, a pragmatic attempt to
formulate a universally valid QM without the introduction of further elements:
the formalism is capable of yielding its own interpretation, once it is accepted that
the world in its totality obeys the same quantum dynamical law.
Two different dimensions have been investigated, following Everett’s own descrip-
tion: from a qualitative (speculative) point of view the first task was to see up to
what extent Everett’s empiricism is maintainable.
From an empirical point of view the theory does not violate the dictates of em-
pirical adequacy, once that the boundaries of its legitimacy are defined within its
isomorphic identity to perceived reality. The so-called extra-structure derives from
the model, and is the expression of the global state, which is not accessible to our
direct experience.
Even if this kind of explanation seems contradictory prima facie, because of the
proliferation of apparently unobservable entities, it has been shown that it could
be put into correspondence with a form of empirical reasoning which justifies a
criterion of pragmatic selectivity.
Another level of investigation was needed, in order to accomplish the justification
of PWM: a more technical, quantitative dimension has been introduced.
Under this light, classical Everettian problems have been revisited, in order to
verify if PWM alone is able to bear the burden of explaining appearance of deter-
minate records and probabilities.
Correlation and entanglement are the sufficient instruments that Everett uses for
explaining the appearance of perceived experience.
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Uniqueness and continuity over branches are then deduced from within the corre-
lation model, so that quantitatively the results match the qualitative dimension.
The last problem, which is the vexed question in the tradition of Everett’s in-
terpretation, is the justification of probabilistic assertions: in other terms, why
probabilities?
Everett aimed to formulate a QM without stochastic elements8, so it was necessary
to give an explanation of why statistical assertions of Process 1 appear to be valid
to almost all typical observers.
For Everett the usage of Born rule was limited to operationalist purposes, again
on a subjective, local level. Probabilities are just mathematical tools used for pre-
dictions, but they have no longer stochastic meaning: in this sense I called them
‘Everettian pseudo-probabilities’.
But this is not a quantitative explanation yet: in order to justify probabilities a
deduction or reduction to the model is needed.
Everett shows how the square amplitude is the more natural measure for branch
counting, expressing the degree of typicality rather than real, objective probabil-
ity.
The analogous with the classical statistical mechanics has been investigated, and
it emerges that typicality in that context is becoming a bridging element between
macroscopic and microscopic explanations.
What is convincing, in my opinion, is that in PWM as Everett originally intended
it, a minimum criterion of empirical acceptability is needed: once we find our
relative state appropriately represented in the model, then we can appropriately,
and pragmatically, infer its typicality.
I think that a development on the justification of typicality deserves more atten-
tion, both in classic statistical mechanics and in PWM; also dynamical invariance
and its connection to typicality and phase space (or branching global state) should
be better analysed.
Concluding, the kind of explanation that has been proposed here can be consid-
ered weak, or an ad hoc attempt to read Everettian QM without metaphysics as
a valid scientific theory simply by limiting its metaphysical weight, and confining
it to a region of unobservability which is given by definition. It seems that a sort
of dangerous circularity affects this kind of reading: it might appear that it forces
the interpretation of PWM in order to ‘limit the damages’ of a literal reading.
Moreover, the problem of empirical evidence is not solved, in the end.
8The first title for his dissertation was “Quantum Mechanics without probabilities”.
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And the same could be said for typicality: it is a simple, safe and pragmatic con-
cept. Again, it could certainly be considered a very weak concept, or an ad hoc
tool for justifying the use of the Born rule without committing to probabilistic
assertions.
But, one can always argue, the same could be said for standard QM and its
paradoxes: the resolution of these miliar problems amounts to the philosophical
perspective one decides to adopt, and certainly realists will probably never be sat-
isfied with this genre of approach (and neither anti-realists, if non-Everettian).
The weakness of such an interpretation depends on the kind of explanation one
wants to obtain: surely, if the goal is that to reach ‘the truth’, starting from a
realist account of experience, then Everettian framework is untenable.
Nevertheless, if one starts from a minimal perspective (and it is now clear that this
was Everett’s own position), this sort of Humean approach is adequate, because it
gives a complete explanation of perceived reality while avoiding the embarrassment
of commitment to metaphysics, on the one hand, or the introduction of drastic and
postulated dichotomies, on the other hand; if we look at PWM from an empiricist
point of view, what counts is the pragmatic valence of typicality measure.
Besides I want to remark once again that the present exposition really aims to
present what appears to be (at least, to me!) the real and original Everettian
core.
A simple correlation model with an associated measure for typicality was all that
Everett would have wanted from his theory.
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